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PREFACE 
When visiting KwaZulu Natal in South Africa in 1997, a few years after the democratic 
transition, I was struck by an incredible sadness over the enormous tension and disillusion 
that met me. I do not know what I had expected. But instead of signs of South Africans 
rebuilding a common future, I found the continuos building of higher walls decorated with 
barb-wire and broken glass around white peoples houses. The gate signs read "alarm: armed 
response", and I was advised against walking alone down crowded streets in broad daylight. 
The train trip from Johannesburg was considered so dangerous that the conductor advised 
me against going, and ended up locking me up. Black students that had been cheering the 
day Mandela became President no longer saw the point of voting, because they did not think 
democracy could solve anything. Coming home, I was unable to let these impressions go, 
resulting in this thesis. 
A special thanks to Liv Tørres who has been my supervisor when writing this essay, and 
who has stretched herself much further than anybody could expect to help the project come 
true.  Thanks to Samfunnsvitenskapelig Fakultet for monetary support to do fieldwork. To 
Paul Houpt at the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town for helping me with 
local contacts, and to the CP Nel museum in Oudtshoorn for giving me access to their media 
archives. All my respondends shared of their painful experiences, and for that I thank them. 
Thanks to Kjetil Stene, Lill Ulvær and Heidi Solheim Johansen for support, discussions and 
invaluable input in my work. My family have been immensely supportive during my work, 
and a special thanks to my parents for reading through my manuscripts. But most of all, 
thank you Fred, for moving to Norway so that I could finish this work, for coming with me 
to South Africa and being the glue that has held our family together in this process. I could 
never have finished this without your support. 
Ragnhild Drange  
May 2003 
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INTRODUCTION 
After the end of the cold war the African continent saw a remarkable change in terms of 
democratisation. Between 1990 and 1996 three quarters of Sub-Sahara independent 
countries (37 out of 48) held founding elections (Bratton and Posner 1998). Hope raised that 
democracy would be able to solve the destructive social, political and ethnic problems, and 
be an instrument in the attempts to create economic development and fight the widespread 
poverty on the continent. But in many of these African countries, democracy has broken 
down or suffered from deterioration in quality (ibid). The high number of armed conflicts in 
the region1 also shows that democracy has left many of the internal conflicts unresolved, and 
that democracy is not yet institutionalised as the only legitimate conflict solving mechanism. 
Several of these countries also have histories of oppressive regimes where severe human 
rights abuses have been frequent.  
Abrahamsen (2000) argues that international agents like the World Bank, IMF and donor 
countries have pushed the African countries to adapt a particular form of democracy based 
on neo-liberal ideas. These include cutting state costs and minimising state intervention. She 
argues that the new African democracies are unable to meet the challenge of dealing with 
poverty, because state budget cuts hit the poorest sections of society hardest. This neo-
liberal, "minimalist" way of understanding democracy only focus on political and civil 
human rights, and exclude economic and social human rights from the agenda. She claims 
the poor majority in African countries wants democracy to be an instrument to improve their 
living conditions, and do not see it as a good thing in itself, independent of performance. 
This makes the new African democracies particularly vulnerable to lack of delivery of 
economic and social human rights, which is undermining the consolidation of the new 
African democracies. 
We also know that countries that have gone through armed conflicts, violence, and gross 
human rights abuses, have a great need for reconciliation. Experiences from Latin America 
shows that open wounds after large-scale use of torture and extra juridical killings by former 
                                              
1 Between 1989 and 1998 the number of armed conflicts in Africa varied between 9 and 17. There were only more armed 
conflict in Asia in the period. The high rate of armed conflicts in these regions cannot be explained by number of states or 
population density alone (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 1999) 
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regimes have been destructive for the consolidation of democracy (Skaar 1994). Yet we have 
limited knowledge about how to address former human rights abuses in democratic 
transition in ways that lead to reconciliation. Democratic theory has often highlighted the 
need to address structural, economic, cultural and institutional factors to promote democratic 
consolidation (Tørres 2000:16), and several of these factors will be critical also in repairing 
wounds from a violent past. But more direct, short term interventions have also often been 
used to address former human rights abuses and promote reconciliation. 
Zimbabwe faced both the problems of widespread poverty and a history of violent conflict 
and human rights abuses when going through a democratic transition. But Zimbabwe under 
Mugabe has not addressed former human rights abuses after the transition, and little has 
been done to change access to land for the poor majority of the population. State violations 
against political opponents in Matabeleland, and current events where so called war-veterans 
are occupying land owned by white farmers with Mugabe's blessing, shows that this has not 
contributed to respect for human rights and the rule of law. It shows that the regime has 
failed to solve the social conflict between the small white land-owning minority and the 
generally poor black majority in a way perceived as legitimate by all parties. Ignoring the 
violations has led to lack of reconciliation after the violent conflict, and limited success in 
solving the socio-economic conflicts in Zimbabwe and is now undermining the 
consolidation of democracy. 
South Africa faced the same issues of widespread poverty and a violent history when the 
country went through its democratic transition in the early 1990s. This thesis looks at how 
the previous human rights violations were handled as South Africa went through a 
negotiated, and thereby restrained, transition to democracy. The racially based system of 
apartheid had been a repressive system that violated human rights, and left a legacy of 
poverty, extreme inequality between different racial groups, and a culture of violence. The 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) was set up to deal with gross human rights 
abuses2 that had taken place during apartheid. But with research emerging on continued 
tensions in South Africa in the democratisation process through the late 90s, and several 
other countries having pursued different paths to reconciliation, questions emerge as to: 
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• How can we best address former gross human rights abuses after democratic 
transitions in ways that promotes reconciliation? 
• Are institutional means to address gross human rights abuses, such as the 
establishment of the TRC, sufficient to promote reconciliation in cases that also have 
experienced massive repression of economic and social human rights?  
These questions are parts of the larger question of how to establish sustainable democracies. 
This thesis is also relevant for the ongoing debate about the relationship between democracy 
and human rights. While close links between civil and political rights and democracy are 
widely recognised, the relationship between democracy and economic and social rights are 
disputed. Some argue that civil and political rights, in the form of democracy, will lead to 
delivery of economic and social rights. Others points out that lack of economic and social 
rights hinders the exercise of the civil and political rights, leaving at best a low quality 
democracy, or at worst democratic breakdown. As the reconciliation debate has focused on 
severe violations of civil and political rights (gross human rights violations), I hereby extend 
the debate by also looking into the relationship between violations of economic and social 
human rights (resulting in poverty) and democratic consolidation.  
1.1 The South African case and the Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission 
South Africa is generally regarded as a success story in the literature of democratic transition 
and seems to be heading towards consolidation of democracy. This apparent success is in 
spite of its violent history where gross human rights violations were widespread over a long 
time-span. The apartheid regime denied the majority black population basic human rights, 
which resulted in a society with one of the most unequal distribution of resources in the 
world, widespread poverty and a general overlap between race and class.  
By the middle of the 1980s, apartheid marked every aspect of people's lives and the country had 
also grown increasingly militarised (Tørres:2000). Reform apartheid in the 70s and early 80s 
was part and parcel of increased military control of the townships which was later turned into 
                                                                                                                                           
2 Gross human rights violations abuses is used as a term for the most severe violations of human rights. Definitions vary, 
but the term generally only includes certain violations of civil and political rights. A discussion of the term is found in 
chapter 2.  
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the counter revolutionary “total strategy” offensive of the apartheid regime. While the 
government was attempting to legitimise the system by claiming that South Africa was facing a 
"Communist threat" and a "total onslaught" from the enemy, - the "onslaught" of the opposition 
was met by a "total strategy" from the government. This included a comprehensive strategy of 
militarisation under a sophisticated National Security Management System. Tanks and security 
forces had become a permanent phenomenon in the townships. The operations of death squads 
aimed at oppositional forces and deaths in detentions etc. were no longer extraordinary. 68 
political prisoners are estimated to have died in detention from 1966 to 1988 (RRS 
1991/92:492-494 & 1992/93:27-28 quoted in Tørres 2000:110). Successive states of 
emergencies followed from 1985 to 1989, allowing for the banning, deportation and detention of 
individuals and the banning and restrictions of organisations deemed to be a threat to the state. 
98 organisations were banned between 1950 and 1988. 73 000 individuals were detained 
between 1960 and 1988 (du Toit 1995:350). About 3.5 million people were forced to leave 
their homes between 1960 and 1983 (du Toit 1996:309). Torture and assassinations of 
political opponents were widespread (TRC final report). Simultaneously, apartheid left a 
legacy of poverty and gross inequality in access to recourses, whether education, work or 
wealth. May (1998) estimates that 40% of the South African households, and almost 50% of 
the total population are living below the national poverty line. Widespread poverty persists 
in spite of the fact that South Africa, unlike most other African countries, is a middle income 
country. South Africa has one of the highest levels of inequality in the world3. 
Resistance against apartheid 
The resistance against apartheid started with non-violent means. The African National 
Congress (ANC) was established in 1912 demanding equal rights for Africans. Little was 
however achieved until the Defiance Campaign of 1952, where nation wide civil 
disobedience was followed by more repressive laws by the government. In 1955 the ANC 
and its white, coloured and Indian allies adapted the freedom charter. A group of Africanists, 
objecting to the co-operation with whites, left the ANC in 1959. Pan Africanist Congress 
(PAC) advocated a non-violent campaign. The Zulu cultural movement Inkatha developed 
                                              
3 Poverty is extremely unevenly distributed between the population groups: 61% of the black population, 38% of the 
coloureds, 5% of the Indians and only 1% of the white population live in poverty (May 1998).  
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into a mass movement under chief Buthulezi4. The Sarpeville massacre5 in 1960 led to 
ANC's and PAC's establishment of military wings (Umkhonto we Sizwe, and Poco), that 
after the banning of ANC and PAC moved into armed confrontation with the state. Key 
people in the resistance movement, including Nelson Mandela, were arrested. In the late 60s 
and early 70s, the Black Consciousness Movement emerged under Steve Biko. He was killed 
in detention, and it looked like resistance had broken down. But in 1976, the student led 
Soweto uprising spilled over to fighting and unrest, spreading to other townships. Strikes, 
stay-aways and consumer boycotts swept the country in the 80s. Uprisings started in the 
townships to make them ungovernable, and were successful in several areas. Despite several 
states of emergencies, tens of thousands of arrests and detentions, and thousands of deaths in 
political unrest, black resistance was stronger than ever (Tørres 2000:110-112). In the 
beginning of the 90s, the main political actors against apartheid in South Africa were the 
ANC, the communist party (SACP), community organisations united in SANCO and the 
trade union federation COSATU, all supporting the Freedom Charter. The africanists 
included PAC and the AZAPO. Inkatha mainly had support in the Zuludominated region of 
Natal6 (Tørres 2000:113). The Apartheid regime was led by the Afrikaner dominated 
National Party.  
After decades of violent conflict without any of the parties winning on the ground, the 
transition to democracy was made possible by a negotiated settlement of the conflict. But the 
negotiations between the apartheid government and the main opposition groups threatened to 
break down several times over the question of how to handle former human rights violations. 
The government refused to give up their power unless there was amnesty for gross violations 
of human rights, which ruled out trial as an option. Without amnesty, there would have been 
no democracy at that point of time. The result was a compromise: The establishment of the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)(Christie2000:65). The TRC's goals were to 
establish a broad picture of former gross human rights violations that the former government 
                                              
4 While the PAC and ANC supported socialist or social democratic economic strategies, Inkatha supported an economic 
system based on market economy. Inkatha, with a formal strategy of non-violent disobedience and negotiations with the 
government, did not boycott the homeland structure. Buthulezi was head of the local government in the Zulu homeland. 
5 Police killed unarmed Africans during a demonstration against the pass laws in Sharpeville.  
6 Even though Inkatha started as a Zulu cultural movement, it later developed into a political party and took the name 
Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP).  
 9 
and liberation movements were behind, give recommendations for reparations for victims 
and to administrate amnesty (TRC final report vol.1ch.4).  
The handling of amnesty puts the TRC in a different position from other truth commissions. 
Former truth commissions was often set up together with a blank amnesty for human rights 
violators. In South Africa the amnesty was limited to politically motivated violations of the 
most severe kind, and made contingent on individual confession and disclosure of the 
violations (Gloppen2002:22). This way the abusers got incentives to tell the truth to avoid 
prosecution. The victims and (or) their families should get to know the details of what 
happened, why, and who was responsible.  
One idea behind this was that victims needed the true stories and acknowledgement for the 
fact that violations had taken place. Knowledge should lay the ground for reconciliation. The 
price the victims had to pay for this was that their offenders would walk free from 
prosecution, but not from moral condemnation. By naming the people and institutions 
involved in gross human rights abuses, the TRC also sought to establish some moral 
accountability. Because the victims and their families lost their ability to sue the perpetrators 
in the process, the commission made recommendations to the state about damage reparations 
towards victims. This can be seen as an attempt to create restorative justice, as opposed to 
traditional retributive justice involving prosecutions and penalty for the perpetrator. 
South Africa thus gave up delivering criminal justice in order to uncover and establish the 
truth about gross human rights abuses and promote reconciliation. No one should ever again 
be able to say that they did not know what was going on. The hope was that the TRC would 
promote reconciliation at the national political level, within communities that were split due 
to the old conflict, between the races and different ethnic groups, between individuals, and 
help victims and perpetrators to reconcile with their own personal past (TRC final report 
vol.1ch5).  
1.2 Reconciliation 
Political reconciliation implies a climate in which conflicting parties can resolve their 
differences through non-violent means, a political climate where former enemies may 
continue to disagree, but nevertheless interact and communicate on the basis of a shared 
normative framework and mutual recognition (Gloppen 1:2002) Gloppen argues that 
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reconciliation is a matter of degree and an ongoing process rather than and end goal 
(2002:V). There are several factors suggested for such processes of reconciliation to be 
successful, but the debate is mainly focusing on the effect of handling former gross human 
rights abuses in different ways, usually focusing on trials, truth commissions and oblivion.  
While trials have a strong focus on justice by seeking to hold the perpetrators legally 
responsible for former abuses, it is heavily debated under which circumstances trials have a 
positive effect on reconciliation. It is also common to acknowledge that in some cases trials 
are not possible because it can be against the interest of powerful people during the 
transition process, who can be in a position to jeopardise the whole democratic transition if 
there are no guarantees for amnesty. In such cases, truth commissions are often established 
to uncover that violations have taken place, establish moral accountability, and in some 
cases give reparations to victims in an attempt to deliver restorative justice. While some 
argue that oblivion (or "national amnesia") is more likely to promote reconciliation than 
focusing on the past by trials or truth commissions, others argue that this outcome is more 
due to power considerations and the interests of key role-players than moral considerations 
or hope for reconciliation.  
Democracy as an instrument for conflict management, poverty reduction and 
reconciliation? 
Adding to such short term interventions as trials or truth commissions, we can also expect 
that the new regimes ability to solve the main conflicts in society, in ways perceived as 
legitimate by all major parties, will in the long run affect reconciliation.  
There is as mentioned a general overlap between race and class due to the legacy of 
apartheid in South Africa, resulting in one of the most unequal distributions of wealth and 
resources in the world. Overlapping lines of division are generally seen as mutually 
reinforcing, and the conflicts in South Africa are often seen as one of conflict of interest 
between the economically (and earlier politically) dominant whites, and the majority of 
black people, with a generally much lower standard of living. Voting patterns can to a large 
extent be explained by race (Reynolds:1999). Voting based on ethnic identity as opposed to 
rational personal interest has by many been seen as the bane of democracy in Africa, because 
elections in such cases become little more than ethnic census, where the largest group will 
dictate the minority (ibid). It has been heavily debated whether this should be solved by 
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institutional arrangements including minority protection mechanisms (like veto power for 
the minority groups or regional self-determination) or seeking to change political identity 
from race/ ethnic group (that are "given" identities), to class (that can be changed by social 
mobility and reduction of inequality). While some have highlighted the need for a gradual 
nation building process (strengthening the overriding identity as South Africans), others 
have argued that their ethnic group has a right to maximum self-determination. 
There is already a lot of knowledge about how different models of democracy fit different 
kinds of conflict structures. Two ideal types are the majoritarian Westminster model and the 
Consociational model. The Westminster model is based on concentration of power with the 
majority, and is suitable in societies where the conflict structure is one-dimensional and no 
group forms a permanent minority. The Consociational model is argued to be better suited in 
countries with frozen lines of division (such as ethnicity), and includes power sharing and 
minority protection mechanisms.7 South Africa has as mentioned overlapping and mutually 
reinforcing lines of division (race and class). A majority model would secure all power to the 
blacks, and be perceived as illegitimate among the whites. A Consociational model would 
include a minority veto for the whites, which could make economic and social reform 
impossible and would be perceived as illegitimate by the majority of blacks.8 Other tools for 
protection of minority rights and instruments to overcome stark cleavages have also been 
debated in South Africa, such as federal versus centralised powers. While the ANC argued 
for a strategy of nation building and centralisation of power, some white groups argued for 
an Afrikaner homeland with high degree of self-determination. The Zulu nationalist Inkatha 
Freedom Party wanted as high degree of self-determination as possible in their stronghold, 
the KwaZulu Natal province. 
After several compromises, the negotiated outcome was a constitution lending from both 
democracy models. As in the Consociational model elections were based on proportional 
representation and as a transitional arrangement, all major parties got access to a 
Government of National Unity. Even though IFP and NP did not get through any form of 
minority veto, changes in the constitution require a qualified majority. Some power was 
given to regional governments securing the IFP control over KwaZulu-Natal. The 
                                              
7 For a thorough discussion on the general debate and the debate within South Africa, see Gloppen 1997 and Deegan 1999. 
8 For a thorough discussion, see Gloppen 1997 
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constitution established a bill of rights, with a strong focus on individual economic and 
social rights, at the same time as establishing the right to private property (Gloppen 1997). 
This is effectively blocking radical redistribution of wealth as a policy option.  
After the democratic transition, the ANC dominated government has increasingly been 
criticised from their own ranks for following a neo-liberal policy focusing on macro 
economic growth, without securing that this growth leads to improved living conditions for 
the majority of poor South Africans. The growth has not led to increase of jobs (Deegan 
1999:140), and estimates of unemployment vary between 32 and 45% (Tørres:2001). Tørres 
also finds indications that inequality within and between the racial groups have increased 
after the democratic transition (Tørres:2001). Despite adapting one of the worlds most 
progressive constitutions when it comes to economic and social rights, and a declared policy 
of redistribution of wealth and fight against poverty, the government has had limited success 
in delivering. As several writers point out the instrumental view of democracy in African 
countries, many worry that the South African democratic consolidation is threatened as 
people are becoming disillusioned by lack of infrastructure and welfare delivery. Against 
this background, with the regime's so far limited success of solving the main conflicts in 
South Africa, I question whether short term institutional interventions as the TRC is enough 
to deliver reconciliation. 
The TRC and reconciliation 
TRC's work and its ability to promote reconciliation has been heavily debated both within 
South Africa and internationally, in academic literature and political circles. Stene 
(2002:128) suggests that the TRC has had limited success in promoting national 
reconciliation because this would require deep changes in society that were beyond the 
limited mandate of the commission. Gunnar Theissen's (1998) research on the TRC suggests 
that white people are still in a state of denial about their role in the gross violations of human 
rights that took place during the apartheid regime, and are unconvinced that the violations 
were wrong. This suggests that the TRC has had difficulties in communicating its findings to 
the main group supporting and benefiting from the apartheid system. This raises the question 
of what happened within the group benefiting from the violations when the truth commission 
operated, and how to reach this group with reconciliatory attempts. 
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The debate on how to promote reconciliation in South Africa has been focusing on the TRC 
and gross human rights violations. But these only affected a small proportion of the South 
African population compared to the majority that suffered from violations of economic and 
social human rights abuses, that still results in widespread poverty. This raises the question 
whether only gross human rights violations count when it comes to promoting reconciliation, 
or if addressing former violations of economic and social rights also matter.  
Most of the analysis of TRC's work focuses on the national level. Considerable research and 
documentation have been conducted by both academics and key players who were part of 
negotiating the establishment of the TRC, focussing on the TRC as a reconciliatory 
compromise that made the transition possible. Several commissioners working within the 
TRC have also written about their experiences9. There is also much literature based on 
surveys and statistical analysis of people's attitudes towards the work of the TRC at the 
individual level. But these analyses are usually either focusing at an elite political level or at 
an individual mass level. But as the TRC seems to have had limited success at promoting 
reconciliation, this reopens the question of what happened at the grass root level when the 
TRC operated. It creates a need for new, open-ended qualitative material on how people 
reacted to  TRC's work, why it seems to have had a limited effect, and what people see as 
obstacles for reconciliation. 
Van der Merwe (1999) argues that the TRC was designed to promote reconciliation at the 
national political level but was less successful at creating community reconciliation. He 
argues that the TRC followed a "top-down" approach to reconciliation, instead of listening 
and taking into account local needs and input (bottom up approach). He suggests that top-
down approaches assumes that national reconciliation will trickle down to community 
reconciliation, while bottom up approaches assumes that community reconciliation will 
aggregate to national reconciliation. I will investigate closer whether the causes of the TRC's 
limited success at promoting reconciliation can be found at the community level, by looking 
into community level reactions to  TRC's work, and investigate what are perceived as 
obstacles for reconciliation at this level of analysis.  
                                              
9 This includes the autobiographies by ANC leader and first democratically elected president Nelson Mandela (1995), and 
South Africa's president during the transition, Fredrik W. De Klerk (1998). Within the TRC, the leader Desmond Tutu 
(2000), Deputy leader Alex Borain (2000), and Commissioner in Western Cape, Wendy Orr (2000) wrote books about their 
experiences. 
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1.3 Focus of the thesis and questions to be addressed 
This thesis will give focus to the tools used to address human rights abuses in South Africa 
with specific focus on the TRC. The overall focus of this thesis is on the strength and 
weaknesses of the institutional paths to reconciliation in South Africa. While existing 
research and surveys may indicate a limited effect of the TRC's work on reconciliation at the 
national level in South Africa, several studies indicate that effects of institutional tools to 
reconciliation will depend on local community characteristics (Van der Merwe:1999). The 
local level has specific relevance to reconciliation, because local conflict dynamics might 
undermine, or reinforce, the work of institutional arrangements designed to promote 
reconciliation. Research on racial contact and harmony suggests that certain forms of contact 
between racial groups promotes racial harmony, while other forms of contact does not have 
such effect (Gibson:2001A). This was not taken into account in  TRC's work or other 
institutional paths to reconciliation. More information is needed on the community level 
about the relative importance of institutional paths to reconciliation compared to other 
factors such as personal experiences through daily contact between different racial groups on 
reconciliation. We need to know more about whether the TRC, with a "top down" approach 
to reconciliation is sufficient to promote reconciliation, or if the limited success of the TRC 
in promoting reconciliation may be explained by its impact on local communities. If the 
TRC was insufficient to promote community reconciliation, this lack of local reconciliation 
might have aggregated to the national level. This would suggest that further work for 
reconciliation should also be put in at the community level. In order to investigate the 
overall general questions mentioned above we will look closer at: 
How we can address gross human rights abuses after democratic transitions in ways that 
promote reconciliation: We need to look at both the various tools that have been used in 
other parts of the world and their strength and weaknesses. We also need to investigate the 
real political restraints in connection with democratic transition that might affect or even 
determine the choice of reconciliatory strategy.  
When looking closer at whether institutional means are sufficient to secure reconciliation, 
we will have to look at the existing research and documentation to date on how the TRC 
affected reconciliation at different levels in society. Furthermore, we need to investigate 
whether the effect of TRC's work have had different content and characteristics in small 
communities that have been specifically affected by human rights abuses and apartheid 
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cleavages, than at the national level. Such community effects will not easily be possible to 
"pick up" from national surveys, which cannot grasp the complexity of local conflicts and 
relationships, which creates the need for more qualitative research at this level. The 
suggested limited effect of the TRC also creates a need to look for other factors that we 
expect may affect reconciliation, and different or supplementary roads to reconciliation. We 
need to know more about community obstacles for reconciliation, how communities reacted 
to  TRC's work, and why the group benefiting from apartheid abuses was alienated in the 
reconciliatory attempts. Can community level answers to limited reconciliation help explain 
TRC's limited success at promoting overall cross-racial reconciliation.  
My main hypothesis is that addressing a limited amount of gross human rights violations 
affecting a relatively small proportion of the people is inadequate to have a strong effect on 
reconciliation if the result of abuses affecting the vast majority is not adequately addressed: 
Limited success in addressing extreme inequality, widespread poverty and overlapping lines 
of division after economic and social human rights abuses are then expected to render short 
term institutional interventions (like the TRC) inadequate to have a strong effect on 
reconciliation.  
1.4 Methodology 
To be able to answer the above questions, former research on the relationship between 
human rights and democracy, and ways of addressing former human rights abuses to 
promote reconciliation and democratic consolidation has to be investigated. As there is a lot 
of research on the effect of the TRC at the national level, I go through some of the major 
findings, and fill in on the limited knowledge of how the TRC affected the communities they 
operated in by doing a community study. This open the possibility of asking open ended 
questions on local reactions to  TRC's work, and what is perceived as obstacles for 
reconciliation. To get an overview over local events and community reactions within the 
limited time and costs available for the project, I chose a small community. At this level I 
could study individual reactions to  TRC's work and how it affected relations between people 
within and between sub-communities in this town. 
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Unit for analysis 
I picked Oudtshoorn as a unit for analysis because it had been affected by human rights 
violations and  TRC's work. Oudtshoorn was a regional centre for oppression and gross 
human rights abuses, forced removals to impose racial segregation, and strict repression of 
black and coloured people's economic and social rights was widespread. The TRC held a 
separate hearing on gross human rights violations that happened in this town, and 
Oudtshoorn was one of a few communities where the TRC arranged a post hearing 
community programme to follow up the needs of the community to promote reconciliation. 
This meant that a lot of information was available about this community from the TRC 
records. The size of the town and its relative isolation meant that local actors knew each 
other and it made it easier to get an overview of local cleavages, conflicts and problem areas 
for reconciliation. 
Oudtshoorn is also of special interest because it is an Afrikaner dominated community. As 
the Afrikaners are not in majority in any area in South Africa, Oudtshoorn is of interest 
because the Afrikaners dominate the town culturally and economically. Located in Western 
Cape, the nature of the oppression was slightly different than in most of South Africa: This 
province was declared a coloured labour preference area, excluding black workers in cases 
where there were coloured people available for the job. This policy resulted in a coloured 
majority in the region, and the town does not reflect the apartheid conflict as one between 
black and white people only. Still the case is of equal relevance because it was affected by 
the same abuses as we find throughout the country, including torture, killings by police, 
forced removals, harsh oppression of the economic and social rights of the coloured and 
black population. It was highlighted in my interviews that coloured people did not feel they 
got recognition for their role in the struggle against apartheid. There is also little specific 
research on the coloured community's reactions to the TRC. 
Written documents 
As the TRC documented its work by making transcripts of hearings and community 
programmes, the transcripts concerning Oudtshoorn have been invaluable sources of 
information. The TRC material in connection with the victims hearing outlines the local 
context for the struggle, type of oppression and the nature of the human rights violations that 
took place in Oudtshoorn. It also includes the testimonies of victims from Oudtshoorn from 
the public hearing. The material from the Post Hearing Community Programme (PHCP) 
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includes a local historical analysis as well as the communities views on what are hinders for 
reconciliation and ways to promote reconciliation.  
Interviews 
I decided to do qualitative interviews with community leaders from all sides of the former 
conflict to get a broad picture about how  TRC's work had affected the community, and to 
what degree it had succeeded in promoting local reconciliation. I wanted to ask their views 
on what were the obstacles for reconciliation, and what was needed to promote 
reconciliation in their town. I wanted their opinion on whether Oudtshoorn was moving in 
that direction, and whether community reconciliation was possible without addressing 
former violations of economic and social rights.  
To get local contacts, I made several attempts of contacting TRC staff that proved to be 
inaccessible as the TRC was closing down at the time. I then went through the Institute for 
Justice and Reconciliation in Cape Town, where former TRC co-worker Paul Houpt, who 
had been involved in putting up the PHCP in Oudtshoorn, got me a contact in Oudtshoorn 
that had also been involved in putting up the PHCP. Arriving in Oudtshoorn, this contact 
helped me to get in touch with key community leaders from all sides of the former conflict. 
Afterwards contacts were made through a snowballing effect as most respondents had 
suggestions of who could fill me in on particular subjects or views. The strength of using 
this approach was that I got access to differing views by people that were informed about 
attitudes and reactions from all main sides of the conflict. The downside is that it is an elitist 
approach, where grass root views may have been underestimated. When asking about 
reconciliation, I was careful to ask to what extent Oudtshoorn was reconciled, about TRC's 
role in the process first. I thereafter asked for views on obstacles for reconciliation, before 
ending with asking whether reconciliation is possible without addressing poverty and 
inequality. That way I tried to avoid steering the respondents' answers on what reconciliation 
would take by my hypothesis. Adding to interviews, I did observations including guided 
tours with one of my informants to the black and coloured townships. I planned to contact 
local bodies working with implementation of the suggestions from the community 
programme, discovering that these were non-existing. Despite the amount of work put into 
the programme by the TRC and the community, nothing was done to follow this up.  
 18 
I traced the response to  TRC's work in the local media. A biased local media controlled by 
white people and covering their versions of reality was identified as one of the major 
obstacles for further reconciliation in the PHCP. I looked into media archives and 
interviewed key people in the local media about whether the input form the TRC had made 
an impact. 
I did an interview with a representative for the human rights organisation Black Sash that 
was involved in taking witness statements for the TRC in the region, with a focus on 
whether the TRC had lead to any changes in reported human rights abuses. I did interviews 
with a member of the municipality about local politics, including political composition, 
involvement with the TRC, the policy for reconciliation and implementation of national 
poverty alleviation programmes.  
The major language in Oudtshoorn is Afrikaans but as I have limited knowledge of the 
language, I decided to do the interviews in English. I wanted to avoid using an interpreter 
because of the sensitivity of the research subject, and fear that it would have affected or 
limited the answers from the respondents. Conducting the interviews in English did not seem 
to be a problem for any of the respondents. I also decided to write this final report in 
English, to avoid errors of translations, and for it to be readable outside Norway, where it 
has most relevance. As I have some knowledge of Dutch, which is fairly similar to 
Afrikaans, I was able to work myself through written documents, like newspapers. 
Methodical dilemmas  
As the TRC in general and gross human rights violations in particular is a highly sensitive 
issue, fear of being identified by readers was an issue for several of the people I interviewed. 
As I wanted to get honest and thorough replies even on sensitive issues, I decided not to tape 
the interviews, offer the respondents to read what I wrote based on their interviews and to 
offer anonymity for the respondents in the report. Most respondents spoke more openly after 
these reassurances, and as most wanted anonymity, I decided to do that for everybody: As 
the local community is so small, and many knew who I had been talking to, it would 
otherwise be too easy to identify who said what. As I did not tape the interviews, I made 
notes instead. I think some information may have been lost this way, but that less honest 
information would have been exchanged if the interviewees were afraid the information 
would be used against them. 
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South Africa is troubled with violent crime, so personal safety affected the choice of 
Oudtshoorn as it is located in the relatively relaxed province of Western Cape. As the town 
was a local centre for repression where the same kinds of human rights abuses took place as 
throughout South Africa, this should not affect the relevance of the findings. 
A general problem with qualitative interviews is that the researcher may affect the answers. 
Sometimes people may answer what they think the researcher wants to hear or what they 
perceive as politically correct. It was obviously little I could do about being a white, younger 
foreign woman, with expectations attached to that. But this also had certain advantages. 
Being younger than everyone I interviewed, and a female student (with lower status than the 
people interviewed), seemed to make me appear less threatening (than if I had a higher 
social status). I also worked on creating a sympathetic environment in the interviews (all 
interviews were executed in a private place decided on by the respondent). I explained that 
the final report would be published in Norway which for most respondents seemed less 
threatening than if it was published locally, as some were concerned about giving 
information that might be used as basis in criminal courts. Being white seemed to give less 
political connotations as I was an outsider/ foreigner that had not been involved in the 
apartheid conflict. I tried to communicate understanding to all my respondents about their 
particular situation and make it clear that I was there to try to understand, and not to judge 
anyone. I generally felt that even though several interviews started out nervously, they ended 
in a friendly manner, where several people said the conversation had been therapeutic. 
Building up this confidence meant that, to a certain extent, I had to let the respondent steer 
the conversation (which was part of the point in asking open ended questions about 
reconciliation). But this made it difficult to ask about the respondents possible personal 
involvement in human rights abuses as perpetrators. 
The coloured and black communities, and people associated with the liberation movements, 
were a lot more eager to discuss  TRC's work than white people were. In these groups 
opinions were deeply split over  TRC's work, but people were generally interested and 
engaged by the theme. The sensitivity of the subject in the white community was apparent 
(reactions varied from surprise, discomfort, ridicule and plain hostility when the TRC was 
mentioned). As it proved hard to get in touch with many hard line Afrikaners, I did 
interviews with a former member of the security police, who gave me valuable input on how 
this group accused of being behind most of the gross human rights violations in town, 
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reacted to the TRC. For input on the more general Afrikaner view of the TRC, I interviewed 
a priest in the Afrikaner NG Kerk. He was known to be more liberal and sympathetic to the 
TRC than general, so I both interviewed him about personal views, and the general view 
within the Afrikaner community.  
As I mainly interviewed community leaders I did not reach the poorest sections of society in 
Oudtshoorn. This did not become apparent until the end of my stay, when I realised that 
most of my respondents from the coloured and coloured communities, that had achieved 
positions as community leaders, were members of the new emerging middle class. The 
poorest people in Oudtshoorn are the black Xhosa population (about 10% of the people), and 
I did not have the language skills to communicate with them, and not the time left to arrange 
for an interpreter. I did, however, during my interviews, ask both for personal opinions, and 
general opinions in the community. When interviewing a clear distinction was made between 
official views of any organisation the respondent belonged to, personal experiences and 
views, and views in the community. As most victims of gross human rights abuses, and most 
community leaders were men, women are also underrepresented in my interview material. 
Issues particularly relevant to women and family and their views on reconciliation were, 
however, covered in the post hearing community programme, which is my main source of 
information on female perspectives.  
1.5 Layout of the thesis 
After this introduction chapter, chapter two looks into theory about the relationship between 
human rights and democracy. I look into the debate over the relationship between former 
human rights abuses, reconciliation and democratic consolidation. The key concepts are 
defined and the analytic tools are presented. 
Chapter three presents different suggestions of roads to reconciliation and how gross human 
rights abuses have been dealt with in the past. Chapter four introduces the South African 
case, the main challenges of the new regime and the compromises that led to the 
establishment of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission as their main strategy for 
reconciliation.   
Chapter five looks into  TRC's work, its mandate, limitations and to what degree it 
succeeded at reaching its aims. Then I present my community study of Oudtshoorn in 
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chapter six. I look into to what extent the TRC succeeded in delivering reconciliation at this 
level of analysis, and different views in the community of what is needed to promote 
reconciliation. 
In the last chapter I summarise the main findings and their implications for theory and 
practice on how to handle former human rights abuses to promote reconciliation and 
democratic consolidation. The findings mainly have practical relevance for policymakers, 
human rights activists and people working with community reconciliation. It has theoretical 
relevance for the ongoing debates on how to handle former abuses after democratic 
transition, and for the debate over the relationship between democracy and human rights, 
and particularly the debates around minimalist versus maximalist views of democracy. 
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2. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, RECONCILIATION AND DEMOCRATIC 
CONSOLIDATION 
This chapter looks into theory about the relationship between human rights, reconciliation 
and democracy. First I look into the debate about the relationship between democracy and 
human rights, and different ways of understanding this relationship. Then I look into how 
human rights abuses during a former regime have made reconciliation difficult and caused 
problems in democratic consolidation.  
2.1 Human rights and democracy 
The human rights agenda has a universal aspiration. It claims that humans have individual 
value and rights that are basic because we are human. It is common to distinguish between 
different generations of human rights. The first is civil and political rights, the second 
economic and social rights, and the third generation is cultural rights10. This thesis will focus 
on the first two. The civil and political rights have had a strong position in the western 
world, and the economic and social rights had a stronger position in the former communist 
block. The academic debate during the cold war was concentrating on whether there was a 
conflict between the two first generations of rights or not. Abrahamsen (2000) argues that 
the human rights debate is being led from the western world after the fall of the Soviet 
Union. She claims as mentioned that the debate now focuses on civil and political rights and 
democratisation, as two sides of the same coin, assuming that political and civil rights will 
lead to economic and social rights. 
In the human rights debate it is common to distinguish between positive and negative 
understandings of rights: A negative understanding, for instance to housing, means that 
taking away somebody's shelter is a violation of this right. A positive understanding of this 
right means that people that have no shelter, have got the right to have it provided for them. 
Beetham argues that democracy and human rights are based on the same understanding that 
all people have the same value. This legitimises the democratic principle that all people are 
                                              
10 For background on human rights and the legal foundations of different kinds of rights, see Gloppen & Rakner 1993. 
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to have right to participate in political decision-making. He defines democracy as popular 
control of collective decision-making by equal citizens (Beetham 1999:39),11 and this is the 
understanding of the concept that I will use in this thesis.  
Its starting point is with the citizen rather than with the institutions of government. Its defining principles are that all citizens are 
entitled to a say in public affairs, both through participation in government, and that this entitlement should be available on 
terms of equality to all. Control by citizens over their collective affairs and equality between citizens in the exercise of that 
control are the basic democratic principles…Once we start with these underlying principles of popular control over collective 
affairs on terms of equal citizenship, then we can proceed to a second order question. What is needed to make these principles 
effective in the context of the modern state? To answer this further question takes us in two directions simultaneously (Beetham 
1999:90-91) 
One direction is towards an elucidation of the institutional arrangements, which have over time proved themselves necessary to 
ensure effective popular control…these institutions can be termed democratic to the extent they contribute to the popular control 
of government (Beetham 1999:91).  
A second direction in which we are taken to consider what other rights citizens require if their basic democratic right of having 
voice in public affairs is to be effective. Here at once the necessity of the civil and political part of the human rights agenda 
becomes evident. At the heart of democracy thus lies the right of all citizens to a voice in public affairs and to exercise control 
over government, on terms of equality with other citizens. For this right to be effective requires, on the one hand, the kind of 
political institutions -elections, parties, legislatures etc. –with which we are familiar from the experience of the established 
democracies. On the other hand, it requires the guarantee of those human rights we call civil and political…Both are needed to 
realise the basic principles of democracy. Thus, as the accompanying diagram makes clear, the connection between democracy 
and human rights is an intrinsic one rather than an extrinsic one; human rights constitute a necessary part of democracy 
(Beetham 1999:91-92). 
 
Figure 2.1 Democracy: Rights and Institutions (Beetham 1999:92) 
Beetham argues that defining democracy in terms of a set of political institutions alone is to 
make a double error because it ignores the underlying principles that makes them 
democratic, and it treats those institutions as all that is required for democracy, by 
overlooking the human rights, which are also an intrinsic part of it. It is because they are 
intrinsic part that democratisation may be more effectively advanced in certain conditions 
under a campaign for human rights than through a campaign for democracy per se (Beetham 
1999:92).  
                                              
11 For a discussion about different ways of defining democracy and its implications, see Beetham: 1999 chapter 1 
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As figure 2 shows, there is a conceptual overlap between democracy and civil/ political 
human rights. The issue hotly debated is the relationship between democracy and economic/ 
social rights. While some argue that the two types of rights reinforce one another, others 
argue that there are elements of conflict between them. The the biggest challenge in the field 
of economic and social rights in South Africa is poverty, affecting about half the prpulation 
as a result of apartheid abuses. I therefor narrow down the focus of the debate below to the 
relationship between the two types of rights to looking at the relationship between 
democracy/ civil and political rights, and poverty. 
 
Figure 2.2 Human rights and democracy (Beetham 1999:94) 
Democracy and poverty 
Amartya Sen argues for the primacy of political rights (1994), because he does not see the 
relationship between different kinds of human rights as dichotomous: He claims that  
Political rights can have a major role in providing incentives and information toward the solution of economic privation. But the 
relationship between rights and needs are not merely instrumental; they are also constructive. For our conceptualisation of 
economic needs depends on open public debates and discussion, and the guaranteeing of those debates and those discussions 
requires an insistence on political rights (Sen 1994:32).  
He thus argues that political rights both will lead to economic rights and form people’s 
preferences. He uses the case of Kerala in India, where democracy has among other things 
led to prioritising education, which has made women choose to have less children. The 
province has also succeeded in building out a health sector and increased the expected 
lifetime. He thereby claims to show that a poor province, like Kerala, has managed to meet 
the basic economic needs of the population because of the existence of political rights. He 
thus argues that political rights can be instrumental in providing economic rights. If this is 
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correct, the waves of democratic transitions across the world after the fall of the Soviet 
Union should be promising for the prospects of delivering social and economic rights. 
Abrahamsen (2000) is less optimistic. She claims that after the fall of the Soviet Union there 
have been developments in the academic debate towards a hegemony claiming that there is 
no conflicts between civil/political rights and economic rights. Many African countries are 
extremely dependent of aid, which increasingly is made contingent on political and 
economic liberalisation and adaptation of World Bank suggested structural adjustment 
programs (SAP). These includes minimising the state and cutting state costs. This policy 
from international agents have according to the argument led to a wave of democratisation. 
But reduction of state costs hits the poor people hardest by cutting in the already limited 
health and education sectors. According to her argument, the African countries are therefore 
forced to follow a neo-liberal economic policy with a minimalist state, with very limited 
possibilities for a pro-poor policy, no matter what the people will vote at the polls. She 
therefore is quite in line with Mkandawire (1999) who writes about “choiceless 
democracies”. Democracies like this have their hands tied because of obligations to 
international donors, and will not be able to meet the demands of the poor population for 
state intervention against poverty. This line of argument seriously challenges the western 
idea that “all good thing go together” and that political rights in countries where poverty is 
vast, will lead to policies that are to the better for the poor. Abrahamsen also warns that in 
African countries where expectations of economic delivery as a result or democracy fails, 
there is a serious danger of undermining the belief in democracy in itself.  
Smith (1997) also challenges the relationship Sen puts up between democracy and poverty, 
and thereby the relationship between civil/ political rights and social and economic rights. 
He illustrates how poor people who are at times dependent on resources from relatives or 
any kind of a patron for the most basic items needed for survival, are in a clientilistic 
dependency relationship with that person. This puts them in a position where formal political 
rights are undermined: In return for the help the patron gives the client in times of need, the 
patron will expect political support, or at least that the client does not support any kind of 
political grouping that would challenge the power of the patron. Thereby Smith claims that 
poverty can undermine poor people's political rights by undermining their ability to fight for 
their own interests. He argues that there is a need for basic economic security and 
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this minimum of economic and social rights makes people unable to freely use the political 
rights that according to Sen are the keys to fight for a policy against poverty.  
I have thus shown that the simplistic thesis that democracy and human rights are two sides of 
the same coin is questionable and that democracy alone does not guarantee delivery of 
economic and social rights. 
Economic development, ideology and poverty reduction 
The relationship between economic development and poverty alleviation is highly disputed. 
While many argue that economic growth is necessary for poverty reduction (and will trickle 
down to the poor), poverty may very well exist in rich countries (Wilson:1996). Some 
poverty research has had a focus on behaviourist explanations of poverty, blaming it on the 
poor themselves and thus effectively taking away any responsibility to fight poverty from 
the larger community12. In a state where ideology like this is widespread, it is not very likely 
that poverty will be on the political agenda, even if it is a democracy. Wilson (1996) classify 
the USA, the United Kingdom and New Zealand as countries where active steps, ideological 
and practical, to dismantle social measures originally designed to protect citizens from the 
worst ravages of poverty, constitutes a new assault on the poor. The poor in the USA have 
been hard to mobilise politically. The poor in the USA are a relatively small group, and 
therefore have little political power both in the form of positions and votes. As the rest of the 
population does not identify with the poor because they are mainly members of ethnic 
minorities, it makes it less likely that poverty will be put on the agenda. In continental 
Western Europe the poor are seen as victims. A democratic structure together with an 
understanding of poverty as a structural problem, has led to less poverty than other countries 
at the same economic level, such as the USA. This shows that democracy and a high level of 
economic development alone do not guarantee poverty alleviation.  
Some argue that it is possible to reduce poverty without economic growth, and that this can 
stimulate growth. Drezé &Sen (1989 chap.12) argue that strategy chosen to combat poverty 
is more important than regime type for ability to reduce poverty. They distinguish between 
                                              
12 We can distinguish between structural and behavioural approaches to understanding the causes of poverty. Structural 
approaches emphasise institutionalised systems of inequality, macro-economic factors, exploitation and exclusion. 
Behaviourist explanations on poverty focus on personal atributes of the poor, their lifestyles of deprivation and misery are 
reinforced and continue from one generation to another. While structural approaches underestimate the significance of 
personal atributtes and social mobility, behaviourist approaches overlooks differences in opportunities (Banik: 2000) 
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the strategies of “support led security” and "growth-mediated security”. The first strategy is 
about reducing poverty by direct support to the poor, for instance in the form of food and 
health schemes, before economic growth. The other emphasises that growth has to come 
first, and growth will trickle down to the poor. The divide is easily read as an ideological 
one, but they show how support-led security has been used with success both in democracies 
(Costa Rica, Jamaica and Sri Lanka), in communist states (China and Cuba) and in 
Pinochet’s right wing dictatorship. How wide and targeted the programmes have been have 
varied: They argue that the Pinochet regime’s success in lowering child mortality and 
bettering health conditions can be criticised for a too narrow targeting, and that it did little to 
reduce economic poverty for the regular citizen. A problem with his article is that it only 
treats success stories, and not those where a strategy for support led security was followed 
without success.13  
This debate shows that a high degree of economic development combined with civil and 
politic rights in a democratic regime alone does not guarantee the delivery of economic and 
social rights. It shows that ideology, commitment to fight poverty and strategy chosen to do 
so is also of importance.  
Does democracy require a guarantee of economic and social rights? Do economic and 
social rights require democracy? 
As the above discussion shows, the relationship between democracy and economic and 
social rights are highly debated, and Beetham (1999:95pp) asks the following questions: 
Does democracy require the guarantee of economic and social rights for its citizens? Do 
economic and social rights in turn require democracy? Or is the relationship looser than that 
of “requirement” in either case? Beetham distinguishes between basic economic and social 
rights, and development, because higher GNP/capita does not in itself guarantee the delivery 
of basic economic and social rights. He claims the main point is not so much to secure 
reduction of inequality, but making sure there is basic security for all. He criticises most of 
the literature on the issue for treating democracy as a clear dichotomy from non-democratic 
rules. Following his argument that democracy is a matter of degree, he claims that how 
                                              
13 Tanzania constitutes one example, where the focus for poverty reduction was building out education and healthcare.  
Unfortunately this happened without making sure that there was enough economic growth to finance it, and has resulted in 
the country being one of the most aid dependent in the world. On the other hand the country are doing better on key 
indicators like in the Human Development Index (based on life expectancy, literacy and income, calculated by the UNDP) 
than what one would expect from a country with its level of GNP/cap. 
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democratic a country is, has to be answered both according to the quality of the democracy, 
as well as its durability (ibid).  
Does democracy require economic and social rights? According to Beetham (ibid), the direct 
consequences are upon the people that are denied these basic rights: 
What value is the freedom of expression to me if I lack the means to communicate with other citizens? What value is there in the 
right to due process or the right to stand for elective office if legal protection and public office respectively are accessible only 
to the wealthy? It is considerations like this that justifies a social agenda for democracy, going beyond the juridical defence of 
civil and political rights, and even the standard of anti-discrimination requirements needed to protect particular sections of the 
population. (Beetham 1999:96-97).  
The question can be rephrased to how much economic inequality is compatible with the basic democratic principle of equal 
citizenship…It is clear that civil and political equality does not require complete economic levelling. But it becomes severely 
compromised if, on the one hand, the privileged can use their wealth or status to purchase undue political influence. Or if, on the 
other the poor are so deprived that they are incapable of exercising any basic civil or political rights, are effectively excluded 
form any common citizenship…The latter, the problems of exclusion, require positive attention to the guarantee of economic 
and social rights (ibid). 
Of the basic rights that are required, he lists the right to life that requires physical security 
and access to the necessities of life: To the means of subsistence, shelter, clean water, 
sanitation and basic health care14. Adding to this is education that he puts up as a key good 
to obtain other economic rights; the ability to get employed and thereby provide for oneself, 
and knowledge about how to obtain good health and to exercise civil and political rights. By 
this he illustrates the interdependence between different human rights. He also points to the 
importance of the right to work, widely ignored in the “developed” world. He claims that  
… both liberal and democratic political theories are premised on the assumption that people are capable of self-determination 
that they possess the capacity and confidence to take responsibility for their own lives, whether individually or collectively. A 
condition of long term unemployment is hardly conductive to the development of such a capacity… (Beetham 1999:98) 
He thereby concludes that the guarantee of economic and social rights is necessary to 
democracy in order to ensure a minimum equality of access to civil and political rights for 
all citizens.15 He addresses two typical objections against the provision of basic economic 
                                              
14 These means of subsistence are overlapping with definitions of poverty based on a basic needs approach. Unlike 
understandings of poverty as a problem of low income alone, the basic needs approach focuses on lack of minimal 
requirements for private consumption and access to the most basic services as for instance health care and sanitation. There 
is no consensus on which needs are basic. "Firstly, they include certain minimum requirements of a family for private 
consumption: adequate food, shelter and clothing, as well as certain household furniture and equipment. Second, they 
include essential services provided by and for the community at large, such as safe drinking water, sanitation, public 
transport and health, education and cultural facilities…the concept of basic needs should be placed within a context of a 
nation's overall economic and social development. In no circumstances should it be taken to mean merely the minimum 
necessary for subsistence; it should be placed within a context of national independence, the dignity of individuals and 
peoples and their freedom to chart their destiny without hindrance" (ILO 1976: 243;and see also ILO 1977 quoted in 
Gordon & Spicker 1999:14) The basic needs approach to poverty is an enlargement of the subsistence approach, that 
usually focus on strict physical needs for survival (Gordon & Spicker 1999:133). An overview over different ways of 
defining and measuring poverty can be found in Gordon and Spicker (1999).   
15 As indirect effects of lack of economic rights, he mentions lower productivity, higher crime rates in the cities, and in the 
rural areas increased urban migration and more rarely organised rebellion and armed conflict. This increases the chances of 
repressive forces to control it. He also claims that unemployment makes a good breeding ground for the politics of 
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and social rights. One is economic in the sense that it claims there is an incompatibility 
between an agenda for economic and social rights and other necessary economic goals, as 
for instance economic development in the “development” world. He claims that the 
understanding of the development term is too narrowly defined in these circles, claiming that 
building out health and education is investments necessary for growth. In the “developed” 
world the contradiction is said to be within the economic rights themselves, a contradiction 
between demands of social protection and employment, through the burden welfare costs 
impose upon economic competitiveness. Thus, the argument goes, any political 
consequences of the political rights programme is irrelevant, because it is unsustainable. 
Beetham claims that this is more a question of the size of that welfare, than its existence in 
the first place (1999:100pp).  
Beetham also questions whether democracy is a requirement for the delivery of economic 
and social rights. He claims that views that there is a trade-off between the two are 
discredited after the end of the cold war but it is interesting to see what it is with 
democracies that makes them better equipped to deliver economic and social rights. For right 
wing authoritarian regimes he shows that lack of democracy might make it easier to follow 
an economic policy leading to growth (because it is not so vulnerable to democratic demands 
for redistribution) but in this way it suppresses demands for economic and social rights. And 
this model does not secure that the expected growth will be spent on economic and social 
rights later. He thereby discredits this model. Left-wing versions of authoritarianism he gives 
credit for their explicit commitment to the protection of economic and social rights, but that 
the collapse of the Soviet Union showed that this model was unsustainable. He also points to 
China that due to lack of a free press and general civil and political rights, was unable to 
hinder a famine where millions of people died. (For a further analysis, see Drezé & Sen 
1989). Beetham concludes that democracy is a necessary but not sufficient condition for 
economic and social rights due to its openness, accountability and distribution of political 
power (Beetham 1999:ch.5).  
                                                                                                                                           
intolerance, populism and blaming of the problems on visible minorities based on religion, ethnicity, racial or language 
groups (Beetham 1999:99-100). 
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2.2 Minimalist versus maximalist understandings of democracy 
Based on the above discussion, we can distinguish two basically different understandings of 
democracy. A minimalist understanding includes political and civil rights only and a 
maximalist understanding also includes economic and social rights. If we relate this to the 
way the TRC has narrowed down the focus of the human rights abuses that took place during 
the apartheid years we find that it only focused on the breaking of severe civil/ political 
rights, and not on the abuse of economic, social or cultural rights16. I will question this 
narrow focus in my analysis as the majority of the population in South Africa were victims 
of a category of human rights abuses that the TRC did not address. 
2.3 Democratic transition and consolidation 
Despite a vast literature on transitions to democracy and conditions for democratic 
consolidation (for a definition, see below), we still have not been able to prevent democratic 
breakdown in several of Africa's newly establish democracies. There is a large literature on 
conditions for democracy, including structural, cultural, economic and institutional 
conditions (Tørres 2000:16). This is discussed elsewhere, and this thesis particularly focuses 
on former human rights abuses and effects on reconciliation and consolidation. Several 
writers, like Karl & Schmitter (1991), point to the importance of power relations at the time 
of transition. They distinguish between four ideal types of modes of transition depending on 
who are the main actors (elites or masses), and the main strategy (compromise or force).  
…Pact (is) when elites agree upon a multilateral compromise among themselves; … Imposition when elites use force 
unilaterally and effectively to bring about a regime change against the resistance of incumbents; …Reform when masses 
mobilise from below and impose a compromised outcome without restoring to violence, and …Revolution when masses rise up 
in arms and defeat the previous authoritarian rulers militarily (Karl & Schmitter 1991:275) 
In cases like South Africa, which went through a pacted transition to democracy, the former 
regime was in a position to negotiate themselves out of power. Former power-holders 
thereby could put up clear demands on their exit, and in several cases put restraints on the 
new regime. Several authors point out Chile as an example, where General Pinochet secured 
himself control over the armed forces and made prosecutions for gross human rights abuses 
impossible by an amnesty law. 
                                              
16 The issue of cultural rights was also hotly debated in South Africa during the transition. While some parties, like IFP and 
several parties representing the white population argued for high degree of self-determination for their ethnic groups as a 
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Democratic consolidation 
Linz & Stephan (1996) defines consolidated democracy as a political situation in which 
democracy has become "the only game in town", behaviourally, attitudinally and 
constitutionally. 
-Behaviorally, a democratic regime in a territory is consolidated when no significant national, social, economic, political, or 
institutional actors spend significant recourses attempting to achieve their objectives by creating a nondemocratic regime or 
turning to violence or foreign intervention to secede from the state. 
-Attitudinally, a democratic regime is consolidated when a strong majority of public opinion holds the belief that democratic 
procedures and institutions are the most appropriate way to govern collective life in a society such as theirs and when support 
for antisystem alternatives is quite small or more or less isolated from the pro-democratic forces. 
-Constitutionally, a democratic regime is consolidated when governmental and nongovernmental forces alike, throughout the 
territory of the state, become subjected to, and habituated to, the resolution of conflict within the specific laws, procedures, and 
institutions sanctioned by the new democratic process (Linz & Stephan 1996:6) 
Measuring whether a democracy is consolidated is hard, given the complexity of the 
concept, and the disagreement over the standard or quality required to qualify. Some 
analysts, like Samuel Huntington, use electoral criteria to determine whether democracy is 
consolidated: According to his "two-turnover test", a democracy is consolidated if the 
winners of founding elections are defeated in a subsequent election, and the new winners 
themselves later accept an electoral turnover (quoted in Bratton & Posner 1998:378). One of 
the main challenges for African democracies is overcoming ethnic voting. If people vote 
based on ethnic identity instead of rational interest, ethnic minorities risk being a permanent 
minority. This can reduce the legitimacy of the democracy in these groups, and be a threat to 
democratic consolidation. Many argue that elections are only a minimum of the requirements 
for democracy: You can have elections without democracy, but you cannot have democracy 
without elections (Bratton & Posner 1998).  
We have outlined the debate about whether democracy only requires a minimum of civil and 
political rights, or if delivering basic economic and social rights also is necessary to secure 
the quality of democracy. But adding to this, there is an increasing literature on the 
relationship between how former human rights abuses have been handled and states ability 
to consolidate democracy. 
                                                                                                                                           
way to secure their unique culture, the ANC has focused on the need for nation building. Even though cultural rights are 
mentioned in the chapter about South Africa it is not the main focus in this analysis. 
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Gross human rights abuses in democratic transition and consolidation 
How to deal with gross violations of human rights often comes up in connection with regime 
change to democracy17. On the one hand, bringing up the issue of past human rights offences 
for instance through bringing it to a national or international court can be so fundamentally 
against powerful political players' interests, that it might jeopardise their support for it and 
ultimately stop the whole transition. This is a particularly big problem in cases where the 
transition happens after negotiations, and former rulers can demand amnesty in exchange for 
giving up their power. But ignoring the abuses of the past sends out a signal that powerful 
people can get away with gross human rights abuses. That does not contribute to establishing 
a culture of accountability and respect for human rights, which are core democratic values. It 
can also lead to wounds that refuses to grow between victims, and perpetrators and groups of 
people identifying themselves with each of them. This split can be wide enough to threaten 
the democratic consolidation (Skaar 1994). This has raised a debate on how different ways 
of addressing gross human rights abuses affects reconciliation. 
2.4 Reconciliation and democratic consolidation 
Skaar (1994) argues that lack of reconciliation has lead to problems with democratic 
consolidation in Chile and Argentina. She points to inadequate addressing of former gross 
human rights abuses as hampering reconciliation. In Chile the new government failed to 
bring perpetrators to trial because the old regime secured amnesty for former violations 
during the negotiated settlement. In Zimbabwe no measures were taken to address former 
gross human rights abuses. Like in South Africa the structures of land ownership was kept 
more or less intact after the transition. But in Zimbabwe recent events, where so called war 
veterans are occupying white owned farmland, show that there is no reconciliation after the 
                                              
17 The term gross human rights abuses/violations builds on the understanding that some human rights are more basic than 
others (for instance the right to life) despite the human rights agendas universal aspiration for all the rights. The definition 
of gross human rights abuses varies from case to case. The truth commissions in Chile and Argentina limited it to 
disappearances, murder and torture. While some argue that the term should be limited to state abuses only (Skaar: 1994), 
others argue that politically motivated abuses committed also by non-state actors should be included. Skaar (1994:24) 
defines gross human rights abuses as “crimes against the fundamental rights of a person, as a member of humanity, defined 
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The State commits them – directly, indirectly or by omission – under the 
protection of its unique power. When this occurs, the state annuls its essential purpose and puts an end to the State subject 
to the rule of law…” The three most common manifest violations of these basic rights (…) are political murder, torture and 
“disappearance”. The latter term refers to people who are detained for political reasons and whose detention is repeatedly 
denied by the authorities, and whose current location remains unknown in spite of all efforts to find them”. The main 
difference between this definition and the TRC’s is that Skaar limits it only to actions committed by the state, like the Truth 
Commissions in Chile and Argentina did. For the definitions applied by the TRC, see chapter 5. 
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old conflicts. The government's policy of acceptance of these land occupations shows 
disrespect for the country's own laws and human rights (Van der Merwe 1999:ch.4.). It also 
shows lack of acceptance of the democratic rules as the tool for conflict management, and 
thereby limited democratic consolidation. 
The way of understanding the concept of reconciliation and measuring it varies a lot in the 
literature and this clouds the debate on the effectiveness of different approaches to 
reconciliation. It is thus necessary to go through different ways of understanding the 
concept, different levels of studying reconciliation, and which of these are relevant for 
consolidation of democracy. Gloppen (2002) argues that political reconciliation is the degree 
of reconciliation needed and relevant to promote democratic consolidation. She defines this 
as a climate in which conflicting parties can resolve their differences through non-violent 
means, a political climate where former enemies may continue to disagree, but nevertheless 
interact and communicate on the basis of a shared normative framework and mutual 
reconciliation. 
At the political elite level it is important that the way of handling the violations that have 
taken place leads to a solution were all major players accept the new democracy and the new 
rules for politics. This means that everybody is allowed to play the game, and that no 
political grouping may start using human rights violations again as a political tool.  
Different levels of reconciliation 
Van der Merwe (1999) has analysed different ways of understanding the concept of 
reconciliation in the literature, and its implication for the reconciliatory work. He uses a 
wider definition than Gloppen's (2002) definition of political reconciliation, by seeing it as: 
…promoting constructive relationships among parties through changes in identity, values, attitudes and behaviour. 
Reconciliation is promoted through engagement with substantive issues that addresses the social needs of the parties affected by 
the conflict. The most notable of these are: justice, security, healing and truth. Reconciliation requires that these issues are 
addressed through a process of negotiation and interactive change (1999:ch.2.3b.iii) 
He distinguishes between 3 dimensions of reconciliation: Spheres of relationships that can 
be changed, (identity, values, attitudes and behaviour)18, substantive issues of reconciliation 
                                              
18 He argues that reconciliation involves a change in relationship between groups divided by conflict- a move towards a 
more co-operative relationship. First is the recognition of the humanity of the other party - recognition of their right to 
exist. Inherent in such a change is the reconstruction of individual group identities and definition of oneself in relation to 
the other party. Group identity and self-image needs to be defined in such a way that it does not negatively reflect on that 
of the other party. Secondly, reconciliation is understood to also involve the creation of a new moral order based on 
consensus around values that encourage co-operation. Thirdly, an attitudinal aspect is identified – the need to adjust 
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(justice, truth, healing and security), and social levels of reconciliation (national, community 
and individual). This essay particularly focus on reconciliation at different social levels.  
Van der Merwe (1999) distinguishes between three main social levels where reconciliatory 
attempts can take place; the national, community and interpersonal. He shows that different 
factors come into play in addressing each one of these levels, both of how to understand the 
concept of reconciliation, and how to promote it. He quotes Siesby (1996) saying that 
reconciliation between populations has features similar to reconciliation between persons but 
contains an additional element: The identification of individuals with a group, a people or a 
nation, an identification which may imply that a whole people may be held collectively 
responsible for the miseries of another people which has a corresponding feeling of suffering 
collective injustice (Van der Merwe 1999:ch.2.8). Adding to these three levels of 
reconciliation is intra personal reconciliation: The ability for people, including victims and 
perpetrators, to reconcile with their own past. 
 
NATIONAL
COMMUNITY
INTERPERSONAL
INTRAPERSONAL
 
                                                                                                                                           
attitudes to overcome the fear, anger and vengefulness which characterises a conflict situation. Fourthly, patterns of 
interaction between adversaries are also identified as requiring a reorientation towards mutually beneficial outcomes and an 
engagement in risk-taking forms of interaction in order to build trust in the realisation and repetition of mutual beneficial 
patterns of interactions (Van der Merwe 1999:8). A change in values implies a change in the underlying attitudes and 
patterns of interaction. Fourthly and most fundamentally is the sphere of identity (both self and enemy). If there are clearly 
defined self and enemy identities in a conflict situation, especially ones that deny the humanity or the right of existence of 
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Figure 2.3 levels of reconciliation 
Van der Merwe argues that different practical and theoretical approaches to reconciliation 
emphasise different aspects of the concept and that these reflect different ideological 
frames19. The top-down approaches are focusing at the national elite level, assuming that 
reconciliation at this level will trickle down to the other levels (community and personal). 
Bottom-up approaches focus on reconciliation at the personal/ community level, assuming 
that reconciliation at these levels will accumulate to national reconciliation (1999:ch2).  
Top-down approaches se community reconciliation as a process promoted by creating a 
broader climate within the national political arena where leaders from the main sections in 
society come to an understanding, make commitments, or build public consensus on values 
and facts using the mass media. The communities are to absorb this reconciliation that is 
assumed to trickle down to this level. The local conflict should be addressed through 
contexualising it within a broader political narrative that explains it in terms of the divisions 
found at the national level. The national narrative is trying to establish a new value system 
based on promoting national unity through redefining political identities (Van der Merwe 
1999:ch.2.9b). 
The bottom up approaches prioritise reconstruction of local social networks and local 
political relationships through understanding the specific local dynamics, renegotiating 
interpersonal relationships, and addressing concerns regarding individual local perpetrators 
and victims. It avoids using individuals as symbols of broader processes or categories of 
people. The focus on inter-group reconciliation rather than intra-communal or interpersonal 
reconciliation might be the key difference between the top-down and the bottom-up 
perspectives. 
                                                                                                                                           
the enemy there is little scope for changes in values, attitudes or behaviour. One can thus speak of different spheres of 
reconciliation as well as the extent of the change in each sphere (Van der Merwe 1999: chapter 2:8). 
19 The term ”ideological framework” is used because groups do not simply accept pre-existing frameworks of meaning, 
but combine available frameworks and adjust them to suit their particular goals and needs. It is “ideological” because it 
arises from situational interests rather than from universal principle (Van der Merwe 1999:chapter 2:31)  
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2.5 Summary 
I have given an overview over the debate on the relationship between human rights and 
democratisation. I argued that the underlying idea behind both human rights and democracy 
is that each person has the same value. I pointed out a conceptual overlap between 
democracy and the group of human rights labelled civil and political rights, but that the 
relationship between economic and social human rights and democracy are more contested. I 
argued that minimalist understandings of democracy excludes economic and social rights, 
while defenders of a maximalist understanding of democracy argue that economic and social 
rights are needed to secure everybody's ability to exercise their civil and political rights. 
Lack of delivery in the field of economic and social rights are seen as undermining the 
quality of democracy. 
Then I turned to the debate about the relationship between human rights abuses during a 
former regime and democratisation. I argued that the debate has been focusing on the 
relationship between gross human rights abuses (severe violations of certain civil and 
political rights), lack of reconciliation and democratic consolidation. The relationship 
between violations of economic and social human rights, and reconciliation and democratic 
consolidation has to a large extent been left unexplored.20  
I argued that lack of reconciliation after severe human rights abuses have lead to difficulties 
in consolidating democracy. But the debate on how to best promote reconciliation has been 
clouded by different ways of understanding the concept and different beliefs over the causal 
relationship between reconciliation at different levels in society. While supporters of top-
down approaches to reconciliation assume that reconciliatory interventions at the national 
level will trickle down to communities and intrapersonal relationships, the bottom-up 
approaches assume that intrapersonal and community reconciliation will accumulate to the 
national level. The approach stakeholders in the former conflict preferes is also affected by 
their situational interests and goals in the process. 
                                              
20 We are here talking about cases where economic and social rights have been actively violated, like in South Africa, not 
simply ignored or not provided in the first place, like in many other African countries. 
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3. ROADS TO RECONCILIATION 
How can we promote reconciliation after widespread human rights abuses? There is little 
consensus in this debate. Elin Skaar (1994:91) introduces three concepts that are important 
in the handling of gross human rights abuses in the aftermath of regime change. It is the 
ability to reveal the truth about the violations, deliver justice, and reconciliation. Her 
research is as mentioned based on the cases of Chile and Argentina, were gross human rights 
abuses were handled by truth commissions. She assumes that the more truth and justice that 
comes out, the more reconciliation. The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission is based on an assumption that truth is a necessary precondition for 
reconciliation. Human rights organisations, like Amnesty International, argue that there must 
be no impunity for human rights abuses, and demands trials. But it is debated under what 
circumstances trials are possible, and to what degree they are able to uncover the facts about 
the abuses and promote reconciliation, with their strong focus on justice and punishment. 
Others argue that trials and truth commissions, focusing on former abuses, will only lead to 
increased anger and potentially resurrection of conflict, and that "letting sleeping dogs lie" is 
a better way of playing down former conflicts. Van der Merwe (1999:ch.4) argues that the 
actual outcome of how former human rights abuses are dealt with depends more on the 
power situation at the time of transition than moral considerations. If there is a clear victory 
without political restraints, trials are a likely outcome if the new regime is committed to 
human rights. It is however quite common that only abuses committed by the former regime 
are taken to the courts. If the transition comes after negotiations between elites (pact), 
representatives of the old regime are often in a strong bargaining position and can make the 
transition dependent on amnesty for human rights violations. In these cases truth 
commissions, non-juridical independent commissions trying to discover the truth about the 
violations are common. Turning a blind eye is common in cases where no party is strong 
enough, or committed enough to human rights, to force through either trials or truth 
commissions. 
Gloppen (2002:3) argues that there are five main roads to reconciliation, focusing on 
criminal justice, truth, restorative justice, prespective justice (institutional reforms) and 
oblivion (amnesia). Sub groups of these are included in the table below. Adding to these 
institutional ways to reconciliation, Gibson (2001A) points out that certain forms of contact 
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is positive for racial harmony. The general debate on how to promote reconciliation is 
outlined below.  
Criminal justice
(accountability and punishment)
- Prosecution
- Domestic trials
- International tribunals
-       Administrative justice
         (purges, lustration)
- Naming of perpetrators
         (shaming)
Truth
- Truth commissions
- Access to files
- History-writing
Restorative justice
- Compensation to victims
- Rehabilitation, restoration
- Recognition
Prespective justice
            Institutional reform
- Judicial reforms
-Administration of justice
-Legal, constitutional
      framework
- Political reforms
- Social and economic reforms
Reconciliation                Democratisation
Oblivion
- No action - passing of time
- Impunity (amnesty)
- Public amnesia
 
Figure 3.1 different roads to reconciliation (Gloppen2002:3) 
3.1 Criminal Justice: International and National War Crimes Tribunals 
We have a lot of experience in using national or international war crime tribunals to address 
gross human rights offences21. Nader and Combs-Schilling (1976) gives an overview of the 
functions of a justice system (quoted in Van der Merwe 1999:ch.3.2): 
                                              
21 Gloppen also mentions administrative justice as ways of promoting criminal justice. This includes lustration- 
administrative purges and prohibitions on holding public office to ensure some form of retributive justice where the scale or 
nature of abuses have made prosecutions difficult (because they are linked to the very structure and operation of 
bureaucratic and social structures). She also mentions social shaming, when names of perpetrators are made public 
(Gloppen 2002:14). 
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1) Prevention. Avoid escalation of the conflict through restoring the status quo or a sense of balance. 
2) Rehabilitation. Reintegration of the offenders so that they regain a position of useful participant in society. 
3) Restitution. Provide for the needs of victims to restore balance and maintain belief in justice of society.   
4) The dramatic restatement of values. Re-affirmation of the validity of the rules and values of a society. 
5) Socialisation. Educate members of rules and values and contribute to their internalisation. 
6) Regulation and deterrence. Imposition of sanctions on individual to deter future behaviour. 
Experiences with international tribunals 
The Nuremberg trials after World War 2 and the UN’s International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia, currently trying Slobodan Milosevic, are well known examples of 
international tribunals. It is often seen as the winners justice: The victorious side can force 
their moral justice on the loosing side by taking the human rights offenders from the other 
side to court. Offenders from the winning side are rarely put on trial in these cases. 
The Nuremberg process was only possible because there were clear victorious and defeated 
parties, and the allied forces prosecuted offenders from the nazi regime. Offenders from the 
winning side were never put on trial. By putting individuals on trial, imposing collective 
guilt on all Germans was avoided, which according to Goldstone (Yugoslavia War crimes 
prosecutor) was a reason for post-Nazi reconciliation (quoted in Van der Merwe 
1999:ch.4.3.b.iii). But Reuter claims that individualised prosecutions has allowed individual 
citizens to avoid personal responsibility, and thereby buried, rather than dealt with their role 
in making the past abuses possible (ibid). While the strongest focus in trials is on justice, 
many argue or assume that trials will lead to some knowledge of the abuses, and that victims 
will have a better chance of reconciling with their own past if justice prevails. 
After the end of the cold war, most armed conflicts are civil wars (Wallensteen and 
Sollenberg 1998:623). In these situations (for instance South Africa, the former Yugoslavia, 
Uganda, Rwanda and Sierra Leone) victims, perpetrators and their communities must learn 
to live peacefully side by side in a closer way than after international wars. The need for 
reconciliation between conflicting groups is therefore greater after internal conflicts than 
after state to state conflicts.  
International war crimes tribunals have been put up after some civil wars where states have 
been unable or unwilling to prosecute. Currently the Arusha tribunals (prosecution leaders 
for the genocide in Rwanda) and the trials in the Hague (prosecuting genocide and crimes 
against humanity during the conflict in the former Yugoslavia) are in operation. Both are ad 
hoc tribunals put up by the United Nations (Van der Merwe 1999:ch.4). Joint national and 
international tribunals have been put up for violations taking place during the conflict in 
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Sierra Leone and Cambodia (Gloppen 2002:12). While a permanent international court to 
prosecute certain severe human rights abuses in cases where national governments fail to do 
so are being established, many now question whether such trials are capable of promoting 
reconciliation within the affected countries. 
The Hague trials have been viewed as a success in the sense that they have been able to 
prosecute such a high profile leader as former President Slobodan Milosevic. But the process 
is controversial, and handing over of other prominent leaders to the courts from the former 
Yugoslavia have been halted due to internal stability concerns. According to Klarin the Serb 
reaction to the tribunal was that it was  
…an instrument for an international ruling class –a “new world order” –whose aim is not to deliver some imaginary 
international justice, but to execute pressure on them and extort political and other concessions (Klarin 1996, quoted in Van der 
Merwe 1999: ch.4p.15)  
Such perceptions like can be serious hinders for the tribunals ablility to play a role in 
national reconciliation. As the UN was an active part in the conflict on the Balkans, 
perceptions of the UN lead trials as simply the winners justice over the loosing side can 
easily be put forward, given the organisations double role. Worries have also been 
mentioned over the lack of media coverage from the trials within the former Yugoslavia. If 
the trials don't contribute to an internal debate around the illegitimacy of former human 
rights abuses, it is unlikely that they will have an affect of hindering new atrocities by 
establishing respect for those rights.  
Experiences with combinations of international and national tribunals 
After the genocide in Rwanda, a combination of national mass trials and UN led 
international trials are taking place. The Rwanda tribunal has defined four different levels of 
guilt in the genocide, varying from ordering, planning and being active in the genocide, to 
stealing and damaging property during the genocide. As a result tens of thousands are being 
held for trial (van der Merwe 1999:ch 4.3b.iii). The national legal system does not have the 
economic recourses or capacity to give fair trials to all. Many people react to the difference 
in treatment between the masses, that are waiting for trial in horrible conditions within 
overcrowded prisons in Rwanda, and the leaders, being prosecuted by the international court 
in Arusha according to international standards of justice. The country is now establishing 
people's courts, based on tradition, to speed up the national process. In February 2002, only 
8 people had been convicted and one acquitted for the genocide by the UN Arusha tribunal, 
despite a budget in 2001 of near 100 million US dollars, and 800 employees. This shows that 
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trials can be an extremely expensive exercise, making it impossible to achieve in many cases 
either due to lack of capacity in the legal system or economic recourses. Being held in 
Tanzania, the UN tribunal is criticised for being to far away from Rwanda to have a large 
impact on national reconciliation (Jonassen:2002). The UN also has a legitimacy problem in 
Rwanda, given that it did not interfere in 1994 despite strong signals of genocide. General 
Secretary of the UN, Kofi Annan, was at the time leader of the UN peace keeping forces and 
thereby responsible for the decision (Jonassen:2002). These examples show that trials, in the 
cases where it is politically possible to impose, don't necessarily have a reconciliatory effect.  
A permanent UN international court is being established with the goal of interfering when 
national courts are unwilling or unable to do so. This will enable the UN Security Council to 
interfere in conflicts where human rights offences are taking place at an earlier stage than 
until now, and is a step towards strengthening international law in the area (Petersen:2002). 
Amnesty International sees the court as a the most important progress in international law 
since the adoption of the UN charter: 
…it will serve as a permanent deterrent to people considering these crimes. In most cases in the last fifty years international 
mechanisms to prosecute people accused of these crimes have only been set up after the crimes have occurred; it will have a 
much wider jurisdiction than the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the tribunals have 
been limited to crimes committed in a particular territory while crimes committed in other territories have not been addressed; 
and the Statute contains the most advanced provisions for the protection of victims from retraumatization as well as provision on 
the Court's order for a convicted person to provide redress, in the form of compensation, restitution, rehabilitation, satisfaction, 
guarantees of non-repetition, and any other type of reparation the Court deems appropriate (Amnesty International 2002) 
It will be set up to prosecute people accused for genocide, crimes against humanity and war 
crimes. More than 60 states have ratified the treaty opening for the establishment of the 
court. This does not, however, guarantee that UN lead trials will resolve the problems faced 
by other ad hoc UN courts. This makes it interesting to look at a few cases where attempts of 
trials failed, and what effect that had on reconciliation.  
Experiences with national tribunals 
The repressive military Junta in Argentina in power from 1976 was responsible for 
widespread killings and "disappearances"22. The regime collapsed after the loss of the 
Falkland war in 1982, which resulted in democratic elections. The democratically elected 
President won after a campaign arguing for trials for the human rights abuses. When in 
                                              
22 While no certain figures for executed people during the regime, the official accepted figure for detained-disappeared 
alone is 8960. Human rights organisations and several researchers believe the true number to be closer to 30 000 
(Skaar1994:61). Most of the violations took place between 1976 and 1978, but violations continued to the end of the 
regime (ibid). 
 42 
power, however, he experienced that the army was still strong enough to stop plans of 
punishing perpetrators, and the president granted amnesty for the abuses. He had created 
false expectations of criminal justice that he was unable to deliver: The result was public 
outrage, and had to leave office early. A truth commission was set up to investigate the 
crimes, but it was unable to satisfy the needs of the victims and their organisations. This lead 
to low levels of reconciliation and severe problems with consolidation the new democracy 
(Skaar 1994). 
Even though it is a national responsibility to put human rights abusers on trial, we have seen 
that this often does not happen. Hinders can be political restraints, political will, recourses or 
capacity. Some countries have adapted laws making it possible to put human rights offenders 
on trial for offences taking place outside their own territory.  
Experiences with trials by other country 
Like Argentina, Chile is also viewed as a country struggling with consolidating democracy 
(Skaar 1994). Chile's ex Dictator General Pinochet negotiated his way out from his 
authoritarian regime to reestablishment of democracy (pacted transition). Skaar (1994:42) 
estimates that more than 3 million people were detained, more than 200.000 exiled, over 
100.000 tortured, a thousand disappeared and roughly 2500 executed23 during his regime. 
Pinochet remained leader of the armed forces, and secured himself immunity from 
prosecution by ensuring himself diplomatic immunity for life. Legal hinders and lack of 
democratic control over the armed forces, still backing Pinochet, made it impossible for the 
new democratic regime to prosecute him or lower ranking human rights perpetrators. Trials 
could lead to a new military coup. Attempts were made to prosecute Pinochet by Spain, 
which demanded him handed over from Great Britain, for abuses where the victims were 
Spanish. Even though the Spanish did not succeed (Pinochet was declared medically unfit to 
stand trial) this sent out a signal that ex dictators might find themselves in a position as 
international outlaws. Even though such an effort to put up trials might have a preventive 
effect against future human rights abuses in other countries, it did not seem to have a 
positive effect on reconciliation in Chile. This failed attempt to prosecute him led to mass 
demonstrations and a revival of the conflict between his supporters and opponents.  
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These examples of attempts of bringing reconciliation through criminal justice after gross 
human rights abuses indicate varying success. In some cases the new regime is too weak to 
force through trials, and failed trials can lead to increased conflict. In other cases the trials 
may be perceived as illegitimate: Either because they are perceived as the winners justice 
over the loosing side, or being too far away from where the atrocities took place to affect 
reconciliation or create a debate around human rights. At other times capacity problems in 
the legal system can make trials impossible, and the overall costs of trials can in certain 
cases be hard to defend in poor countries, where recourses are very limited and other issues 
also pressing. But even though trials, with a focus on justice, seem to have limits in its 
ability to promote reconciliation, it is however the road suggested by international law. 
Criminal justice also serves other important functions than promoting reconciliation such as 
prevention of future abuses.  
3.2 Reconciliation through Restorative Justice 
In contrast or adding to the traditional understanding of criminal justice (focusing on 
punishing perpetrators), the concept of restorative justice has been used much in the 
academic literature on transitional justice. It focuses on the victim instead of the perpetrator, 
usually by compensating the victims of human rights, instead of punishing the perpetrator. 
Restorative justice is possible to achieve in cases where real political restraints makes 
amnesty impossible to avoid. This approach includes a need to decide how broadly one 
should define victims and address compensations (Gloppen 2002:31pp). It can for instance 
be argued that all non-white people in South Africa are victims of political and economic 
repression and thereby should have the right to compensation, and all white people benefited 
from the abuses and has a duty to pay reparations. This could legitimise redistribution of 
economic recourses, for instance through taxes, poverty reduction programmes and land 
reform. A more narrow understanding of victimisation is that only the most affected like 
victims of forced removals and gross human rights violations should receive personal 
compensation. This could have an important symbolic function, and cost far less money than 
a broader reparation policy. A narrow understanding of the violator would usually include 
                                                                                                                                           
23 The numbers of victims vary according to different sources. Skaar reports estimates based both on official recognised 
numbers and documentation from human rights organisations in Chile (1994:42) 
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perpetrators of gross human rights abuses, and people ordering them. This avoids the issue 
of collective guilt. It also takes away responsibility from ordinary South Africans that choose 
to ignore the human rights abuses or indirectly supported them by voting for the NP. Efforts 
at delivering restorative justice are often combined with truth commissions in cases where 
criminal justice is not achieved.  
Other elements of justice 
Gibson (2001B) distinguishes between different dimensions of justice that can be achieved 
in cases where amnesty has made criminal justice impossible: Giving compensation to 
victims of gross human rights abuses, giving victims a voice, social exclusion of the 
perpetrator and apologies for what happened. He argues that all of these elements apart from 
social exclusion of the perpetrator play an important role when people judge fairness in 
amnesty.  
Many argue that sincere apologies from perpetrators can have a positive effect on 
reconciliation, while lack of such apologies or insincere apologies can worsen the conflict.24 
In Chile the new government apologised for abuses (committed by the former regime) on 
behalf of the state. 
Even though Gibsons elements of justice does not serve all the purposes of criminal justice 
quoted above, they can provide restitution by providing for the needs of the victims and 
maintain beliefs of justice in society; restate that the violations were wrong and that human 
rights offences are unacceptable; and have a socialisation effect by educating members of 
society in human rights as core values that it is unacceptable to break.  
                                              
24 Van der Merwe (1999:ch.3) also discusses the importance of different concepts of justice in different cultures. 
Wagatsuma and Rosett (quoted in Van der Merwe 1999 ch.3:section 3b) argue that apology plays an important role in 
conflict resolution in Japan because it reaffirms the value of the social order, seen as providing harmony and stability. They 
argue that apology is not playing this role in the United States because an apology would only be viewed as admitting legal 
liability or an indication of personal character and thereby not contributing to the resolution of disputes in rights based 
dispute settlement framework. Using a Japanese model in the US would thus be hindered by implying/imposing legal 
liability in cases where parties attempt to apologise. Haley (1988:208) finds “considerable empirical support for the notion 
that encouraging remorse and restitution does tend to reduce recidivism” based on the same to cases, given Japans lower 
crime rate. According to van der Merwe (1999:ch3.3b) these mechanisms are thus not culture-bound, but can be 
incorporated into other western legal systems, and are more a paradigm choice than a culturally determined process. Nader 
and Combs-Schilling (quoted in Van der Merwe 1999:ch3.3b) warns about transferring restitution models to western post-
industrial societies because of implementation problems where among other things most legal disputes are between people 
who does not know one another, legal access is largely by wealth and crime closely follows class.  
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3.3 Reconciliation through oblivion 
Turning a blind eye (oblivion or national amnesia) to former gross human rights abuses is 
common in cases where powerful people in the transition process have interests in keeping 
the abuses in the dark or in cases where both sides of a conflict have got dirty hands. The 
result is impunity through amnesty or inaction. Some argue that oblivion is a way to promote 
reconciliation because, unlike trials and truth commissions, it does not dwell with a painful 
past. 
Amnesia was as mentioned the solution Zimbabwe choose after the transition from Smiths 
white dominated Rhodesian regime to the independent formal democracy, lead by Robert 
Mugabe. Like in South Africa, Zimbabwe had a violent history and a general overlap 
between race and class, and white farmers controlled much of the land. Van der Merwe 
(1999) argues that Mugabe adapted a non-vengeful strategy of national reconciliation based 
on non-racialism, and political and economic compromise. This reconciliation was presented 
as a gift from the victims based on personal moral convictions. While it may have succeeded 
in ensuring a peaceful post-transition normalisation of social relations, it ultimately appears 
to have failed as a political program. The underlying assumption of (or hope for) a 
commitment to a redistribution of resources and the establishment of a unified African 
identity was not acceptable to whites. They did not perceive the existence of a covenant in 
which the “gift” of non-retribution was exchanged for social justice and incorporation into 
an African identity (Van der Merwe 1999:ch.4.3a). Carver argues that lack of prosecution of 
human rights abuses that took place within the Smith regime is part of the reason for the 
subsequent abuses committed by the new government during the Matabeleland crisis 
(1989:13). The governments blessing of the ongoing occupation of white owned farms, by so 
called war veterans, where several people have been killed, also shows that Mugabe’s 
regime has failed to promote reconciliation, establish a regime based on respect for human 
rights and respect for the rule of law.  
The National Party in South Africa was arguing for oblivion in connection with the 
transition to democracy. NP argued that South Africa had been in a state of war. Abuses had 
taken place on both sides, like in any war, and it was time to call it even. ANC disagreed, 
claiming that they were fighting a just war against an illegitimate regime. Oblivion would 
put the two parties on the same moral level and that was unacceptable to the ANC. But the 
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ANC was as mentioned not strong enough to force through trials, and the National Party was 
in a position to stop the democratic transition.  
By not dealing with former gross human rights abuses, new democratic regimes fail to meet 
any of the functions Nader and Combs-Schilling pointed out as functions of the justice 
system. Even though some argue that oblivion promotes reconciliation, the case of 
Zimbabwe shows that it can also lead to continued human rights abuses, lack of respect for 
the law, and undermine reconciliation and democratic consolidation. But real political 
constraints can make prosecutions impossible. Truth commissions can be seen as an attempt 
to find a middle way, with a stronger focus on truth and often -restorative justice than 
criminal justice, and increasingly focusing on reconciliation. 
3.4 Reconciliation through truth25: Truth Commissions  
There is a growing experience with truth commissions, non-juridical independent 
commissions trying to establish a general picture of former gross human rights offences 
(Christie 2000:60-61). Truth commissions try to of uncover violations in a specific time 
frame, have limited time spans and usually have got some authority that gives it access to 
sensitive information. The goals are: 
Creating an authoritative record of what happened; providing a platform for the victims to tell their stories and obtain some form 
of redress; recommending legislative, structural or other changes to avoid a repetition of past abuses; and establishing who was 
responsible and providing a measure of accountability for the perpetrators (Popkin and Roth-Arriaza quoted in Christie 2000:61. 
By establishing the truth of gross human rights abuses it is usually meant establishing for a 
fact that such abuses did happen, which has often been denied by powerful people and their 
supporters. It can mean establishing who committed the violations, and who was ordering 
them and who were victims of these violations. It can mean finding out the details about how 
particular cases happened and why. The TRC’s final report distinguishes between four 
different notions of truth (vol.1 ch.5):  
Factual or forensic truth is about what happened to whom, where, when and how, and who 
was involved, and requires extensive verification and corroboration policy to make sure that 
                                              
25 Adding to truth commissions, Gloppen mentions access to files (like the opening of the Stasi files), and history writing, 
as ways of making the truth about human rights abuses come out (2002).  
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findings were based on accurate and factual information, and find the contexts, causes and 
patterns of violations. In the words of Michael Ignatieff: 
All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse. 
In Argentina, its work has made it impossible to claim, for example, that the military did not throw half-dead victims in the sea 
from helicopters.In Chile, it is no longer permissible to assert in public that the Pinnochet regime did not dispatch thousands of 
entirely innocent people... (quoted in TRC final report vol.1 ch.5). 
Personal and narrative truth was about giving people an opportunity to tell their stories and 
the truth as they see it. These personal truths were communicated to the broader public by 
the media and sought to contribute to the process of reconciliation by ensuring that the truth 
about the past included the validation of the individual subjective experiences of people who 
had previously been silenced or voiceless. 
In recognising the importance of social or ‘dialogue’ truth, the Commission acknowledged 
the importance of participation and transparency. Its goal was to try to transcend the 
divisions of the past by listening carefully to the complex motives and perspectives of all 
those involved. It made a conscious effort to provide an environment in which all possible 
views could be considered and weighed, one against the other. 
Healing and restorative truth is the kind of truth that places facts and what they mean within 
the context of human relationships - both amongst citizens and between the state and its 
citizens. What is critical is that the facts be fully and publicly acknowledged. It is not merely 
the actual knowledge about past human rights violations that counts; often the basic facts 
about what happened are already known, at least by those who were affected. 
Acknowledgement is an affirmation that a person’s pain is real and worthy of attention. It is 
thus central to the restoration of the dignity of victims.  
South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Chad, the Philippines and Uganda are examples of countries 
that have tried truth commissions (a list of truth commissions and their mandates and 
findings is added in appendix 3). In some cases obstacles faced by truth commissions 
become too large to overcome, and some commissions, like the Philippinean, have never 
been able to deliver a final report (Christie 2000:58). In other cases reports have been 
publicises, but ignored by governments (Uganda's first commission, Uruguay's commission) 
(Christie 2000:54, 58). Chad, Chile, Argentina and South Africa's truth commissions all 
documented large-scale abuses, but had mixed results. In Chad, where 40 000 killings were 
reported, the abuses continue. According to Christie (ibid), the commission was mainly a PR 
stunt for the new government.  
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In Chile and Argentina the commissions managed to start a discussion around the issue of 
state terrorism and gross human rights violations. They gave victims a first chance of being 
heard and taken seriously by the government. The reports consciously listed the names of the 
victims of gross human rights violations, but failed to account for a large number of other 
serious violations, such as torture and exile, which affected large parts of the population. The 
reports failed to reveal the names of the perpetrators26 (Skaar 1994:107). 
…the attempt at “truth telling” had a much more positive effect in Chile than in Argentina even though the strategies regarding 
the issuing of the government reports was almost identical in the two countries(Skaar 1994:130) 
She argues that the disappointment was bigger in Argentina as people had expected the 
military to be punished for their crimes. The transition here came (as mentioned) after the 
military had been defeated in the Falkland war. The new president Alfonsín was known for 
his commitment to human rights and boldness in politics. When he failed to deliver his 
promises of criminal justice people felt let down. In Chile the transition was more controlled, 
the army was stronger and still controlled by Pinochet. President Aylwin was careful not 
promesing too much in the field of human rights, learning from the Argentine experience. 
The disappointment over failure of delivering criminal justice was therefore smaller in 
Chile.The time factor is also very important. The worst human rights violations in Chile had 
taken place fifteen years prior to the transition, allowing time for the blunting of feelings and 
the partial healing of wounds. In Argentina the wounds were still wide open, as large-scale 
violations were fresh in most peoples memories (Skaar1994:131). 
Both cases gave compensation to victims, but they were more extensive in Chile than in 
Argentina. Skaar also argues that civil society played a different role in the two countries. 
The extra pressure from the Grandmothers27 in Argentina has presented the authorities with 
an ongoing problem absent in Chile. Moreover, Alfonsín faced much more opposition from 
non-military actors than Aylwin. This indicates that one ought to take into account the 
position of civil society as well as the position of the military when judging the result or 
effects of human rights policies. Alfonsín lacked the adequate backing from the human 
rights organisations and the political parties on the Left to carry his policy through. This 
offered the military an opportunity to close ranks and strengthen their position (Ibid).  
                                              
26 Skaar seems to use the term Gross Human Right Violation in a different way here, by not including torture, like she did 
in her definition of the term, referred to above 
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The Chilean case had a little bit more success than the Argentinean in discovering the truth 
and promoting reconciliation. Problems connected to the Chilean and Argentinean 
approaches were that offenders of human rights did not get a good reason to talk: They got 
amnesty anyway, so why let people know what they did? This problem is even clearer when 
it comes to trials: Then perpetrators have greater incentives to hide their crimes, in fear of 
punishment. 
The South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission was different because it avoided 
giving Blank amnesty to people who had committed gross violations of human rights. 
Amnesty was used as a carrot to make perpetrators tell the truth about the violations: 
Amnesty was only supposed to be given in exchange for the truth. The victims were to get 
compensation from the government in return for accepting amnesty. This was built on an 
assumption that truth was a necessary precondition for reconciliation, and restorative justice 
could to a certain extent compensate for criminal justice. 
Can truth commissions fill the functions of a justice system, in cases where criminal justice 
is of limits? The cases above suggest that truth commissions have had varying success at 
preventing future abuses. Rehabilitation and reintegration of offenders are parts of the 
fundamental focus on reconciliation in the South African case. By combining truth 
commissions with reparations to victims, some restorative justice were achieved for instance 
in Chile, Argentina and (to some extent) South Africa. The focus on human rights can 
contribute to re-affirm human rights as important norms, promote socialisation and 
internalise human rights as core values among members in society. Truth commissions can 
thus to some extent fill some of the functions of justice systems. But given that truth 
commissions often (but not necessarily) are put up in connection with amnesty, it is 
questionable to what extent truth commissions can deter future violations to the same extent 
as criminal justice. 
                                                                                                                                           
27 The grandmothers of Plaza de Mayo is a family based human rights organisation in Argentina, specifically devoted to the 
search for disappeared grand-children (Skaar 1996:144) 
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3.5 Reconciliation through prospective justice/ institutional reform 
The argument for Institutional reform or prospective justice is that reconciliation depends 
less on how to address the past than the fairness of the present and future terms of social co-
operation. Past repression should be addressed with social reform and affirmative action 
programmes, rather than compensation to individual victims. The focus is shifted from 
handling gross human rights violations to addressing past repression of equality, social and 
cultural rights. If pursued alone, this strategy would ignore the problems connected to 
impunity, the need to restore a sense of justice after gross human rights abuses, and can 
jeopardise the rule or law. But this can be avoided by following the strategy in combination 
with other strategies, such as criminal justice or truth commissions (Gloppen 2002:34)  
3.6 Reconciliation through contact? 
The roads to reconciliation discussed above all focus on institutional ways of promoting 
reconciliation. Some theorists argue that contact between the races will lead to greater 
understanding and racial harmony, under certain conditions: This suggests a possible non- 
institutional road to reconciliation in cases where the conflict has partly been a racial one as 
in South Africa. Gibson (2001A:12-13) quotes Pettigrew saying the contact have to include:  
equal status –the expectation and perception by parties of equality in the interaction(…) common goals –sharing a common 
objective (as in athletics or in the military) (…) intergroup cooperation –interactions based around cooperative rather than 
competitive circumstances; and (…) support of authorities, law, or custom – the presence of authoritative norms encouraging 
acceptance. 
The importance of personal experiences through daily contact between former conflicting 
parties has to a largely been overlooked in the debate on roads to reconciliation. We need to 
know more about the relative importance of institutional approaches to reconciliation 
compared to other elements that can affect reconciliation, such as contact. If this works in 
favour of reconciliation, it is clearly a low cost way (in both time and effort) to promote 
reconciliation, either alone or together with institutional paths to reconciliation. We will take 
a closer look at this in chapter 6 
3.7 Summary  
We have identified five roads to reconciliation adding to a hypothesis that the experience of 
everyday contact between conflicting racial groups will affect reconciliation. We saw that 
none of the institutional paths are best under all circumstances. While criminal justice, 
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oblivion, restorative justice and truth commissions focus on how to address former gross 
human rights abuses, prespective justice (reform) focus on the result of repression of the 
rights to equality, social and cultural rights. 
Even though international law obligates governments to prosecute after gross human rights 
abuses, restraints on new democratic governments can limit the policy options after 
democratic transitions (even in cases where the new government is committed to human 
rights). Such restraints can a.o. include promises for amnesty made as part of a negotiated 
pact during the democratic transition, fears that trials might trigger attempts of coup détàt in 
cases where powerful antidemocratic enclaves exists within the new regime, and these 
groups see trials as a threat to their interests. Lack of institutional or financial recourses can 
make (fair) trials impossible to implement.  
In some cases where new governments show little will or ability to prosecute, international 
actors have been involved either through international war crimes tribunals, joint tribunals or 
prosecutions abroad. The examples discussed indicate that these have had a limited effect on 
reconciliation. Lack of local ownership of the process and located away from where the 
abuses took place has limited the ability to promote a local human rights debate. 
Furthermore, in cases where the party prosecuting can be seen as having a role in the former 
conflict, the trials can be perceived as biased and the winner's justice and limit its local 
legitimacy.  
But the criminal justice approach have other important features apart from effect on 
reconciliation that cannot be overlooked. These include ability to prevent and deter future 
abuses, rehabilitating the perpetrator, restitution towards victims, socialisation of the 
population in basic rules and restate the validity of rules and values in society. We argued 
that it is questionable whether oblivion leads to reconciliation and this strategy fails to fill 
any of the other functions of criminal justice. 
Truth commissions and measures of restorative justice can to some extent compensate for 
lack of criminal justice after gross human rights abuses. These approaches shift the main 
focus from perpetrators to victims, acknowledgement and tries to reinstate the values of 
human rights. Successful truth commissions might have greater chances of uncovering 
violations than trials, because trials give perpetrators greater incentives to cover over abuses 
in fear of punishment. Still many truth commissions are unsuccessful due to lack of 
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recourses, accusations of bias, are unable to publish a report or their reports are ignored. The 
South African TRC, by many viewed as a possible model for future truth commissions, 
showes that contingent amnesty can be a powerful tool to make perpetrators speak and 
uncover the truth about the abuses. But it is still an open ended question to what degree such 
revelations promote reconciliation. This will be discussed in chapter 5 and 6. 
We saw that social/ institutional reform can be a supplementary road to reconciliation by 
addressing the result of general repression of social, economic and cultural rights. But that 
all these institutional roads to reconciliation fail to take into account the effects of peoples 
daily experiences with former enemies through contact. How this affects institutional 
attempts at promoting reconciliation at the community level will be addressed in chapter 6.  
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4. THE SOUTH AFRICAN CASE  
South Africa is often seen as a success case in democratic consolidation despite conditions 
of a violent past where human rights violations were widespread, and the mode of transition 
to democracy put restraints on how former human rights abuses could be addressed. To 
avoid resurrection of old conflicts and democratic deterioration, reconciliation was put on 
top of the political agenda. In order to understandbetter the various reconciliatory attempts 
that were initiated, I will in the following briefly present some background information on 
the conflicts and the legacy of human rights abuses in terms of poverty, extreme inequality 
and political cleavages28. We look into which restraints the negotiated transition put on 
choice of reconciliation strategies. The main challenges South Africa was facing and how 
these were addressed is presented. I question whether South Africans have an instrumental 
view of democracy and whether limited delivery of economic and social rights is 
undermining the consolidation of democracy in South Africa.  
4.1 Human rights abuses under Apartheid and their legacies 
Racial discrimination was already widespread in South Africa under the British colonial 
rule. In 1913 the Native Land Act limited land purchases by Africans (70% of the 
population) to 7 percent of the land, within special reserves. In 1948, when the Afrikaner29 
dominated National Party came to power, the system of apartheid was institutionalised 
whereby the various racial groups were to develop, and be awarded rights, separately 
(Deegan 1999:xi). The ideology and policy of apartheid was developed to secure white 
people's economic and political domination over the other population groups. In the early 
1960s the UN declared apartheid a "crime against humanity" (Christie 2000:19). 
                                              
28 There exists extensive literature on the structures and ideological background of apartheid system. A brief historical 
context is added in appendix 2. 
29 The Afrikaans speaking population are mainly descendants of European settlers, and has developed a self-image as a 
haunted people, first fleeing Europe to settle in Africa, and later oppressed by the new British Cape Colony. In the "great 
treek", farmers (Boers) tried to escape British colonial rule by moving inland. The treek Boers arrived in an area where the 
Zulu expansion under king Shaka had lead to migration of large population groups resulting in further conflicts. In the 
Anglo Boer war, many Afrikaners were killed in British concentration camps, and strengthened the Boers self image as a 
haunted people. By securing themselves power over the state through the National Party they saw an opportunity of safety 
for their own group, and control over the major economic recourses for the white people.  
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The population was divided by skin colour. The majority of the population was classified as 
black/African. The racially mixed population and descendants of the indigenous Khoi-san 
population were classified as Coloureds and were given some more privileges than black 
people. Asians and whites30 as the other two groups were recognised even more status and 
rights. After formal democracy was established, 11 languages were recognised as official 
languages, with Zulu and Xhosa being the largest ones.31The regime subdivided the 
population by ethnicity and actively played out a policy of divide and rule. Cross-racial 
marriages were banned. The main African ethnic groups would each get their own self 
governed homeland32 and this was enforced by forced removals33. As the homelands were 
too small and situated on marginal land unable to uphold the populations, the homelands 
served as labour reserves for the white people, and a system of migrant workers took form. 
The pass laws made sure that black people without jobs were not allowed to stay outside the 
homelands. Only the white part of the population enjoyed full political rights like the right to 
vote under apartheid, while the black population was supposed to exercise their political 
rights only within their own territories, the Bantustans.34 By the early 1990s, 70 percent of 
the land was owned by a little over 50 000 white farmers, in a country with more than 40 
million inhabitants.  
By breaking basic human rights the whites took control over most of the land and economic 
recourses. Access to equal education was hindered by the Bantu education act, the press was 
                                              
30 The white part of the population is divided between Afrikaners and the English speaking population (descendants of 
people immigrating when South Africa was a British colony). While the Afrikaners have mainly been rural farmers, the 
British have been urban with control of commerce and the rich mining industry.  
31 The 11 language groups are: Zulu (22%), Xhosa (18%), Afrikaans (14,5%), North and South-Sotho (15,5%), English 
(8%), Tswana (8%), Tsonga (4%), Siswati (3%), Venda(2%) and Ndebele (1%) (Gloppen 1997:18) Adding to this is the 
language of the indigenous KhoiSan population. 
32 Ten homelands/Bantustans were established, four so-called independent and the rest so-called dependent homelands. The 
prior were set up with separate foreign policy, military etc., while the latter shared these tasks with the white South Africa 
while carrying independent responsibilities for health, education etc. Even the prior depended however, heavily on transfers 
from the apartheid government. 
33 3,5 million people have been estimated to have been removed from their homes in order to fit into their "right" area in terms of 
these laws from 1960 to 1983 (du Toit 1996:309, Tørres 2000). 
34 The government introduced voting rights also for the Asian and coloured population for separate chambers in the 
Parliament after a referendum in 1983. The legislature, i.e. Parliament consisted of three houses or chambers: a House of 
Assembly (for whites), a House of Representatives (for "coloureds") and a House of Delegates (for Indians) (Tørres 2000). The 
distribution of tasks between the chambers in Parliament followed a separation between "own" and "general" affairs. "Own 
affairs" were matters that affected one specific population groups, while "general affairs" were all matters that were not "own 
affairs", i.e. such as defence, foreign affairs, law and order, transport and the like. If disagreements occurred between the 
chambers in parliament, the Presidents Council had the final say. Elections were also introduced in several townships outside 
the urban areas, but were widely boycotted. 
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censured hindering access to information, and many of the most attractive jobs were 
reserved for whites only. The banning of the main opposition groups like the ANC and PAC 
and widespread gross human rights was a part of the government’s oppressive policy. This 
made it possible for a minority of whites to hold on to their economic and political power. 
The unequal distribution of economic privileges resulted in a white population enjoying a 
standard of living comparable to any first world county while the black population enjoy a 
standard of living comparable to South Africa's neighbouring countries (Gloppen 1997:27). 
Simultaneously, about half the black population is living in poverty, and public services like 
roads, water and sanitation are mainly built out to service the white population (May 1998) 
(An overview of basic needs in South Africa at the time of the transition is added in 
appendix 1). Poverty is extremely unevenly distributed between the population groups: 61% 
of the black population, 38% of the coloureds, 5% of the Indians and only 1% of the white 
population live in poverty (measured by the national poverty line). Women are more affected 
by poverty than men: 60% of female-headed households, and 31% of male headed 
households live in poverty. Poverty is most widespread in rural areas. The poorest 40% of 
the households (50% of the population) receive only 11% of total income, while the richest 
10% of the households (7% of the population) receive over 40% of the total income (May 
1998). Many commentators suggests that customary law is still a potent force in the lives of 
rural women despite the Bill of Rights and the governments commitment to gender equality 
(Deegan 1999:88). 
The main resource for rural women is land, to which their households have access under traditional customary arrangements. 
White points out that under customary law, women obtain land only through a male relative or their husband. So although they 
may be sole cultivators of the land "they may not make any important decisions about its use or disposal (White 1995). Equally, 
under the African communal system, grazing rights and rights to live and grow crops on portions of land are allocated by the 
chef to male heads of household…because alternative forms of paid work are rare, women are dependent on the remittance sent 
to them by their spouses (Deegan 1999:88).  
Social identities and political cleavages in South Africa 
The apartheid years to a large extent determine the present political cleavages and formed 
social identities in the South African population. The regimes division and sub division of 
people into racial ethnic groups35 (largely overlapping with language groups36) combined 
                                              
35 The root of all statutory discrimination was to be found in The Population Registration Act, which laid the basis for 
classification according to race. Classification did little justice to the cultural complexity of SA or to people's self-
definition. It became a function of administrative decisions, and for allocations of rights and duties, but mostly for 
allocation of privileges and resources. The Land Act and The Group Areas Act (36 of 1966) regulated residence, property, 
and use of land and business premises in respectively rural and urban areas. The Separate Amenities Act (49 of 1953) gave 
regions and localities access to regulating access to and use of amenities like hotels, transport, restaurants, etc. according to 
race. In addition, to these laws, thousand of other restrictions regulated apartheid segregation and discrimination 
(Tørres:2000) All in all, Horrell (1979) argues that there were 331 different enactments directing race relations. Giliomee 
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with rights being connected to this classification has led to a general overlap between class 
and race, strengthening the divide. There are also lines of division based on geography, 
religion, age, gender and education in South Africa. Gender is an important social identity 
that has shaped peoples ability to make choices in South Africa.  
South Africans still to a certain extent identify with the racial categories created by 
Apartheid, even though many identify themselves as South African37. Voting patterns to a 
large extent overlap with race and class, but the IFP is the only party based on ethnic 
identity. In the second elections in 1999 there were tendencies of three major parties (ANC, 
NNP and DP, representing 83% of the votes) becoming more cross cutting in terms of racial 
support, even though their policy platforms are not (Reynolds 1999:177). Due to class 
differences and separation of residential areas between these groups, South Africa is still a 
highly segmented society, where there is very limited contact between the groups.38 After 
the end of apartheid a newblack middle class has emerged, and some whites have become 
poorer. But according to Tørres (2001;forthcoming) there are indications that inequality has 
grown between the races after the end of apartheid, as has inequality within the racial 
groups.  
The Bantu Education Act made sure black people received lower quality and lower level 
education than whites. Many young South Africans quit school to join the liberation 
movements or got their education disrupted by schools boycotts or close downs due to the 
political situation. As a consequence the younger generation is often labelled "the lost 
generation". Unemployment is nearly 32 percent using a strict definition, and 45 percent if 
                                                                                                                                           
(1979) refers to another estimate, which suggests that by 1978, there were 4000 laws and 6000 regulations affecting the 
private sector of the economy. 
36 An ethnic group is often viewed as a group that sees themselves as a unity based on for instance common historical 
background, language, religion or culture (Gloppen 1997:12). It is debated how important ethnic identity is in South Africa. 
The ANC has claimed that the divisions between different ethnic groups were created or enforced by the Apartheid 
government's divide and rule tactic (Gloppen 1997: 18). 
37 The importance of ethnic and racial identity is heavily debated in South Africa. For a thorough discussion, see Gloppen 
(1997:17pp) 
38 The separate development programmes resulted in a strong segregation of the country. While it resulted in different 
residential areas for the various population groups which still constitutes the major cleavage to be crossed for normal social 
contact to be established, other racial residential patterns should also be noted. The racial politics of The Afrikaners had 
established independent settler republics before conquered by the British colony and have their strongholds in the Free 
State. English speaking liberals have a stronghold in Western Cape, as this used to be the regional centre for the British 
colony in South Africa. Together with the Northern province it was a coloured labour preference area, which means that 
black people were not allowed to work there if there were coloured people available. As residence permits were connected 
to being employed, these are the only regions in South Africa where the majority of the population is not black but 
coloured. 
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those who have given up finding jobs are included. It hits Blacks, youngsters, women and 
rural dwellers the most, and white people the least (Tørres 2001:8). There is a large informal 
economy on the side of the formal, with cleavages between people with access to formal 
jobs and rights connected to this, and people working in the informal sector (Tørres 2001:16-
18). The drop in political violence has been followed by a dramatic increase of violent crime 
making safety an issue at all times in South Africa today (Deegan 1999:164pp). 
Racial group to a large extent still determines political preferences (Reynolds 1999:176-
187). Most black people support the ANC, while the white vote still goes to the new 
National Party (traditionally mainly supported by the Afrikaners) and the liberal Democratic 
Party (traditionally supported by the English speaking population)(Raynolds 1999). While 
ethnic conflicts has been widespread in many African countries, such conflicts between 
various African groups have been by and large absent in South Africa. But the ethnic 
mobilisation conducted by the Inkatha Freedom Party should be mentioned. Inkatha 
mobilised under apartheid specifically in the homeland KwaZulu, which is the region where 
it still regains most of its votes39, with ethnicity and defence of the “Zulu nation” as the main 
driving force. IFP has been fighting to preserve Zulu national identity, hindering nation 
building and preserve local power based on ethnicity, and the power base of traditional 
leaders. Yet, IFP has little support from non-Zulu's and most Zulu's support ANC (Gloppen 
1997:22). The ANC and IFP were engaged in an armed conflict mainly in the KwaZulu-
Natal province around the time of transition, but this politically motivated violence has 
decreased. The Conservative Party is the last major white party, adding to several small right 
wing Afrikaner groupings, struggling for an Afrikaner homeland.  
While race and class seem to be major determining factors for identity and political 
preferences, religion has less impact on politics.40 While the urban-rural divide to some 
                                              
39 We have seen that Inkatha accepted the homeland status awarded by the apartheid government (as compared to the ANC 
and PAC who refused this system any legitimacy). While primarily mobilising in KwaZulu, it also tried to mobilise some 
support in the townships around Johannesburg from the late 80's. Today, Inkatha has majority in the same region, now re-
named KwaZulu Natal. 
40 Christianity is the dominant religion but there are a variety of different churches. They have a history of social and 
political engagement against apartheid, particularly in the times when opposition groups were banned. The Afrikaner Dutch 
reformed church (NG kerk) stands out because it legitimised Apartheid religiously. The Dutch reformed church also had 
churches for coloured and for black people. These were opposing Apartheid. (For an overview of other churches and 
religious communities, see Tørres 2000:499). The Dutch reformed church have acknowledged that apartheid vas "church 
policy", the church pushed hard to get the NP to enact laws against racially mixed marriages, establish group areas, Bantu 
education, and received secret state funding for propaganda purposes. The church even acknowledges that is provided 
theological and biblical justification for apartheid (Botman 1999:129) 
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extent reflect the previous divide between the former homelands and the former white areas, 
and still reflects major differences in living standards, urban versus rural seem to also have 
less impact on political priorities.  
                                             
4.2 Transition to democracy by negotiations 
Towards the end of the 80s, the cost of the apartheid system was beginning to take its tolls 
also on the apartheid state. While the struggle and military encounters in the frontline states 
had achieved limited military success, there is no doubt that the liberation movements had 
won the international opinions to their side. International sanctions and disinvestments, 
combined with a general economic downturn due amongst others to decreasing international 
prices for gold and diamonds also had its impact. The economy was also suffering long term 
effects of the costs of upholding the repressive state apparatus. Internal turmoil contributed 
further to lack of stability and predictability for employers and the state alike. These factors, 
combined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, and hence the “communist threat” laid 
additional bases for the “talks about talks” and the negotiations to start. 
Informal talks between the government and imprisoned ANC leader Mandela lead to 
Mandelas release in 1990 and the unbanning of the liberation movements. 1990 saw the real 
dawn of political change in South Africa (Tørres 2000). Several apartheid laws had been lifted 
in the late 80s and more followed in February 1990.41 In 1991 formal negotiations over the 
establishment of democracy started (Convention for a democratic South Africa, CODESA), 
where the government and opposition groups were present. The outcome was agreement of a 
two-stage process: First the main political groups negotiated an interim constitution as the 
basis for national elections for a constitutional assembly. This assembly drafted the final 
constitution. This strengthened ANC's influence over the final constitution, as the elections 
marked a change of power between the NP and the ANC. The influence of the South African 
negotiated pact on the final constitution were thus less restrained then for instance in Chile, 
where undemocratic enclaves of power (the military) still exist, hindering democratic 
consolidation (Skaar 1994). Free parliamentary elections took place for the first time in 1994 
and local elections were to follow in 1995 and -96. The Constitution was finalised in 1996 and 
 
41 President De Klerk opened Parliament on February 2nd 1990, announcing the unbanning of the African National 
Congress, the South African Communist Party and the Pan Africanist Congress.  
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new, fully democratic elections held in 1999. This transition is an example of a pacted transition 
to democracy, discussed in chapter 2. 
The negotiations leading up to the new constitution and the elections took place in a setting 
where political violence escalated, particularly between ANC and IFP supporters in 
KwaZulu Natal. Inkatha and PAC boycotted the talks42. How to handle former human rights 
abuses was a hot potato and threatened to break down the negotiations. NP demanded 
amnesty, and as a compromise between amnesia and trials the parties agreed to put up a truth 
commission. 27th of April 1994 South Africa's first fully democratic elections were held, and 
Inkatha, that had decided to boycott the election, decided to join in the last minute. 
ANC won a clear majority of seats in the parliament, but did not have a qualified majority. 
Together with the NP and Inkatha it established a Government of National Unity 
(Reynolds:1999). On top of the agenda was reconciliation and creating a final constitution 
that established democratic conflict resolution mechanisms that were perceived as legitimate 
by all major parties (Mandela 1995:744-5). ANC voters expected improved living conditions 
and addressing of injustices from the past. The deep cleavages between different groups had 
to be addressed. While reconciliation was seen as essential to avoid resurrection of violent 
conflict and democratic deterioration, the means to achieve this were controversial. 
The final constitution borrowed, as mentioned in chapter one, from both the majoritarian and 
Consociational models43. The constitution cannot be changed without a qualified majority 
and includes a bill of rights with a strong focus on human rights including economic and 
social rights. It not only established that the state did not have the right to take away these 
rights (negative right), but also the states obligation to try and deliver these rights (positive 
rights). This made the South African constitution one of the most progressive in the world 
when it comes to human rights. Included in the bill of rights was the right to property, which 
made radical redistribution of land impossible. 
                                              
42 According to Mandela, the PAC decided to boycott the talks, accusing the ANC and the national Party of conspiring 
together to set up a multi-racial government. The PAC feared democratic elections because they knew that such a vote 
would expose their meagre popular support. Chief Buthulezi also boycotted the talks on the grounds that he was not 
permitted three delegations: for Inkatha, the KwaZulu government and King Zwelithini (Mandela 1995:713, Tørres 2000) 
43 For an extensive debate on the South African transition and the democratic institutions, see Gloppen 1997 
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This election system gave the ANC majority at the national level, but not enough seats to 
change the constitution alone. It also controls all provinces apart from the KwaZulu Natal 
(IFP), and Western Cape, where (N)NP44 governed alone after the first election, and in an 
alliance with the DP after the second election. The IFP/NP wish of preserving group 
identities and only changing rules for intergroup behaviour was thereby partly met by 
establishing a certain degree of local self determination. Both parties did, as mentioned, 
manage to get into government in a region each, (possibly strengthening commitment to 
democracy, because minority parties has a fair chance of local power even though no party is 
in the foreseeable future in a position where they can challenge ANC at the national level). 
Both parties got some influence at the national level through access to the GNU, even 
though the NP decided to drop out in 1996. 
4.3 The new government: Challenges and policy 
After the democratic transition, the expectations of what the new democratic government 
could achieve were high, both within South Africa and abroad. There was a need to de-
escalate the former conflict, create stability and consolidating democracy, and reconciliation 
was seen as essential to reach these goals. The part of the population that had been oppressed 
during the apartheid regime expected improved living conditions, which put the social and 
economic conflict on the agenda. At the same time, the government was afraid to alienate the 
white population in fear of revival of armed conflict or mass emigration which could lead to 
brain-drain and loss of necessary capital in South Africa. The negotiated settlement of the 
old conflict also put restraints on the policy options for the new government. Finding a 
balance between these goals within the policy restraints from the negotiated settlement was 
problematic: While radical redistribution of wealth (for instance through large scale 
landreform, taxes or appropriation of private owned companies) might have lead to 
improved standard of living for the black majority, it was excluded as a policy option: The 
right to private ownership was established in the new constitution, and the new government 
adapted a long term policy for dealing with the social and economic conflict through gradual 
redistribution of wealth through redistribution of state recourses and growth (discussed 
below). 
                                              
44 The National Party has changed name to the New National Party (NNP). 
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Although apartheid laws had been formally lifted, the cumulative weight of apartheid racism 
still marked every aspect of society.45 Enormous differences in real distribution of 
socio-economic resources remained. Access to education, infrastructure, health- and social 
services varied according to residential areas, which again to a large extent overlapped with race 
and population groups. South Africa has one of the highest degrees of inequalities in wealth and 
income in the world. There were also differences in distribution of resources between rural and 
urban areas and between groups living in the ten old traditional "homelands" established under 
apartheid and people living in other areas.  
The ANC was struggling with how to adjust from being a liberation movement to a 
democratic party in government. At the same time as it had to deal with the process of 
nation-building and building of democracy, and trying to redistribute recourses from one 
powerful group represented in their government. There was a violent conflict it KwaZulu-
Natal, and former gross human rights violations had to be addressed. Social problems like 
high unemployment rates together with raising crime and violent crime rates, a growing 
AIDS crisis, widespread poverty and lack of skills had to be addressed. Lack of 
infrastructure in former disadvantaged communities hampered the delivering of basic needs, 
and the limited economic growth made it impossible to grow out of the economic conflict 
and avoiding economic redistribution. The adaptation of a neo liberal policy has lead to an 
increasing tension within ANC and its allies, such as the trade union movements COSATU. 
4.4 Consolidation of democacy in South Africa? 
To what extent is the South African democracy consolidated? Reynolds (1999) uses electoral 
(minimalist) criteria as indicators to degree of democratic consolidation in South Africa, 
while we can also use Linz and Stephans (1996) 3 criteria for consolidation of democracy 
(behaviour, attitudes and constitutional to indicate degree of consolidation.  
Much of the analysis of the 1994 election revolved around whether the results demonstrated 
a mere "ethnic census" of the electorate -black voters voting for black parties, and white 
people voting for white parties, and voters choices made by ethnic affiliation and kinship ties 
instead of their interests. Such ethnic voting has long been cited as the bane of 
                                              
45 See Tørres (2000) for a substantive discussion of these challenges. 
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democratisation attempts in Africa. Reynolds (1999:176) argues that the high correlation 
between voting behaviour in -94 and ethnicity did not imply "irrational" voting: Both on 
pocket book and social issues, it was highly rational for non-white South Africans to vote for 
the ANC. The ANC won an estimated +/- 80 percent of the black votes, less than 30 percent 
of the coloured and Indian votes, and a handful of white votes only (Reynolds 1999:180). 
According to Reynolds (1999), South Africa's second election received so little international 
coverage because it was moving towards democratic consolidation and multi-party 
competition as the "only game in town". South Africa had passed the first of the two criteria 
in Huntightons "two-turnover test" for democratic consolidation (quoted in Bratton and 
Posner 1998:378). Despite minor hiccups, the Association of Western European 
Parliamentarians for Africa said the elections had set a high standard, and 96% of the voters 
in an exit poll believed the elections to be free and fair (Reynolds 1999). The ANC under 
Mbeki's leadership thus strengthened its position as a dominant party, and missed the magic 
2/3 majority by one seat. The next day it went into an alliance with the MF46. The ANC has 
not used this power to dramatically rewrite the constitution. The Democratic Party increased 
their position from 7 to 38 members of parliament, taking over the NPs position as main 
opposition with most of the white votes, with their "fight back" campaign. The NNP lost 
most of the votes to the DP, and the IFP kept their position as the third largest party in the 
parliament. Three of the main parties have as mentioned become more multiethnic and cross 
cutting in their support than in the 1994 elections, even if their policy platforms are not. 
Ethnically rooted parties together represent less than 15% of the vote. This shows that South 
Africa is moving away from the African trend of ethnic voting, and increases the chances of 
democratic stability (ibid)47 These election results indicate that South Africa is moving 
                                              
46 The MF (Minority Front) only got one representative in parliament (Reynolds 1999:186)  
47 In the second election the ANC won some less black votes, but more successfully managed to appeal to the educated 
middle class voters in Western Cape, that had voted for NP in 1994, got more white and Zulu votes. During apartheid's 
white only election, the DP/PFP47 had never received more than 20% of the votes, and in -94 it got only 10%. In 1999 it got 
an estimated 55% of the white vote in 1999. It was now gaining support not only from white die hard liberals as in -94, but 
from coloureds around Cape Town, Indians in Durban, and an estimated 12% of the DP's vote came from blacks. The IFP 
kept their main support mainly in KwaZulu-Natal. It lost about 2% of their votes from conservative white and Indian 
voters, and more or less split the Zulu votes with the ANC (ibid). The NNP lost over half of their national vote, 54 MP's the 
province they had controlled outright, 2/3 of their white vote, and 1/3 of their coloured vote. The party upholding apartheid 
now get more votes from non-whites, struggles to win a 5th of the white vote, and lost grip of its strongholds in Transvaal 
and Free State. NNP was reduced to a regional party in the Western Cape, where it gathers more than half its votes 
(Reynolds 1999). 
The ANC strengthened its position also in the provincial elections, winning 23 extra seats. It became the largest party in 
Western Cape, even though an alliance of NNP-DP took over government form the NP. In Northern Cape, the ANC turned 
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towards in the direction of consolidation when only looking at the most minimal criteria. 
Whether it is moving towards a qualitative, deeper, maximalist democracy is more 
controversial.  
Constitutionally48 
South Africa's constitution is as outlined above based on human rights, including civil and 
political, economic and social, and cultural rights. The impact of the negotiated, pacted 
transition on the final constitution was made somewhat smaller than it could have been due 
to a two stage process in the transition, where the final constitution was not written until 
after multi party elections. But the negotiated pact did put some limitations on policy 
options. Such as ruling out criminal justice after gross human rights abuses by agreeing on 
amnesty, and radical redistribution of land. The establishing the right to private ownership of 
land and property effectively secured the white population continued control over key 
recourses; recourses other population groups to a large extent had been denied access to due 
to apartheid policies. These limitations had large impact on choices of reconciliation 
strategies, discussed below.  
The existence of customary law, parallel to state laws, can hinder rural women's rights to 
control over the land that is crucial to support their families. Customary laws can undermine 
the formal rights stated by the constitution and the bill of rights to the extent they are 
practised, and based on undemocratic principles. This can be seen as a hinder for the depth 
of democratic consolidation. 
After the second election the ANC in co-operation with a minor party got a qualified 
majority in parliament. This enables them to rewrite the constitution, an opportunity they 
have not used: This might indicate that the limitations of the power of the democratically 
elected government imposed by the pact and constitution has been acceptable to the ANC 
                                                                                                                                           
a minority government into a majority one and made strides in the KwaZulu-Natal region. In Gauteng it increased share of 
votes with 10%, and in the rest of the 5 provinces it still dominated with 74-88% of the votes. In Eastern Cape ANC was 
challenged by the UDM, and in North west by UCDP, loosing 10% and 4%. Contrary to -94, there were no requirement of 
power sharing at the provincial level, leaving the ANC in charge of all cabinet portfolios outside Western Cape and 
KwaZulu-Natal. The IFP kept its control over KwaZulu-Natal. The NNP was declining also at this level. It had held sole 
government in Western Cape, and now had to go into coalition with the DP, forming the Democratic Alliance (DA). It had 
also been the official opposition in all other provinces but KwaZulu-Natal, and was only keeping its position as official 
opposition in Northern Cape (Reynolds 1999) 
48 For an extensive debate on constitutionalism in South Africa, see Deegan 1999 
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leadership. This suggests that constitutionally, South Africa is moving in the direction of 
consolidation of democracy, even though it is too early to make a final judgement about the 
democracy's depth and durability. 
Behaviourally 
To what extent anti-democratic forces are working against the government is hard to tell, but 
the major political groups seem to accept the new democratic conflict resolution mechanisms 
even though some militant right wing Afrikaner groupings exist. The political violence 
South Africa experienced during the time around the democratic transition has dramatically 
decreased which suggests movement in the direction of consolidation. Reynolds (1999) 
points out that the second election had a sense of routine and lack of drama completely 
different form the atmosphere around the time of the first election, and the second election 
was to a large extent was judged as free and fair. 
Attitudinally 
Mattes et.al (2000) analyses South Africans attitudes towards democracy. They found that 
only roughly half the South African population agrees or strongly agree that democracy is 
always best, while over a third of the population supports the thought of a strong leader if 
democracy does not work. These numbers are fairly stable over time varying between 47 and 
56 % being committed to democracy.  
Table 4.1: Commitment to democracy in South Africa (1995 to 2000) 
 1995 1997 1998 2000 
Democracy always best: Agree/ strongly agree 47 56 47 55 
Need strong leader 43 30 38 38 
Don't know 10 14 15 5 
Agree with neither (volunteered) NA NA NA 3 
Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader who does not have to bother with 
elections. Others say that even when things don't work, democracy is always best. What do you think? With which statement do you agree 
with most: Need Strong Leader or Democracy Always Best? (Mattes et.al 2000:6) 
There are however some differences between the races: While the black population is most 
committed to democracy, white and black coloureds respondents show lower and more 
fluctuating levels of commitment. Since 1997, Indian South Africans shows the lowest level 
of commitment.  
Table 4.2: Commitment to democracy by race 
 Sept/ Nov. 1995 June/July 1997 November 1998 July/August 2000 
Black 46 61 49 60 
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White 46 39 43 36 
Coloured 35 53 44 52 
Indian 54 27 33 33  
 (Mattes et.al. 2000:6) 
Mattes et.al (2000) also found that a majority of South Africans rejects some non- 
democratic alternatives. (These included one party elections, rule by elders, traditional 
leaders or chiefs, abolishment of parliament and parties for presidential rule, and a 
government by the army). But only 1/4 of South Africans would reject that economic experts 
rather than elected government or parliament made all important decisions about the 
economy. While 3/4 of the blacks would reject return to previous regime, only half of the 
coloureds and less than a third of white and Indian South Africans answer the same. 
Between 48 and 62% South Africans answer that they are willing or very willing to live 
under an "effective" authoritarian regime, if that regime was able to impose law and order 
and deliver houses and jobs (2000:17). These findings indicate that South Africa has a long 
way to go in consolidating democracy in the dimension of attitudes. This makes us turn to 
the question of whether South Africans have an instrumental view of democracy, and that 
lack of delivery in the field of economic and social rights are undermining the consolidation 
of democracy. 
4.5 Minimalist or Maximalist views of democracy in South Africa? 
We argued in chapter two that democracy and civil and political rights conceptually overlap, 
so no democracy is possible without civil and political rights. Understandings of democracy 
based only on civil and political rights can be labelled minimalist. The relationship between 
economic and social rights and democracy are disputed: Maximalist understandings of 
democracy also include economic and social rights. While some argue that civil and political 
rights will lead to economic and social rights, others argue that there is no automatic 
connection between them. Beetham (1999) argues that lack of delivery of economic and 
social rights will affect the quality of democracy, and Abrahamsen (2000) argues that 
Africans have an instrumental view of democracy, and lack of delivery in the field of 
poverty alleviation undermines the new African democracies. We therefore need to take a 
brief look at South Africans understandings and expectations of democracy.  
Table 4.3: Understandings of Various components of Democracy in South 
Africa 
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Majority Rule 38.4 
Complete freedom for anyone to criticise the government 34.9 
Regular Elections 37.3 
At least two political parties competing against each other 29.1 
Basic necessities like shelter, food, and water for everyone 67.2 
Jobs for everyone 73.4 
Equality in education 65.7 
A small income gap between rich and poor 34.5 
People associate democracy with many diverse meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called 
democratic is each of these:(…)Per cent responding "Absolutely Essential" (Mattes et.al 2000:12)  
The first four meanings in the table above focus on a civil/ political components of 
democracy, the next four on economic components. Of the latter, two focuses on access to 
economic rights, and the two on equality in that access. It shows that South Africans put 
strong weight on economic components of democracy: Jobs, basic necessities and equality in 
education are rated as absolutely essential for a society to be called democratic by about two 
out of three South Africans. Each of the political components and a small income gap are 
only seen as absolutely essential by a third49. This shows that South Africans are closer to a 
maximalist understanding of democracy than a minimalist understanding. This supports 
Abrahamsens (2000) assumption of an instrumental view of democracy.  
As reports emerges (Tørres 2001; forthcoming) on problems of delivery in the field of 
economic and social rights, at the same time as South Africans view these as the most 
important part of democracy, we need to know how satisfied South Africans are with 
democracy. The table below shows that satisfaction with the way South Africa's democracy 
works have varied between 39 and 63%, which is fairly low. Blacks are most satisfied and 
whites and Indians least satisfied. The trend over time is too unstable to say anything 
definitive about long term trends, but the overall low level of satisfaction with democracy 
combined with a maximalist, instrumentalist view of democracy seems to leave the South 
African democracy in a vulnerable position.   
 
Table 4.4: Satisfaction with Democracy in South Africa (by race) 
 Sept./Nov 1995 June/July 1997* November 1998 July/Aug 2000 
Black 47 45 73.5 59.3 
                                              
49 Mattes et.al found some racial differences in these perceptions: black, coloured and Indian South Africans are more 
likely to see the economic components as essential to democracy than whites. Still even white South Africans attach more 
importance to economic components (with the notable exception of a small income gap between rich and poor) than to any 
political component (2000:14).  
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White 23 7 27.6 25.9 
Coloured 40 25 43.7 40.3 
Indian 38 13 33.1 10.9 
Total 41 38 63 52 
Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in South Africa? Per cent very or fairly satisfied ( Mattes et.al 2000:21) 
*5% scale 
4.6 Reconciliation policy 
South Africa had to address the results of Apartheid abuses including inequality, poverty and 
open wounds after gross human rights abuses at the same time as trying to promote 
reconciliation between population groups. This was made particularly difficult due to the 
overlapping lines of division in South Africa (discussed in chapter one and above). The 
negotiated settlement also put restraints on the government's policy options for 
reconciliation: Criminal justice after gross human rights violations was given up to secure 
the democratic transition. To avoid oblivion/ national amnesia the new government chose to 
address former gross human rights violations by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
The TRC opened up for trials in cases where the perpetrators did not apply for amnesty. 
Although large scale trials after the closing of the TRC process seem unlikely, victims and 
their families can sue their perpetrators in cases where the perpetrators did not apply for 
amnesty. Mixed with the truth commissions attempts at promoting reconciliation through 
truth, were attempts at delivering restorative justice by recommendations on individual 
compensation to victims identified by the commission. But the government has only partly 
implemented the reparation policy, thereby undermining this attempt to help the victims, 
acknowledge their suffering and use the full potential of restorative justice to compensate for 
lack of criminal justice. By establishing democracy, civil and political rights were formally 
recognised and protected. The major strategy to address economic and social rights, reducing 
poverty and inequality, was the Reconstruction and Development Programme. Its main focus 
was rechanneling state recourses to the former disadvantaged communities, which can be 
seen as an example of prospective justice through social and economic reform. Before 
turning to the work of the truth commission in the following chapters we will briefly look 
into other roads to reconciliation in South Africa. 
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Prospective justice: The Reconstruction and Development Programme 
We have seen that addressing the enormous inequality/ class conflict created by apartheid 
was made difficult because of the need to de-escalate the overlapping racial conflict at the 
same time50. Radical redistribution of wealth was excluded as an option, because of fear 
from reactions within the white community. There was fear this would trigger resurrection of 
violent conflict, mass emigrations of the educated white elite and lack of needed foreign 
investment resulting in possible break down of the economy, and democratic deterioration. 
In the international setting, market economy was the only option. RDP was a large scale 
programme intended to channel public recourses, earlier focused on providing services to the 
white population, to former disadvantaged people and areas. As large scale land-reform was 
ruled out, addressing inequality and poverty had to be done through economic growth and 
redistributing of recourses through taxes. Problems with this approach was limited state 
recourses and growth compared to the enormous needs. The RDP was based on a "basic 
needs" approach to poverty reduction, where poverty is seen as lack of income/economic 
recourses and lack of access to public services. The role of the state was seen as securing 
macro economic conditions for employment and growth, and building out public services to 
reach former disadvantaged communities with schools, health care, clean water, houses, 
infrastructure (roads, electricity, sanitation, telephone networks etc). The major policy areas 
of the RDP were meeting these basic needs of the people, developing human recourses, 
building the economy, democratising the state and South African society and 
implementation of programmes (Deegan 1999:121). The economic strategy adopted in 1996 
to achieve the goals was the Growth, Employment and Redistribution Programme (GEAR). 
GEAR aimed to double the annual real GDP growth to around 6 percent by the year 2000, 
giving emphasis to the role of market forces and reducing the role of the state. Reforming the 
labour market was seen as a crucial tool in creating a better functioning labour market while 
discussions around flexibility and reduced protection has also put severe strains on the 
alliance between the ANC and the labour federation COSATU (Deegan 1999:139,140). 
ANC is increasingly being criticised from its own ranks for following a neo-liberal policy 
creating a jobless growth.  
                                              
50 As part of the strategy of building down the overlapping lines of division, the ANC led government adapted a long-term 
strategy of nation building, while still leaving room for differences. The new national anthem has lyrics in several 
languages, 11 languages were recognised as official languages and "the rainbow nation" was adapted as a slogan. This was 
an attempt to create an overriding national identity adding to and toning down racial ethnic identity.  
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The right to land had been restricted by race during Apartheid, and thereby securing most of 
the land for the white population. To separate residential areas by race, the apartheid regime 
had used forced removals. Land is also a valuable economic resource in South Africa. The 
ANC had a history fighting for radical redistribution of land, but this was given up, and the 
negotiated outcome was that the constitution established the right to private property. The 
policy chosen to deal with the land issue was a very limited land reform based on voluntary 
sales of land to the programme and the possibility of compensation to people that had lost 
their land for instance through forced removals. The programme is struggling with limited 
access to land, as not enough people are willing to sell land to the programme. Its limitations 
make it unlikely to have any larger impact on the distribution of wealth in South Africa.  
These strategies for poverty reduction and redistribution of wealth without worsening race 
relations have had limited effect. Tørres (2001, forthcoming) suggest that economic 
inequality has increased after apartheid. Tørres material suggests that about 10% of 
households receive some 50% of overall household income, while about 50% of households 
receive only roughly 10% of total household income. Only Brazil has higher levels of 
inequality than South Africa (measured by the Ginni index). While Africans on average 
make R1638 per month, whites earn R6131. There is a much smaller gap between coloured 
earnings (R1929) and Africans. Indians make R3799. Men on average make twice as much 
as women. Tørres finds that whilst there have been improvements in the income fortunes of 
higher earning Africans, most other African employees have not benefited to the same extent 
(2001). This policy has thus managed to produce a new black/ coloured middle class that 
several writers point out as a buffer between the poor black majority, and the white minority 
even though it has had limited success at reducing overall poverty and inequality. 
This suggests that in spite of a strong focus on economic and social rights in the constitution 
and a declared policy to reduce the widespread poverty and enormous inequality, restraints 
from the negotiated pact and needs for reconciliation has made delivery of these rights 
difficult. Given South Africans instrumental view of democracy this lack of delivery seems 
like the most direct threat to democratic consolidation in South Africa now. 
Cross racial contact and reconciliation in South Africa 
As one of the main intentions of Apartheid was to keep racial groups separate and hinder 
assimilation, there is limited contact between racial groups. 55% of Africans have no contact 
 70 
with other racial groups at work, and over 60% of this group have no contact across the race 
border outside work. Over 80% of the blacks have never eaten a meal with someone across 
the race-line. Less than 2% of the blacks claims to have quite a number of "true friends" 
from other races. The minority white, coloured and Asian populations report some more 
contact, but only about 7% of whites, 18% of coloureds and 15% of Asians say they have 
true friends across the race-line (Gibson 2001A:45pp). He finds that cross racial contact is 
statistically connected with more reconciled attitudes, except when the contact happens at 
the workplace (ibid). This might suggests that contact has a potential of promoting 
reconciliation, but as contact remains highly limited, the potential effect becomes smaller. 
There is also a problem in determining the causal direction between contact and 
reconciliation: One can argue that contact can lead to reconciliation, or that it is more likely 
that people that have reconciled have contact across the race border.  
4.7 Summary 
We have argued that even though South Africa is generally seen as a success case in 
transition to democracy despite a violent past where gross human rights abuses were 
frequent, the country is facing challenges in terms of consolidating democracy. The legacy 
of human rights abuses includes extreme inequality and widespread poverty, and deep 
cleavages between different racial groups that have limited contact due to the overlap 
between class, race and residential areas. I argued that the transition form, pact, put restraint 
on the government's policy options when looking for different reconciliation strategies. It 
made criminal justice impossible because of amnesty for gross human rights abuses, and as a 
compromise a strategy of truth commission and compensation to victims was set up. I argued 
that South Africans have an instrumental view of democracy focusing on economic and 
social rights more than civil and political rights. The lack of delivery in this field seems to be 
the biggest challenge for democratic consolidation in South Africa. I argued that even 
though the South African Constitution is one of the most progressive in the world when it 
comes to including positive economic and social rights, restraints due to the pacted transition 
has hampers the delivery of these rights. As the right to private property was included in the 
constitution, radical redistribution of wealth was ruled out, and the governments policy of 
social and economic reform through the RDP has so far proved inadequate to address the 
results of apartheid human rights abuses in terms of poverty and inequality reduction. These 
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findings suggest that the democracy that seems to be consolidating in South Africa is of a 
minimalist kind, despite the people wanting a maximalist democracy. We saw that cross 
racial contact might have a positive effect on reconciliation, this contact is highly limited 
due to the apartheid legacy of racial segregation. It is against this background we in turn to  
TRC's work as an institutional road to reconciliation, and question whether addressing 
former gross human rights violations was enough to promote reconciliation in South Africa.  
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5.  THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION  
This chapter presents the work of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
and reactions from the political elite and the general public, and explores to what degree the 
commission was able to promote reconciliation at various social levels. First  TRC's work is 
outlined: How it was established, its mandate, composition, institutional arrangements, and 
implementation and its main findings. Second I address questions as to what extent the TRC 
was a success at uncovering the truth, deliver some form of justice and contribute to 
reconciliation and consolidation of democracy.  
5.1 Background on the TRC 
The negotiated Interim Constitution stated that amnesty should be given for politically 
motivated offences during the former conflict, but it left the establishment of procedures and 
mechanisms to the first democratically elected government. This resulted in the 1995 
Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act. Briefly stated, the Commission was 
given four major tasks in order to achieve the overall objectives of promoting national unity 
and reconciliation. These were:  
…to analyse and describe the "causes, nature and extent" of gross violations of human rights that occurred between 1 March 
1960 and 10 May 1994, including the identification of the individuals and organisations responsible for such violations; (…) 
make recommendations to the President on measures to prevent future violations of human rights;(…) restore the human and 
civil dignity of victims of gross human rights violations through testimony and recommendations to the President concerning 
reparations for victims;(…) grant amnesty to persons who made full disclosure of relevant facts relating to acts associated with a 
political objective (TRC final report vol.1, ch.4)51 
Gross violations of human rights were defined to include politically motivated killings, 
torture and severe ill treatment, committed either by the state or non-state actors.  
… ‘gross violation of human rights’ means the violation of human rights through - (a) the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill 
treatment of any person; or (b) any attempt, conspiracy, incitement, instigation, command or procurement to commit an act 
referred to in paragraph (a), which emanated from conflicts of the past and which was committed during the period 1 March 
1960 to 10 May 1994 within or outside the Republic, and the commission of which was advised, planned, directed, commanded 
or ordered, by any person acting with a political motive (TRC final report vol.1, ch.4) 
The commissioners were selected in an open nomination process, and a multi party panel 
held public interviews with about 45 out of around 200 candidates. The panel suggested 25 
names to the President who after consulting his Government of National Unity appointed 17 
commissioners. The commission was balanced in terms of race, gender and geographical 
                                              
51 This was however not the first experience with human rights commissions in South Africa. For an overview, see 
Appendix 3 
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origin (Tutu 2000:64). They were "persons of integrity without high party political profile", 
and the commission was lead by Archbishop Desmond Tutu (Gloppen 2002:23). TRC 
divided its workload between three committees, the Human Rights Violations Committee 
(HRVC) with 8 commissioners, the Amnesty Committee (AC) with 3 commissioners and the 
Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee (RRC) that had 5 commissioners. Adding to this it 
had an own investigating unit that was led by a Commissioner.  
The commission had a staff of more than 300, with a budget in excess of US $35 million, 
which were mainly funded domestically. The HRVC was responsible for investigation, 
documentation and reporting of violations. It collected statements and held five types of 
hearings, most of which were public with cameras present, including victim hearings, event 
hearings, special hearings, institutional hearings and political party hearings. At the victim 
hearings, it attempted to create a welcoming environment for the victims to tell their story, 
with comforters engaged to support them during the hearings. It established the identity of 
more than 20 000 victims, and these were the only ones to qualify for reparations. The 
institutional hearings looked into the roles different institutions in society played in gross 
human rights violations, including business and labour, the faith community, the legal 
community, the health community, media, and prisons. The special hearings particularly 
looked into the roles of compulsory military service, women, and children and youth. At the 
political party hearings, the main political parties were invited to give their story of the past. 
The event hearings included among others the Caprivi hearing52, hearings on chemical and 
biological warfare, the Helderberg flight53, the Mandela United Football Club54, State 
Security Council (consisting of key cabinet members and leadership of the security forces) 
and Trojan horse55 hearings (TRC homepage).  
                                              
52 The South African Defence Force, SADF, was found to have secretly trained IFP hid squads in Caprivi. Chief Buthulezi 
later challenged the findings on his involvement. See footnote below on TRC and Inkatha court-case. 
53 This hearing looked into a plain crash: On 28 October 1987, the SAA Helderberg, a Boeing 747, crashed into the sea off 
the coast of Mauritius. All 159 people on board died. Almost immediately after the incident, allegations of foul play were 
made. A year later, in January 1989, the South African government established a commission of enquiry headed by Justice 
Cecil Margo to determine the cause of the crash. The Margo Commission found that the crash was caused by a fire on 
board, but that the cause of the fire was undetermined. Many people rejected this finding, including investigative journalists 
who insisted that there were strong indications that the fire was caused by dangerous substances on board. Allegations were 
made that South African Airways (SAA) passenger flights were used to courier arms components and explosives in 
sanctions-busting activities by the parastatal Armscor (TRC final report vol.2 ch.6b).  
54 A group of young men connected to Winnie Mandela was accused of gross human rights violations including killings of 
alleged informers and arson in Soweto in 1988-89 (Tutu 2000:98) 
55 Trojan horse was an ambush tactic used by security forces. 
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The Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee was established to recommend compensation 
and restoration for victims and policies to facilitate reconciliation and prevent recurrence. In 
its work, it arranged a few post hearing community programmes to locate the needs of 
communities affected by  TRC's work (discussed in chapter 6). As it didn't have any 
implementing powers, the victims had to wait for the parliament to reject or accept these 
recommendations. During the work of the commission it became increasingly clear that the 
government was not prepared to pay large sums in reparation, and the committee started 
looking for symbolic signs of reparations such as memorials (Orr 2000). Even though the 
commission made it clear that it was essential and urgent to implement the suggested 
reparations policy, only small interim reparations have been given to victims. In spite of the 
mandate only including gross human rights violations, the committee highlighted the need to 
address the social and economic situation created by the apartheid system. 
The Amnesty Commission was headed by judges that heard amnesty applications, mainly 
held in public. Of the roughly 7000 applications received, most were from convicted 
criminals, some from police and military and few from political leaders. No applications 
came from members of the National Intelligence Service (TRC Final report vol. 5 ch.6). By 
November 2000, the Amnesty committee had granted 849 amnesties, and refused 5392, 
mostly because no political motive was found to be behind the act56. After the process is 
ended, it is unlikely that prosecutions of perpetrators who either failed to apply for amnesty 
or were denied amnesty will follow.  
The TRC was the first truth commission with the power to grant amnesty to individual 
perpetrators, as amnesty was made contingent on telling the truth about the violations. The 
South African mandate had the advantage of elicited detailed accounts from perpetrators and 
institutions, unlike commissions elsewhere, which have received very little co-operation 
from those responsible for past abuses. The commission had access to greater recourses than 
earlier truth commissions and was granted the power to compel witnesses or perpetrators to 
come forward with evidence. This meant that the TRC had greater access to official written 
records from government and armed forces, despite the widespread destruction of state 
records taking place before the democratic transition.  
                                              
56 As the work of the Amnesty committee continued after the delivery of the "final" report, this is probably not the final 
number of perpetrators granted amnesty.  
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The South African process was more open than former commissions as many hearings were 
public and some broadcasted57. Public hearings had been used in Uganda earlier, but on a 
smaller scale. In Latin America, the testimonies had been private, and no information was 
released before the final reports. The openness of the process was a part of the strategy of 
communicating the findings to the general public. The TRC's arrangement of institutional 
and special hearings allowed for NGO's and those involved in specific areas of activism to 
contribute. Few other commissions have included such interaction with "non-victim" public 
actors. To protect the witnesses, a witness protection programme was set up, which 
strengthened the TRC's investigative powers and allowed whiteness to come forward with 
information they feared might put them at risk (TRC final report: vol.1:ch.4). 
Main findings of the TRC 
The primary findings of the TRC are that all the major stakeholders in the former conflict 
were involved in gross violations of human rights, but to various degrees. The State was 
found to be the primary perpetrator.  
…the South African State in the period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s became involved in activities of a criminal nature 
when, amongst other things, it knowingly planned, undertook, conducted and covered up the commission of unlawful acts, 
including the extra-judicial killings of political opponents and others, inside and outside of South Africa. In pursuit of these 
unlawful activities, the state acted in collusion with certain other political groupings, most notably the Inkatha Freedom Party… 
(TRC final report: vol.5.ch.1). 
Other abuses it found the state responsible for included torture, abduction, juridical and extra 
juridical killings. It found that when the conflict intensified in the 1980s, the State Security 
Council launched a total strategy including counter-revolutionary warfare and adopted it 
within South Africa. This included giving orders perceived as permission to kill political 
opponents, and the SSC were found to be responsible for gross violations of human rights 
(TRC final report vol.5 ch. 5). Former NP leader, President and leader of the State Security 
Council P. W. Botha refused to appear before the Commission. He was found guilty of: 
contributed to and facilitated a climate in which (…) gross violations of human rights could and did occur, and as such is 
accountable for such violations (TRC final report vol. 5 chapter 1).  
Several state agencies were found guilty of systematically destroying official records to 
avoid disclosure of ways the apartheid regime had operated. The findings about F.W. De 
Klerk (President of South Africa during the negotiated transition) were censored from the 
                                              
57 This included extensive coverage of the hearings in the daily news, and in the weekly TRC Special Reports on national 
television. There were 81 programmes, totalling more than 100 hours of prime time documentary. These were widely 
watched (Gloppen 2002:26) 
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final report58, due to a court decision (Orr 2000:347-348). The homelands were found to be a 
part of the government's tactic of divide and rule, with the dual aim of diverting the struggle 
by Africans for democratic rights inside South Africa, and preserve the economic and social 
privileges of the white minority (TRC final report:vol.5.ch.1). The administrations and 
homeland governments were found guilty of being a cornerstone of the apartheid policy, and 
for widespread gross human rights abuses mainly against political opponents. Within the 
KwaZulu homeland, lead by IFP leader Chief Buthulezi, the TRC found that the IFP and 
local government were indistinguishable, and a far larger numbers of violations were 
committed by members, supporters and office bearers of the IFP, unlike the other homelands 
where the security forces were the main perpetrators (ibid).  
IFP was found responsible for some 3800 killings in the KwaZulu and Natal area. TRC 
statistics suggest that IFP was responsible for 3.5 killings per every killing attributed to the 
ANC59. Members of four right-wing opposition groups, including the Afrikaner Volksfront, 
was found to be responsible for gross human rights violations against political opponents 
around the time of the transition to democracy. The commission also found some evidence 
of "third force" activity including the security forces being involved in destabilising the 
homelands and providing weapons and training to the IFP, without the government taking 
sufficient steps to stop it (ibid).  
The TRC recognised the ANC and PAC as legitimate liberation movements fighting a just 
war against an illegitimate regime, but distinguished between legitimate aims and means. 
The ANC leadership took collective responsibility of activities that happened outside 
established norms, including MK activities. The TRC found that, although it was not ANC 
policy to target civilians, MK operations were responsible for killing more civilians than 
security force members. It holds the ANC responsible for gross human rights violations. 
These included cases where the MK did not distinguish enough between civilian and 
                                              
58 The so-called Final Report of the TRC was delivered to the president to fit the deadline of the work of the commission. 
But the Amnesty Committee was allowed to continue its work, and complete the final report with added material/ 
appendixes, including lists of the names of all victims. Commissioner Orr (2000) suggests that this extra material will be 
about the size of the original report. At the time of writing, the publication of this Final and extended report has been halted 
because Buthulezi is challenging the TRC's findings about him and his party in court. After a resent settlement, the TRC 
has agreed to "minor changes" in the report regarding the IFP. This opens up for the publication of the last version of the 
report and possibly reparations to victims (Durban :2003, Sole:2003).  
59 As mentioned, the IFP discouraged its members to report violations to the TRC. It is therefore likely that there is an 
underreporting of violations against IFP supporters. The TRC claims that this finding, however, is supported by other 
national and international publications. The TRC still agreed to modify these findings after the IFP/TRC settlement.   
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military targets, including a landmine campaign resulting in civilian losses. ANC was also 
held responsible for not discouraging supporters form committing gross human rights abuses 
in the "peoples war" against apartheid. It also holds ANC responsible for abuses outside 
South Africa, including torture, executions and severe ill treatment within ANC camps. In 
the time after the unbanning of the ANC, it was found to be responsible for contributing to 
the spiral of violence, particularly by creating and arming self-defence units (SDU), which 
lead to gross human rights violations.  
The special hearing on the role of Winnie Madikizela-Mandela and her football club, found 
that the club was responsible for killing, torture and arson and assault in the community, 
without Madikizela-Mandela taking the necessary steps to stop it. It found that dissidents 
were labelled as informers and killed. The TRC held her responsible for gross human rights 
violations.  
On the United Democratic Front60, the commission finds that members and supporters were 
responsible for killing (often necklacing61) and severe ill treatment of political opponents, 
members of state structures such as black local authorities and SAP, and burning and 
destruction of homes and properties. Violent enforcement of boycotts lead to killings and 
severe ill treatment, and lack of political tolerance led to violence between a.o. UDF, 
AZAPO and IFP. The UDF leadership accepted political and moral responsibility for the 
acts, and the TRC found it responsible for them, and for not trying hard enough to stop them 
(ibid).  
The TRC holds the PAC responsible for gross human rights violations taking place during 
the "land war", where white civilians, members of the police living in the townships, 
dissident members of the PAC and representatives of traditional authorities in the homelands 
were victims. After 1990 it targeted whites at random, and the Commission rejects PAC's 
position that this was legitimate in war. The TRC also holds PAC and APLA responsible for 
extra juridical killings in exile. The IFP claims that over 400 IFP office bearers were killed 
                                              
60 The United Democratic Front was established in 1983 as allies of the ANC and supporters of the freedom charter (Tutu 
2000:32, Guelke 1999:54). In Western Cape the UDF and ANC virtually became indistinguishable (TRC final report:vol3 
ch.5)  
61 Neclacing, putting petrol inside a car tire, putting the tire around the victim's neck before lighting it, so the victim would 
die from burning, was used by some members of the liberation movement as punishment for believed traitors, like for 
instance police informers. 
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by ANC and its affiliates. The Commission found that the number was much lower, and held 
the ANC/UDF/MK structures responsible for 76 of the alleged killings.  
Adding to these findings on the key stakeholders in the conflict, the TRC made findings on 
the role of civil society, the health sector, faith communities, business sector, media and the 
judiciary (for a summary see TRC final report: vol.5.ch.1). It also outlined the special 
victimisation of children and youth, which was the largest group of victims. It a.o. holds the 
state responsible for forcing many young into exile, and for denying them adequate 
education. Through banning legitimate political activity, the state encouraged the youth to 
turn to violent protest. It is held responsible for militarising young men through conscription. 
The liberation movements are held responsible for arming young people and giving them 
military training. The TRC holds the ANC and IFP responsible for failing to reintegrate 
youth into society, which has lead to criminalisation of many young people (TRC final 
report: vol.5 ch. 1). It also found that women suffered from gender specific gross human 
rights violations including severe ill treatment in the form of sexual abuse both in exile and 
by the security forces (ibid).  
As this overview shows, all the main stakeholders in the apartheid conflict were involved in 
gross human rights violations, with the state being the main perpetrator group. 
5.2 To what extent was the TRC a success? 
The whole process around the TRC was (and still is) highly controversial within South 
Africa and in the academic debate on transitional justice. The process has been criticised 
from human rights organisations, such as Amnesty International, on principle grounds. 
Amnesty's position is that amnesty never should be granted in cases of gross human rights 
violations (Amnesty homepage). In the academic debate there seems to be general agreement 
that the TRC was successful at playing a reconciliatory role by being a part of the 
compromise that made the democratic transition possible, but much of the agreement stops 
here. Here I will present the main reactions to  TRC's work in South Africa among the 
political elite, research on reactions on the grass root level and community studies. We 
question to what extent the TRC was a success at delivering any form of justice, uncovering 
the truth about former gross human rights violations and promote reconciliation at various 
levels of analysis. 
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On the national political arena the TRC was criticised from all major parties. The criticism 
from supporters of the old regime (like the National Party, the Afrikaans speaking 
community and Right Wing groups) was that it was a witch-hunt on the Afrikaner, and 
biased in favour of the ANC. The IFP saw the TRC as a part of an illegitimate nation-
building process by trying to write an authoritative common version of the truth about the 
past and biased in favour of the ANC (Christie 2000). The ANC was from the start positive 
towards the TRC, but Thabo Mbeki (now president) rejected that the actions of the liberation 
movement could be defined as gross human rights violations because they were fighting a 
just war (TRC political party hearing, transcript: TRC homepage). By defining the ANC's 
actions in the same way as those of an illegitimate regime was seen as putting the liberation 
movement at the same moral level as the regime. The ANC lead government has to a very 
limited degree followed up the policy recommendations of the TRC, which has been a large 
disappointment to victims and people believing that reparations is necessary to justify 
amnesty.  
Elements of criminal and restorative justice 
As pointed out previously, the negotiations that lead to democracy in South Africa, made 
prosecutions for gross human rights violations impossible, and amnesty was to be given 
against disclosure. Criminal justice was therefore not achieved in South Africa. Many of the 
amnesty applicants were convicted criminals that had little to loose from an application. At 
the time of writing, it is very unlikely that any systematic follow up work or trials against 
revealed perpetrators who either failed to apply for, or were refused, amnesty will take place. 
Many has pointed out that the TRC dealt only with the direct abusers, not with the 
beneficiaries of the apartheid system who did nothing to change it and the TRC thereby took 
away the focus of ordinary South Africans role in the abuses.  
Theissen (1999) looks into public opinion surveys et al. on reactions to amnesty and found 
that:  
There is no consensus who should benefit from amnesty and who not. While white South Africans are more willing to excuse 
the human rights violations of the old apartheid security forces, most black South Africans have the opposite opinion. There is 
also no agreement on how the liberation struggle should be judged in moral terms. Most white South Africans still believe that 
the struggle over apartheid was like a war, in which both sides hove done wrong. This perception is not accepted at all by most 
black South Africans (Theissen 1999:78) 
Most South Africans feel (…) that people that did not apply for amnesty should be prosecuted. While the public agrees, that the 
state may refrain in certain cases from punishing alleged perpetrators, most South Africans feel that victims should be entitled to 
sue perpetrators for damages. They want restorative justice see done. The public sentiment is: Justice is not sacrificed by 
granting amnesty, justice is sacrificed, when victims are not restituted (ibid). 
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Gibson (2001B) has investigated South Africans attitudes towards amnesty and found that 
South Africans generally did not perceive amnesty as fair. He also found that compensations 
to the victims were the single most important way to increase perception of fairness. Sincere 
apology and voice to the victims’ family also increased the perceptions of fairness, but the 
reactions of the perpetrators families had no effect. The were little differences between the 
different racial groups, apart from the whites. They generally saw the process as more fair, to 
be less influenced by compensations and apology to the victims, and more affected by how 
severely the perpetrator was punished by his family. He concludes that most South Africans 
oppose granting amnesty to those who committed gross human rights violations during the 
struggle over apartheid. The failure to achieve any sort of retributive (criminal) justice is 
deeply unpopular. But justice matters: Whether people are willing to tolerate amnesty 
depends in part on whether other forms of compensatory justice are received. That 
acceptance of amnesty changes by nearly 40 percentage points - from the condition under 
which no justice is received to that in which all four types of justice are received- is highly 
significant for the politics of amnesty. Still only half of the South African population 
approves of amnesty even if all Gibson's four forms of compensatory justice (apology, voice 
to victims, reparations and social exclusion of the perpetrator) are present. He concludes that 
the failure to satisfy expectations of justice can quite readily undermine the legitimacy of the 
regime, and ultimately the democratic transition itself (Gibson:2001B:25-26). 
By asking victims what they were hoping the state could do for them in terms of reparations, 
it raised expectations among victims. As the AC had implementing powers, the perpetrator 
receiving amnesty was immediately free. But as the Reparation and Rehabilitation 
Committee only had powers to recommend reparations, the victims often had to wait in 
uncertainty for reparations from the government. Many argue the unfairness in that 
perpetrators may benefit while victims are imposed a second set of violations. 
The governments lack of/ limited implementation of the policy of reparations towards the 
victims that the TRC suggested is further undermining the South African populations 
perception of fairness in granting amnesty. TRC suggested individual compensations as well 
as symbolic compensation, whereas the government has paid some victims small interim 
compensations and highlighted the work of public reforms, to benefit everybody that 
suffered during apartheid, not only gross human rights victims. This seems to be a lost 
opportunity for the South African government to achieve some justice. Many point out that 
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asking the TRC to recommend policy of reparations, and thereby raising expectations, and 
then failing to implement them created anger and can possibly be a more dangerous road 
than never promising too much.  
Truth 
The TRC distinguished between four types of truth about gross human rights abuses: Factual 
and forensic truth; personal and narrative truth; social truth and healing/restorative truth 
(TRC final report vol.1ch.5). At an individual level, the Commission was required to make 
findings on particular incidents and in respect of specific people. In other words, what 
happened to whom, where, when and how, and who was involved. It also sought findings on 
the contexts, causes and patterns of violations. However, all truth commissions have their 
limitations. In the words of Michael Ignatieff (quoted in TRC Final report vil.1 ch.5):  
All that a truth commission can achieve is to reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public discourse 
(ibid). 
The TRC established for instance that some disinformation about the past that had been 
accepted as truth by some members of society lost much of its credibility, including that: 
…the practice of torture by state security forces was not systematic and widespread; that only a few ‘rotten eggs’ or ‘bad apples’ 
committed gross violations of human rights; that the state was not directly and indirectly involved in ‘black-on-black violence’; 
that the chemical and biological warfare programme was only of a defensive nature; that slogans by sections of the liberation 
movement did not contribute to killings of ‘settlers’ or farmers; and that the accounts of gross human rights violations in the 
African National Congress (ANC) camps were the consequence of state disinformation (ibid). 
The TRC thereby did succeed in drawing a rough picture of the past abuses, even though it 
was more successful in some fields than other. Theissen (1999) reviewing public opinion 
surveys on attitudes towards the TRC concludes that:  
Most South Africans are relatively satisfied with the performance of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Especially in 
comparison with other legal institutions, the TRC has fared well in public opinion. Most South Africans believe that it has done 
a good job for the country. They are confident that the commission has indeed succeeded in uncovering past atrocities (Theissen 
1999:78).  
But as most of the amnesty applicants were the "foot soldiers", while most of the "big fish" 
like political and other leaders did not apply, the commission uncovered less about their role. 
The IFP discouragement of their supporters to co-operate with the TRC also made it difficult 
to access their version of the truth, resulting in a self- fulfilling prophecy from the IFP leader 
Buthulezi, that the TRC was biased towards the ANC's version of the past. The findings on 
former president De Klerk was censored from the final report by a court decision, and as 
mentioned, at time of writing the publishing of the rest of the final report is halted due to a 
lawsuit by the IFP, claiming that the TRC's finding that the IFP was the main non-state 
perpetrator is unjust. Van der Merwe (1999 ch.8) also argues that there was disappointment 
in local communities because of the TRC's limited capacity of following up individual cases 
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by investigations. Many local people attended the hearings to clarify what had happened in a 
special case. Only in a few cases did the TRC have the capacity to follow this up.  
The Commission also sought to capture the widest possible record of people’s perceptions, 
stories, myths and experiences. As such, the Commission sought to recover parts of the 
national memory that had been officially ignored. The public storytelling in the human rights 
commission, in a victim friendly environment, was due to capacity only accessible for some 
of the victims. The TRC tried to pick out stories that were to some degree representative, or 
illustrating of the conflict. Van der Merwe (1999:ch.8) argues that in the communities he 
studied, victims that were not chosen for public hearings felt that their stories were censored 
because they did not fit neatly into the picture the TRC wanted to draw of the South African 
past. He argues that the TRC was trying to illustrate the broad national conflict through local 
hearings, and thereby ignoring local conflict dynamics, that in many cases diverged from the 
national picture. 
The TRC did succeed in establishment of a forum to discuss the past, and its work and 
findings were widely debated within South Africa. 
It made a conscious effort to provide an environment in which all possible views could be considered and weighed, one against 
the other. People from all walks of life were invited to participate in the process, including faith communities, the South African 
National Defence Force (SANDF), non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and political parties. The public was engaged 
through open hearings and the media. The Commission itself was also subjected to constant public scrutiny and critique(...) The 
process whereby the truth was reached was itself important because it was through this process that the essential norms of social 
relations between people were reflected. (TRC final report, vol.1 ch.5) 
But throughout the process the TRC kept pointing out that the white community was less 
present in the process. Theissen (1999) argues that white people are in a state of denial about 
the past abuses, which suggests that the TRC has had limited success in communicating its 
findings to this particular group. Commissioner Wendy Orr also points out that one of the 
Afrikaner Commissioners, Wynand Malan, was so much in opposition to the rest of the TRC 
that he withdrew from the writing of the report, and wrote a minority report (Orr 2000:344). 
In 1998 44 % of the surveyed (whites only) thought apartheid was a good idea, but badly 
executed (Theissen 1998). 51% of whites answer the same in a survey conducted by the 
Institute for Justice and Reconciliation in 2001 (Gibson 2001A). This indicates that  TRC's 
work has not been successful at entirely discrediting the former regime as illegitimate based 
on revealing the truth about its human rights record. 
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 TRC's work was built on an understanding that truth can have a healing and restorative 
effect in human relationships, including the relationship between citizens and between the 
state and citizens.  
‘Acknowledgement’ must be emphasised. Acknowledgement refers to placing information that is (or becomes) known on 
public, national record. It is not merely the actual knowledge about past human rights violations that counts; often the basic facts 
about what happened are already known, at least by those who were affected. What is critical is that these facts be fully and 
publicly acknowledged. Acknowledgement is an affirmation that a person’s pain is real and worthy of attention. It is thus central 
to the restoration of the dignity of victims(TRC final report vol. ch.5). 
Whether establishing the truth about former gross human rights violations in fact is healing 
is widely debated in the academic literature. Many have pointed out the therapeutic effect for 
victims in telling their story, and having their version acknowledged. It is also often pointed 
out that lack of remorse, insincere apologies or lack of apologies from the perpetrator can 
have a negative effect on the victim. Some argue that revelation of the truth alone can be 
destructive if there is no reestablishment of the violated norm through apologies or 
reparations. It is an important question how the perpetrators community react to truth telling 
about violations. If the perpetrators are seen as heroes by their own communities when the 
truth comes out, the violated norm is undermined, and it is likely to have a negative effect on 
inter group reconciliation. But if the perpetrators own community distance themselves from 
the violation, it can confirm the validity of the broken norm. People favouring an "amnesia" 
approach would argue that focus on the truth of former abuses could lead to a revival of 
anger and destruction of relationships. A lot of the debate is based on theoretical arguments 
more than empirical research on to what extent truth leads to healing (reconciliation) and if 
that is so at various levels of analysis. Below we look into what we know about the TRC's 
effect on reconciliation. 
The TRC's ability to promote reconciliation 
We have seen that reconciliation can be measured at various levels and is a matter of 
degree62. Theoretical understandings of the concept vary, as does operational definitions, 
and this cloud the debate on whether truth commissions promote reconciliation. We go 
through political reconciliation, reconciliation at the political elite level, and mass levels63, 
between the races and at the community level. We argued in chapter 4 that choosing a truth 
commission and amnesty was a reconciliatory compromise that made the transition to 
                                              
62 For an extensive literature on reconciliation in South Africa, se homepage of the Centre for the Study of Violence and 
Reconciliation, and the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation homepage 
63 Theissen (1999) has examined the findings from 20 public opinion surveys about different aspects of the TRC's work.  
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democracy possible in the first place. South Africa is seen as a success story in the literature 
about African transitions to democracy after the end of the cold war in the sense that the 
democratic regime has not seen attempts of irregular turnover of power, and the democratic 
rules are mainly respected. While there was a lot of international attention during the first 
national election, the second was considered a routine event, suggesting political 
reconciliation. The political violence that torn the country before (and in KwaZulu-Natal 
some time after the first election) decreased, even if the regular crime rate has gone up, 
including violent crime. Theissen draws the following conclusions on the TRC's role of 
promoting reconciliation at the national level after investigating public opinions on  TRC's 
work (1999): 
The Truth and Reconciliation Commission was an important step in the consolidation of South Africa's first democracy. For 
many people it was the first time that a state institution expressed respect for their suffering and acknowledged the violation of 
their human rights. It would however be wrong to believe that an institution like the TRC can itself change deeply rooted 
attitudes and believes. Reconciliation needs the active participation of ordinary South Africans, many further local and national 
initiatives. But reconciliation cannot be achieved without social justice. Many people will only be able to reconcile with the 
former beneficiaries of the apartheid system, after they have been compensated and some of the wealth of this country has been 
redistributed. A human rights culture can only unfold, if the public is educated continuously about past and current human rights 
issues and the criminal justice system made more efficient and human rights conscious (Theissen 1999:79-80).  
Although the Truth and Reconciliation Commission has without doubt made an important contribution to the human rights 
culture of the new South Africa, human rights awareness remains low across all population groups. In the wake of a high crime 
rate, the use of force against suspected criminals is supported by a large percentage of the population. Public support for the 
reinstallation of the death penalty is extremely strong, despite its political misuse during the Apartheid past, and most people 
believe the new constitutional order protects better criminals than ordinary people. Political intolerance is still high, especially in 
the rural areas of KwaZulu Natal, in Gauteng and in the Free State and violence against women is openly conducted by many 
male and female South Africans. Many South Africans would support it, if the government would prevent citizens from 
expressing negative and unpopular views, and over 20% of all South Africans would refuse to provide an illegal immigrant with 
free emergency health care after an road accident (Theissen 1999:79). 
At the political elite level the major players accepts the new democratic rules: The fears of 
right wings grabbing arms leading to civil war did not come through. This suggests at least a 
limited political reconciliation. When it comes to the way the political elite's reacted to  
TRC's work, the picture slightly changes. The three major parties, all present in the 
government when the law leading to the TRC was established, had objections to the actual 
work of the commission. Former President of South Africa and former leader of the NP, 
Botha, refused to appear before the commission. President during the time of transition 
negotiations, and Nobel Peace Prize winner De Klerk did co-operate by giving submissions 
before the TRC on behalf of the NP. But he later went to court against the TRC to hinder it 
from publishing its findings on his own role in the abuses, as member of government and as 
state President. He won the case, and the TRC had to take out the findings. The NP 
leadership also refused to take any collective responsibility of former state violations.  
The ANC put in submissions before the TRC, by then deputy President (Now President) 
Thabo Mbeki. But the leadership insisted on taking on collective responsibility for the ANC 
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abuses, and thereby not following the procedure of the TRC, which was based on individual 
responsibility and applications for amnesty. This was accepted by the amnesty committee, 
and resulting in the TRC taking its own, independent committee to court to reverse the 
verdict. Many supporters of the leader of the ANC's women's league, Madikizela-Mandela 
reacted on how she was treated by the truth commission and the ANC. Being the most 
prominent ANC leader to appear for the commission defending herself, many saw it as 
scapegoating and an attempt at discrediting her politically. There were several incidences 
that showed co-operation problems between the ANC and the TRC (Orr 2000, Tutu 
2000:71,152). The most striking might be how the law requested the TRC to give policy 
suggestions on reparations for the victims, but the ANC government did little to implement 
these suggestions.  
The IFP and Buthulezi was openly quite hostile to the TRC process. They accused the TRC 
for being biased against the IFP and discouraged its members from appearing before the 
TRC, even though the victims could loose an opportunity for reparations. This lack of co-
operation made it difficult for the commission to take IFP and their supporters views into 
account, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy. Shortly before the deadline, a rush of 
statements came from IFP supporters, giving the TRC little time to investigate them (Tutu 
2000:168). 
These conflicts between the political parties and the TRC can be interpreted in different 
ways: It can be seen as a failure of the TRC to write an official record of the past abuses that 
was acceptable to all the major parties. On the other hand, it also means that the major role-
players saw  TRC's work as so important that they tried to influence its work to their own 
benefit, and the TRC was successful in the sense that its findings were seen as of great 
importance by the political elite.  
Van der Merwe (1999) argues that the establishment of the TRC was possible because 
different stakeholders had different expectations to  TRC's work. He points out the following 
differencesin understandings of democracy and views on how to promote it: 
some saw the process as one that would neutrally grant amnesty without making moral judgements (while others saw moral 
judgement as a crucial part of the construction of a new human rights and non-racial culture)(…) some saw it as a body that 
would promote greater mutual understanding of the moral basis of the other parties motives during the conflict (while others saw 
it as a way of discrediting past moral justifications).(…)some saw it as a was of distancing political leaders from the actions of 
the torturers and other "deviants" within their own ranks (while others saw it as a way of calling leaders to account)(…)some 
saw it as an opportunity for parties to close the book on the past (while for others it was a way to open up the debate) (Van der 
Merwe1999: ch.13.2)  
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He argues that the TRC adapted an understanding of reconciliation that was closest to the 
understanding of the ANC. Rather than a body that had party-political or racial bias, the 
TRC was a body that manifested a specific interpretation of reconciliation (a mix of certain 
reconciliation ideologies) that were seen as threatening by certain political parties and 
whites. He claims the commission had not sufficiently understood the divisions in political 
vision that faced the country (ibid). 
Did the TRC help build relations and reconciliation between the races? A survey in July 
1998 indicated that a large majority of South Africans felt that the process had increased 
racial tension (Gloppen 2002:27). We have seen that some groups including the IFP saw the 
TRC as a illegitimate attempt of nation building by writing a common history for the whole 
population of South Africa. Theissen found that almost half the white population surveyed 
(46%) saw the TRC as an ANC inspired witch-hunt to discredit its enemies (1998). 
From the very beginning of the TRC process most white South Africans were not in favour of the Truth Commission. They 
tended to claim that the process was biased towards the ANC and former liberation movements, and were less confident that 
truth would emerge. White South Africans were also quite pessimistic about reconciliation. Most believe that the TRC has not 
contributed to reconciliation at all. In contrast to their fellow citizens they believe that the TRC has made race relations worse 
(Theissen 1999:78) 
He found that 23% of white South Africans claimed that they had heard of the apartheid 
abuses for the first time through the TRC, 55% that they knew about abuses, but not about 
their severity, and only 22% that they were more or less fully aware of the abuses (ibid). 
This means that the TRC did uncover some facts that make violations hard to deny. Still he 
found that white people are in a state of denial about their role on the abuses, and that the 
abuses were morally wrong64.  
Furthermore, many Africans people do not believe that white South Africans are serious about reconciliation. It appears that 
only very few white South Africans are committed to share some of their wealth. Firstly, most whites do not see themselves as 
beneficiaries. Only 18% of all white South Africans claim to have benefited from the apartheid system. Secondly, only a small 
minority (9%) of white South Africans supports redistribution and Affirmative action policies. Although 48 percent of white 
South Africans concede that land forcefully removed during apartheid should be restituted or the victims compensated for their 
loss of property, less than a third of all white South Africans are in favour of compensating victims of past human rights 
violations (Theissen 1999:79). 
Indeed, respondents from all racial groups show only very limited appreciation for members of other racial groups. While black 
South Africans have only strong negative perceptions about white Afrikaans-speakers and do in average not express negative 
sentiments about other population groups, white South Africans tend to dislike all other South Africans than their own. Against 
this background it does not wonder, that 61% of all South Africans claim that "blacks and whites will never trust each other". 
Although social interaction has changed in the new South Africa, white South Africans tend to socialise rather seldom with 
people from other cultural or ethnical backgrounds. They are also less positive about the idea of a rainbow nation (Theissen 
1999:78-79). 
Community level reconciliation can be studied both within and between communities (for 
instance  between different racial groups living in the same town). Most of the research on 
                                              
64 This survey was however based on a relatively few respondents, as an explorative study. It was conducted by telephone 
interviews with 124 white South Africans in 1996, shortly after the first public hearings of the TRC. 
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the effect of the TRC is done at the national/ regime/ political elite levels. During the 
process, many claimed that the TRC was like a circus, coming to town, turning everything 
upside down to leave the next day. Van der Merwe (1999) has studied how two local 
communities were affected by  TRC's work. He argues that the TRC was a top-down 
process, focusing more on national needs, than the needs of the local communities it 
operated in. Reconciliation at this level was assumed to trickle down to the community 
levels. This meant that each communty's special needs to promote reconciliation were 
overlooked, and opportunities lost. 
Local communities had expectations that the TRC would substantively contribute to uncovering the truth about local human 
rights abuses, assist in rebuilding the fragmented war-torn community, and help victims recover from trauma and socio-
economic marginalisation. These expectations were too vast for a limited body such as the TRC to address, and more 
significantly, this agenda was not at the core of the TRC's interpretation of its mandate…its limited attempts to engage local 
communities and victims ultimately served to create unrealistic expectations…the lack of delivery in its (explicit and implicit) 
promises ultimately undermined the TRC's credibility in these communities (Van der Merwe1999:ch.13.2.b). 
Van der Merwe finds that local conflict dynamics rarely fit neatly into the interpretation of 
the conflict as one between black and white people. The perpetrators and victims in his 
casestudies were usually both black.65  
From the victim's perspectives, the issue of race is thus not necessarily directly involved in addressing gross human rights 
violations. While, for most of the victims there was a clear connection between their victimisation and the question of race, this 
was not the usually the primary social division highlighted by their victimisation (…) most victims did have a political 
understanding of the victimisation that places ultimately responsibility for the suffering with the apartheid government and/or its 
security apparatus. Their victimisation was, however, perpetrated through intermediaries such as black police, local informers, 
another political party, etc. the community as a whole was also fragmented by suspicion and fear. This isolated people and 
sometimes turned a community against an individual (a suspected informer) or made the intolerant of a particular group(…) The 
relationships, which they most desperately wanted to mend were these local ones on which they were dependent for daily 
survival. Rebuilding a local sense of community was, for them, the essence of a reconciliation process (1999:ch.13.3-4). 
He gives the TRC credit for opening the reconciliation debate, and giving victims a chance 
to be heard and organise themselves. But he also highlights the dangers of mainly focusing 
on gross human rights violations as the route to racial reconciliation: 
Gross human rights violations provides a spotlight that leaves most of the suffering caused by apartheid in the dark. The 
suffering of those subjected to legal forms of oppression (forced removals, pass laws, inferior education etc.) is not addressed. 
The fact that whites were given vast privileges under apartheid through a system that determined access to recourses and power 
on the basis of race, and the present inequalities are a direct result of these allocations, it is not a part of the TRC's mandate. The 
research demonstrated that much of the racial tension still exists at community level (and probably at other levels) is because 
these inequalities (and attempts to maintain them), rather than resulting from gross human rights violation (Van der Merwe 
ch.13.4A). 
Van der Merwe thus suggests that the TRC was trying to promote intergroup reconciliation, 
while the communities felt the need for intragroup reconciliation as most relevant. We still 
have limited knowledge on how to promote intergroup reconciliation and whether a group 
react to revelations of perpetrators within own group by shaming or by seeing them as 
heroes. We will come back to this in chapter 6. 
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At the interpersonal level we can study how  TRC's work affected the relations between 
victims and perpetrators of violations, as well as the relationship between individual 
members of victimised groups and groups benefiting from apartheid. The TRC didn't have 
the capacity to follow up most cases in this respect. There were, however, some meetings set 
up, some with cameras present. Different outcomes of these meetings were broadcasted. 
Two of the most famous cases included the Amy Biehl case where apologies from 
perpetrators were accepted by the victims familiy66 and a case where apologies were 
perceived by the victims families an insincere, resulting in physical attack on the 
perpetrator67. This shows that the desired outcome, reconciliation, is an empirical question, 
and it seems we need to know more about under which circumstances truth has a healing and 
reconciling effect. Many have also pointed out the need to follow up the work the TRC 
initiated in this field68. 
The TRC argued that giving voice and acknowledgement to the victims, and establishment 
of the facts about the violations, could contribute to intrapersonal reconciliation. Tutu (2000) 
argued that the violations had dehumanised the perpetrators and that confession could have a 
therapeutic effect for the perpetrator (many perpetrators were diagnosed with Post Traumatic 
Stress Disorder). The TRC points out some "success stories" where people felt such a 
therapeutic effect69, but there were many stories of the opposite (Tutu:2000). Many victims 
were angered by the lack of compensation and follow up work from the TRC, for instance in 
investigating their cases, or longer term help like medical or psychological treatment for 
                                                                                                                                           
65 Van der Merwe studied two communities, one where the main conflict was between black IFP and ANC supporters, the 
other between ANC supporters and the security forces.  
66 Amy Biehl was a young American student, engaged in the anti-apartheid struggle, that got stoned to death in the 
township of Gugulethu in 1993. The panafricanist organisation PASO and the ANC friendly Congress of South African 
Students (COSAS) were arranging a campaign with street protests in Cape Town, throwing stones and using slogans as 
"one settler, one bullet". Her parents followed the amnesty hearings and embraced the perpetrators' families. They support 
the work of the TRC and established the Amy Biehl foundation working to help young people in Gugulethu. One of the 
people granted amnesty for the murder is now working for the foundation (Tutu 2000:113). 
67 An Afrikaner member of the security forces asked the family of a victim for forgiveness for killing him. For years after 
the disappearance of the victim the police had harassed the family, that did not know what had happened to him. The 
policeman kept referring to his Christian duty to ask forgiveness, and the family's religious duty to forgive. The younger 
son in the family knocked him in the head with a vase, in front of the camera team. The scene was widely broadcasted in 
South Africa (Long Nights Journey into Day, movie) 
68 Some NGOs like the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation are working with these issues. 
69 Tutu highlights the importance of the philosophy around Ubuntu, a Nguni word indicating that we are people through 
other people: A person that has ubunti is generous, hospitable, friendly and caring. Ubunti is about being a person through 
belonging. He sees restorative justice as part of the Ubunti spirit, with its focus on healing and reconciliation (2000:42-
43,56).  
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damages due to their victimisation. It seems like  TRC's work with its focus on the truth has 
only started scratching the surface of the needs of the people directly affected by abuses to 
be able to reconcile with their own history, even though  TRC's work has been very 
important in identifying people struggling with problems after violations.  
5.3 Summary 
We have outlined  TRC's work and pointed out that it stands out from former truth 
commissions in terms of size, contingent amnesty, the broad involvement from society at 
large and the thorough documentation and publication of its work in the mass media. The 
TRC drew a broad picture about past gross human rights violations, acknowledge the abuses 
and tried to compensate for the lack of criminal justice by suggesting a policy for 
reparations. The establishment of the truth commission was a reconciliatory compromise that 
made the democratic transition possible, but its role in promoting reconciliation and 
democratic consolidation is disputed. At the political elite level all major parties seems to 
have had different views of the role of the commission. They all accused the TRC of bias, 
and the commission was involved in court cases against all three major parties (or key 
people in their leadership), challenging their work. Amnesty still angers the South African 
public. The government's limited implementation of the suggested reparations has 
undermined the acknowledgement for the victims suffering and the attempts of 
compensating for lack of criminal justice, and caused a lot of anger from and on behalf of 
the victims. The commission succeeded at starting a human rights debate in South Africa, 
but still the overall level of commitment to human rights remains low. There are indications 
that the work of the commission has worsened race relations, at least in the eyes of the white 
population. Even though the commission has succeeded in being an eye opener among 
whites for the fact that violations has taken place, they tend to be in denial about their own 
involvement, and does not necessary deem the violations as morally wrong. At the 
community level the TRC did little to follow up their hearings to promote community 
reconciliation. Van der Merwe (1999) criticises the commission for not taking local 
perspectives and needs into account, and thereby not having a large impact on reconciliation 
at the community level. He argues that at the community level, people felt greater need for 
help to reconcile within their own group than help with reconciliation between conflicting 
groups. The commission also had limited capacity to follow up reconciliation between 
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individuals and intrapersonal reconciliation. It is however apparent that the commission has 
been able to identify a large need for continued work in these fields, and that revealing the 
truth about former abuses alone is only a small start in the work for reconciliation, at all 
levels. 
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6. THE COMMUNITY STUDY OF OUDTSHOORN 
6.1 Research needed on TRC's ability to promote reconciliation 
We have seen that here is little consensus on how to promote reconciliation. There is little 
consensus on how truth and justice after gross human rights violations are connected with 
reconciliation, both between main stakeholders in South Africa, and in the academic debate. 
This points to a need for more empirical studies. There is quite a lot of knowledge of how 
the TRC made the transition to democracy possible, and how it worked with the political 
elite and controversies at this level (Stene 2002, Orr 2000). At the same time many surveys 
has focused on TRC's effect on the individual level. But we need more knowledge on how  
TRC's work affected local communities, and what would be needed to promote 
reconciliation at this level. We know little about the relationship between reconciliation at 
various social levels, and little research has been done to understand how affected local 
communities react to the handling of gross human rights abuses by truth commissions. Do 
public hearings trying to establish the truth about former gross human rights abuses promote 
reconciliation at this particular level? Or are other or additional roads to reconciliation 
needed?  
The TRC has had problems involving white South Africa in spite of its efforts to do so (TRC 
post hearing community programme). We have seen that white South Africa is still in denial 
about their role in former gross human rights abuses. Even though the TRC had some 
success in opening the eyes of many white South Africans for the fact that such violations 
have taken place, they are still unconvinced that they played a role in apartheid abuses and 
that these violations were wrong (Theissen 1998). Gibson points out that particularly 
Afrikaans speaking whites are notable for their distinctive rejection of racial reconciliation 
(2001A:79). The Afrikaners were blamed for the violations given their association with the 
apartheid regime. It is particularly interesting to see how the Afrikaners as a community 
responded to  TRC's work, and why they were alienated and did not accept its findings. We 
need to know more about how beneficiaries of violations react to revelations from truth 
commissions, and how it affects self-perception and relationships within this group and the 
relationship to other groups. We also need to know more about how revealed perpetrators 
were treated by their own community: As heroes, and thereby undermining the human rights 
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norm and the reconciliatory work towards victimised people and groups, or with rejection of 
the perpetrators actions, and thereby contributing to upholding the norm. 
The following part of this essay is a study of how an Afrikaner dominated community70 
affected by widespread gross human rights abuses reacted to  TRC's work. Van der Merwe 
(1999) pointed out that the TRC's main focus was on national reconciliation and did not take 
local reconciliatory needs into account. Which steps does members of the community 
suggest are needed to promote reconciliation here, and what are seen as hinders of 
reconciliation? Was the TRC enough to promote reconciliation given the limited success at 
addressing violations of other human rights? Violations of economic and social rights 
affected most of the population, and resulted in poverty and inequality and overlap between 
race/ class that still prevails. Is reconciliation possible without a broader addressing of 
poverty and inequality, the result of economic and social human rights abuses? We also want 
to look into how the former abuses affect contact between the races, as this is a suggested 
non-institutional path to reconciliation. 
First the historical context of the Oudtshoorn case is outlined. We trace  TRC's work in 
Oudtshoorn including victim hearings in the Human Rights Violation Committee (HRVC), 
and the Post Hearing Community Programme (PHCP) that was put up by the Reparation and 
Rehabilitation Committee to promote reconciliation. We look into the community's reaction 
to  TRC's work, and question to what extent it contributed to uncover the truth about former 
abuses, and to what extent it achieved any form of justice. We look into the TRC's ability to 
promote community reconciliation; input from the community on hinders for reconciliation 
and ways of promoting it. We question to what extent community members felt that 
reconciliation is possible without addressing poverty and inequality, the result of violations 
of economic and social rights. Last we look into how former abuses affected the contact 
between racial groups in Oudtshoorn, and to how this daily contact affects reconciliation. 
                                              
70 As the Afrikaners rarely are a majority group anywhere, Afrikaners do not numerically dominate Oudtshoorn, but it is 
Afrikaner dominated in terms of economic power, cultural dominance, language etc.  
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6.2 Background on Oudtshoorn 
Oudtshoorn is an isolated little town located inland in Western Cape, living of ostrich farms 
and tourism. This was one of the main centres of oppression in the province during the 
Apartheid years and Oudtshoorn was among the most conservative in the Cape Town area71. 
It was a coloured labour preference area, which meant that black people were not allowed to 
occupy jobs unless there were no coloureds suitable for the job. This resulted in a coloured 
majority (PHCP transcript). The municipality estimates the population to about 8000 blacks, 
17000 whites and 48000 coloureds (interview). The coloureds, like the Afrikaner 
community, speak Afrikaans as the mother tongue. The black population mainly speaks 
Xhosa. 
In 1961 the Group Areas Act was imposed in Oudtshoorn, resulting in extreme social and 
spatial engineering. The township of Bridgeton was put up outside town to house the 
coloureds. Black and coloured people were forcefully removed from their homes in town. In 
1963 alone, 325 families were moved. In 1966 Bongulethu was put up next to Bridgeton, to 
house the black population formerly living in a shantytown. The forced removals continued 
until 1969 and the pass laws were strictly implemented. Residents in Bridgeton had to obtain 
permits to visit relatives in Bongulethu and registration at the Labour Bureau was 
compulsory. In 1973 the Karoo Bantu administration Board took over control of Bongulethu 
from Oudtshoorn Municipality, and after this followed sky-high rent increases without any 
improvement for residents (PHCP transcript).  
Between 1973 and 1983 there was a growth of community organisations leading to 
politicising of the area. Leaders experienced constant police harassment and arrest. In 1976 
an uprising starting with a student boycott at the university of Western Cape spread to 
Oudtshoorn with widespread marches, arson, shooting injuries and one death. In the rural 
areas in Western Cape all but one of the people killed were coloured (ibid).  
In 1985 open political conflict broke out. Students at a local school were detained, resulting 
in a school boycott and 155 students arrested in April. In May the SADF (South African 
Defence Force) and SAP (South African Police) moved into Bongulethu. Several people 
                                              
71 The TRC a.o mentions that a church minister barred coloured mourners from the funeral of their white farmer boss 
because coloured people were not welcome in the white church as a manifestation of this conservative attitude. 
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were shot. In June three children (Felize Hanze (14), Andile Majola (13) and Patric 
Madikane (14)) were shot dead and others injured at the black policeman Mngoma’s house. 
This became internationally known as the Bongulethu 3 case. The conflict escalated after 
this between the residents in the township and everybody seen to be working for the state. 
All black policemen were driven out of the townships. A bus driver, believed to be a 
member of the security police, was killed in connection with a bus boycott. The community 
newspaper Saamstaan alleged that at least 600 people were injured by police shootings in 
1985. Between 1987-88 at least 6 activist injured by kitskonstables in Oudtshoorn72 (PHCP). 
This can be seen as part of the government’s strategy of black on black violence. Community members also complained that one 
of their problems was that the area was - hardly had any legal assistance…and local attorneys refused to represent people who 
were arrested for unrest related charges. (Mr Pienaar, PHCP transcript).  
The NP ran the municipality in Oudtshoorn until 1994. There were separate councils for 
coloureds and blacks in Bridgeton and Bongulethu, but they had to come to town to get their 
decisions approved. After the 1995 local election there was a transitional council with an 
ANC majority. After the local election in 2000 the Democratic Alliance (an alliance of NNP 
and DP) took over control at the municipality with the support of independent candidates 
(formerly ANC representatives). The ANC has 10 councillors, DA 10, Action 2000 two and 
one councillor is independent. There are according to the municipality less differences 
between the ANC and the NP in Oudtshoorn than at the national level (interview 
municipality). Even though the ANC are on the sideline in local politics now, the party is in 
charge of national development policies that the local municipality to some extent 
implement. 
                                              
72 In 1987 and –88 so called kitskonstables, or “instant police” were sent to Bongulethu: with only six weeks of training, 
they got weapons and authority to police the township. And they were often people from the area who were poor, largely 
untrained people. At least 16 kitskonstables were operating in the townships surrounding Oudtshoorn. Police records 
suggested trouble with the discipline of the kidskonstables: One of them fired at his brother with a shotgun, apparently 
while drunk; another reported for duty drunk and was sent home; another shot himself with a shotgun; another exploded a 
grenade by accident in his hand; that another was hit by a shotgun after a shuffle at the water tap, and altogether there was a 
picture of disorderly and undisciplined conduct (PHCP).  
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Poverty and Inequality in Oudtshoorn 
As a result of the apartheid policy in Oudtshoorn, economic and social cleavages developed 
between the different racial groups in town. The legacy of this policy is still stark in 
Oudtshoorn, where the residential areas to a large extent still overlap with class and race: 
The white population dominate in middle class homes in town, and controls most of the 
businesses and the ostrige farms. In the black township Bongulethu the living standard is the 
lowest. Large area of shacks, informal houses with little access to public services, have 
grown up73. In the coloured township Bridgeton the standard is in between those found in the 
other areas, but with visible differences between the majority, and houses owned by the new 
emerging coloured middle class.  
National strategies for poverty and inequality reduction have had some effect in Oudtshoorn. 
One of the main goals of the RDP was to redistribute public recourses to the former 
disadvantaged communities, including building out infrastructure in these areas. Bridgeton 
and Bongulethu have seen improvements in infrastructure such as some asphalt roads and 
streetlights (interview, municipality). Still there is a problem with marked failure: Even 
though water to a large extent has been provided to the houses in the townships, the poor are 
unable to pay for the service, so the water often has to be closed off (ibid). The informal 
settlements have access to water, but not other public services. Between 1994 and -98 the 
Masikani Programme was implemented to stop rent boycotts and make people pay for public 
services, which was seen as a success by the municipality (ibid).  
926 new houses had been built by 2001, and the municipality had been granted state funding 
for another 660 houses74 (ibid). Adding to this a new fond (Equity Share Fond) has been put 
up by the provincial government to subsidise the poorest of the poor households. 1500 
families in Oudtshoorn had applied for support in the form of cash support (70-80 Rand a 
month,) and reduced prices on public services. Local Economic Development Fonds (LED) 
support municipality projects, and has resulted in some small companies in Oudtshoorn. The 
                                              
73 I have been unsuccessful at finding statistics on poverty, inequality and unemployment for Oudtshoorn specifically, but 
we know from national surveys that Western Cape has a lower level of poverty compared to the rest of South Africa 
(May:1998). Poverty is still highly visible in Oudtshoorn, together with social problems like dagga smoking, begging, 
prostitution etc. Many also pointed out the problems connected with AIDS, that is taking its toll in Oudtshoorn 
(interviews). 
74 About half of the money is granted to the municipality to build infrastructure, and the other half to start building houses. 
The land is provided for free to people who apply, and does not already own a home. The houses are 27square meters, and 
are delivered with outer walls and toilet. The rest has to be provided by the new owner (interview municipality). 
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fund also support Oudtshoorn Economic Initiative, an NGO providing advice for people 
wanting to start small businesses.  
Land claims from people that were victims of forced removals were being treated at the time 
of my stay, but people were worried about the process. The land reform is based on people 
voluntarily selling land to the programme, and this land should be redistributed a.o to people 
that had lost their land during forced removals. But only a small proportion of the land 
needed has been made available, and nearly every one interviewed feared developments in 
similar to those in Zimbabwe: Violent attacks on white farmers and illegal occupation of 
white owned farms. 
6.3 The Commission's work in Oudtshoorn 
Victim hearing 
The Human Rights Violations Committee (HRVC) started collecting statements in the region 
in 1996 and its research team held discussions with community members about the history of 
the town. It held hearings in neighbouring George and one day (June 18.th 1996) only 
addressed gross human rights violations that had taken place in Oudtshoorn. These included 
torture, killings, abductions and severe ill treatment, and had mainly taken place in the 
1970’s and 1980’s. Other issues that had been important locally, like forced removals, non-
political violence (the violence white people were most affected by) and general repression 
of economic and social rights were excluded from the agenda. As for all the hearings, the 
TRC did not have the capacity to hear all the cases that were brought to the commission, but 
tried to hear a few, representative cases. The hearing was being translated to the three major 
languages in the area, Afrikaans, English and Xhosa. This made it possible for people 
testifying to speak their own language, and understand what was being said by listening to 
translations through headsets.  
The HRVC heard several cases involving people being shot and wounded or killed by the 
police or kitskonstables (a.o the Bongulethu 3 case). Police beating, bribing and torturing to 
get information was covered. In one case a man, Michael Lucas, was sentenced to death for 
murder on the bus driver based on information achieved under torture (including torture 
against the Mayor of Oudtshoorn at the time of the hearings). It also heard a case where the 
police forces were not the offenders. A community councillor in Bongulethu was attacked 
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with an axe and then necklaced in the township for co-operating with the regime, in front of 
his young son.75 After finishing the statement taking and hearings, the HRVC was to decide 
whether applicants were to be defined as victims of gross human rights abuses. The RRC 
was then to take appropriate action with those cases.  
Findings based on the hearing 
The commission concluded that the Bongulethu 3 case was a police ambush carried out on 
children and youth. While an eyewitness testified that people believed the policeman's house 
to be empty, shots started going of from inside the house when a young boy approached the 
door. The police was accused of filling a Fanta bottle with petrol and leaving it next to the 
body of a child. The police claimed to have acted in self-defence after the house they were 
guarding was attacked by a crowd: They claimed a youth had sprinkled petrol on the carpet 
in the house, and the police had shot to prevent a youngster to lighten a match. They claimed 
the other two children were shot in the process of fighting the crowd that had gathered 
outside the house (victim hearing transcript, TRC homepage). The TRC found the use of the 
“Trojan horse” ambush tactics by the security forces to be entirely inappropriate for dealing 
with civilian unrest. It was used to lure civilians deliberately into situations that then resulted 
in fatalities and injuries. Relying on concealment, speed and surprise, it resulted in 
indiscriminate shootings by the security forces, injuring bystanders and protestors alike, 
many under the age of 18 (TRC final report. vol. 3 ch. 5). It established that torture had been 
used at least in two of the cases to force the signing of statements to implement Michael 
Lucas, a friend of the people tortured, in the death of a local security policeman during the 
bus boycott. Lucas had later been sentenced to death for this and hanged. The commission 
found that execution for politically motivated offences constituted a gross human rights 
violation (ibid). The commission found that this period saw the most widespread 
perpetration of torture in this region during the period of the commission's mandate. The two 
groups tortured most consistently were individuals suspected of public violence activities, 
and individuals suspected of belonging to MK. Separate accounts of similar means employed 
                                              
75 Neclacing, putting petrol inside a car tire, putting the tire around the victim's neck before lighting it, so the victim would 
die from burning, was used by some members of the liberation movement as punishment for believed traitors, like for 
instance police informers. This issue was central in the case against Winnie M. Mandela, President Mandelas ex wife and 
leader of the ANC Women’s League. The TRC criticised the leadership in the liberation movement for not distancing itself 
from neck lacing (Tutu: 2000,TRC final report, vol3 ch5). 
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in either the same premises or by the same named perpetrators lend authenticity to these 
accounts (TRC final report. vol. 3 ch.5). 
The commission finds evidence of widespread torture in rural areas, predominantly at police stations…and security branch 
headquarters…and several police stations in the southern cape…the motive for such torture was often intimidation or the 
forcible extraction of confessions…such torture was committed with the complicit knowledge of the superiors of the individuals 
associated with acts of torture (TRC final report. vol. 3 ch.5). 
The commission finds as consistent pattern of members of the security forces lying in court by denying involvement in acts of 
torture…magistrates and judges were singularly reluctant to accept or believe allegations of torture (ibid). 
In the case of the necklaced councillor, the TRC found that he fled when youth had burned 
his belongings in the street. When he returned he was chased and killed by necklacing. 
About twenty people were charged with murder. Three people had been sentenced to death; 
three others got long prison sentences. It found that the use of necklacing that took place in 
the region between 1985 and 1989 was an expression of rage towards opponents, perceived 
collaborators and representatives of the state. It was used by various groups with different 
political affiliations, but became associated with UDF supporters, and that the leadership 
should have acted more vigorously to indicate disapproval (ibid). The other cases brought 
before the TRC in Oudtshoorn were not commented in the final report. 
No job for the Amnesty Committee 
In the community there were no knowledge of anybody involved in local abuses applying for 
amnesty76. This means that the local perpetrators view of the conflict, why abuses had taken 
place, details about who was involved, who gave the orders, and details about the abuses that 
the victims families and the general community didn't already know, did not come out. An 
opportunity for perpetrators to come forward and acknowledge that violations had taken 
place, and possibly plea for forgiveness, which many point out to be positive for 
reconciliation, was lost in Oudtshoorn. 
The post hearing community programme 
To prevent a "circus left town” syndrome, the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee 
(RRC) put up at least 11 Post Hearing Community Programmes (PHCP) throughout South 
Africa, including in Oudtshoorn. These were attempts to follow up of the victim hearings 
                                              
76 I was unsuccessful at verifying this with the TRC, but if anybody connected to Oudtshoorn did apply for amnesty, it still 
did not have an effect in the community, as it was not generally known. 
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and focussed on getting input from the community on their needs in the reparation process, 
and the mobilisation of the community toward a healing process.77 
Members of different sub communities, NGO’s and local faith communities were invited to 
the programme, but many people commented the general absence of the white community in 
Oudtshoorn. The programme included a submission from the TRC on their work in the area, 
and submissions from the community of how it was affected by the gross violations of 
human rights that had take place there. There were submissions about youth and education, 
women, the churches, the media and the family. Workshops were put up discussing where 
the community needed to go from there, where also mental health workers had input. 
Discussions included strategies for improving the quality of life for Oudtshoorn residents, 
the process of healing and joining together, and reconciliation. The programme also included 
putting up an exhibition in the local museum documenting the history of Oudtshoorn during 
the conflict. The RRC used the input from various such community programmes to make 
suggestions on national reconciliation and reparation policies. At the time of my visit, some 
victims had received small interim reparations, and it is still unclear whether the government 
will pay further reparations. The RRC did not have the recourses to follow up any of the 
suggestions from the programme locally. The PHCP seems to have had a more important 
function in enlightening the Reparation and Rehabilitation Committee on obstacles for 
reconciliation at the community level, than been a tool to start working for community 
reconciliation in Oudtshoorn. This support Van der Merwe's view that the TRC worked from 
a top down perspective on reconciliation, instead of a community based bottom up approach. 
6.4 TRC's ability to promote truth and justice in Oudtshoorn 
To what extent did the TRC uncover the forensic truth about local violations? 
It is obvious that the TRC did succeed in its hearing to uncover some of the "forensic truth" 
about the violations that had taken place in Oudtshoorn. It uncovered that gross human rights 
violations took place in Oudtshoorn, identified many victims and acknowledged that the 
violations were wrong. We have seen that lack of amnesty applications limited access to 
facts about abuses held by perpetrators. I asked people in the community to what extent the 
                                              
77 The main source about the PHCP is the transcripts form the hearing at www.truth.org.za/reparations/oudshoo.htm 
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findings of the TRC were common knowledge, or news to people in Oudtshoorn until the 
hearing. The general opinion was that the black/ coloured population was familiar with the 
violations, but opinions varied on to what extent the white population knew:  
Oudtshoorn is a small community, but it was completely divided by the apartheid rule, so it was not really one community. Some 
communities did not have a clue about what had been going on, and it was a big shock to them what came out in the TRC 
hearings. Particularly white people did not know. Still many white people do not want to believe what happened. Many still sees 
the TRC as an instrument for the ANC. Whites did not know the things that were common knowledge in the coloured 
community. The coloureds are without a voice, as whites control the media. News travel by word of mouth in the coloured 
community. News about human rights violations are particularly blocked out of Afrikaans newspapers (Afrikaner). 
We never knew what a large role the security police played. And nobody would say they were members of it. But when the TRC 
came, it was revealed (Afrikaner). 
It was covered by the Saamstaan (newspaper run by the liberation movement). But white people did not read that. White 
newspapers would just put in a notice. But the people in the involved communities did know. But for many whites it was new 
information when the TRC held its hearing here. I think the TRC was an eye-opener for the ones that were not involved. I was 
even surprised about who had done what… Within the Security branch we did not talk about what was done. If somebody had 
done something, it was not something that they would brag about. So most people within the security branch did not know what 
others were doing (former security police). 
It was a familiar picture the TRC drew of Oudtshoorn. People knew what had been going on, because it is a small community. 
We also knew via the media…White people also wanted to know, but they had a different perspective. A lot was kept away from 
the white general public, and they did not know(...)There is a saying that "nobody is as blind as the man that does not want to 
see". So I think the TRC was an eye opener for many people, particularly white people. I think the TRC made a difference 
here…myself I was always in the middle. Many people has come to me after the TRC and said they had no idea…So there has 
been a change in attitude (retired army officer, coloured).  
When the UDF was established, I was in the leadership… White people ignored me, and I was seen as a troublemaker. Now they 
say "we did not understand", suddenly they didn't understand anything?…people knew. Everybody (UDF/ANC leader). 
Suspicions and rumours about people being involved in abuses or threats of abuses are still 
widespread in Oudtshoorn, which shows that the TRC only seems to have uncovered the top 
of the ice berg of forensic truth about local abuses.  
No one in the police here asked for amnesty. And it is not common knowledge who was behind various things here. Some of the 
people that were in the struggle think they might know (ANC leader). 
According to one of the community leaders active in helping the TRC put up the community 
programme, people named as perpetrators in the hearing had all left town after this 
(interview). But other people I interviewed pointed out several known perpetrators still 
living in the community: 
I think I know who tried to kill me. The man walks the streets of Oudtshoorn today. I had my car for repair. A guy from the 
security police asked the man repairing it for the key. He refused to give it, but the security policeman threatened him, so he 
gave the key. The next day he comes back with the key, tests the duplicate key in the lock. The white man who was repairing the 
car tells me this when I am picking up the car. Only days later he dies in a mysterious car accident…Some chemicals were put 
on my car: My whole family got sick, but we were lucky to survive. The car had to be contaminated…the man I think was 
behind (…) he knows that I know (UDF/ANC leader)  
A policeman .. had personally called me death threats over the phone, saying he would "wipe me of the earth", (I knew it was 
him, because I recognised his voice) (ANC). 
Many cases were for various reasons not brought to the attention of the TRC. Several of the 
people I interviewed in Oudtshoorn did consider themselves as victims of gross human 
rights abuses, or had information about such abuses, but chose not to bring their cases before 
the commission and thereby limited the TRC's information about abuses in the region.  
At the end of the day, I choose not to go to the TRC. I am willing to discuss it, the past, with anybody in my office, but I did not 
want to put my family through the pressure and the attention…I had gone through so much social exclusion when I quit the 
police. I could not go through all that again. I figured it would have lead to some positive reactions about it being tough coming 
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forward, but also negative reactions like "he is lying" or "he is only doing it to promote his career" (former security police, 
Afrikaner). 
When the TRC put up the Post Hearing Community Programme, I was contacted, but skipped because none of the police people 
had given testimony, and nobody asked amnesty…I feel now that the TRC was a mistake…the TRC did a bad job. But the TRC 
was the right way to go in the transition to democracy (ANC leader, victim) 
I was not involved with the TRC. I need to overcome some things for myself first, before the real (own name) comes out. I have 
not had enough time to deal with the trauma I went through (ANC/UDF leader, victim of several attempts of murder, police 
harassment, forced removal, detentions and house arrest). 
I was a victim myself, you know. But I choose not to go to the TRC. It would be harder for me to forget it then. It was the police 
that was behind it. And they are still working in the police here. We have a working relationship now, and I did not want to put 
them in that position (Black Sash, statement taker for the TRC in the region). 
The TRC thus managed to draw a broad picture of a pattern of abuse. Still many cases were 
not brought to the attention of the commission and it did not have the capacity to follow up 
more than a few cases. Suspicions on concerning violations thus remains widespread.  
Personal, narrative and social/dialog truth 
The people that did testify in the hearings got a chance to bring out their "personal/ 
narrative" truth. But criticism was raised over "who's truth" the TRC highlighted and 
acknowledged. This raises the question of social/ dialog truth: Which groups in Oudtshoorn 
got their version of the truth verified or rejected by the TRC? Were important groups 
excluded in the process? We also need to know how sub communities reacted to the 
information provided by the TRC and whether it contributed to change people's perceptions 
of the past. 
From the coloured community the TRC was criticised for picking out cases illustrating the 
conflict as one between black and white people, and thereby not giving coloured people 
credit for their involvement in the struggle. It was claimed that this gave a wrong impression 
of the composition of the resistance movement in the area.  
I had friends that testified. Few coloureds did. Only whites and blacks were taken to the for-front (by the TRC). But coloureds 
were important in the struggle. I was myself classified by the old system as a coloured man, even though I see myself as a black 
man (ANC victim). 
In other parts of the country, the TRC succeeded in bringing about a lot of the truth, but here in Southern Cape, it had little 
success in bringing the real stories (ANC victim who followed the hearing in George). 
In the Afrikaner community, the version of the truth presented by the TRC was very painful. 
People tend to get very uncomfortable whenever the issue is being brought up, and many 
refuse to talk about the TRC at all.  
The Afrikaner people saw the TRC as a bad thing (Afrikaner). 
It was like it was blocked out. There were few whites at the meetings…It was talked about, because it was hard to ignore. Many 
people did not want to accept that it was true, what came out. Most Afrikaners now know it was true. And there is a feeling of 
shame (Afrikaner priest) 
Most whites did not find the TRC objective…the TRC was the wrong body. It should find out what happened, and that was 
good, but the reconciliation process should not have been lead by the same organisation. Not many Afrikaners had faith in it 
(retired security police). 
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Two people named in the TRC hearings as perpetrators were in my congregation. I happened to be together with one of them, 
when we heard a program in the radio, where his name was mentioned as a perpetrator. He got so upset that he called the radio 
station to explain (Priest, Dutch reformed church). 
Some Afrikaners thought the TRC was an eye opener: 
It was hard for us to let everything sink in. It's like seeing yourself in the mirror and see somebody you didn't recognise 
(Afrikaner).  
People have a better image of it now than in the start. It did some good work. And it has helped some. And the larger community 
seems to think it was all right. And a lot of things came out that would have otherwise remained hidden away (Afrikaner). 
When the TRC came, nobody was immune. People had to listen…some people still say the TRC was biased. But if some people 
were perpetrators, it would be almost impossible when the TRC came, not for them to feel that the TRC was after them. We must 
accept what was been done in the past. But many are looking for flaws in the work of the TRC, and they find it, and use it as an 
excuse to disregard it (Priest Dutch reformed church) 
This shows that  TRC's work was painful in the white community, that responded by looking 
for excuses to block out the findings or disregard them. Still some "forensic truth" seems to 
have come through, which have been hard to deal with in this community. 
The reactions among white people that were directly involved by working for the security 
forces like the police or army seems to have been less favourable among the whites than 
among coloureds and black people: 
I was not myself involved (with the TRC). But there were reactions within the forces. White people did not like it. There were 
people there that had been doing things that were not allowed. There was fear. But generally speaking it was accepted. But the 
effect was mainly that white people were afraid of the consequences, while coloureds were more positive generally speaking, 
also towards appearing for the commission (retired army officer, coloured). 
An Afrikaner who had quit his job as a captain in the security branch of the police, told me: 
Everything was rough here. There was a rent boycott and the struggle was hard here. I felt that I should not have been here. But 
changing a job was not part of the tradition. It is a tights community within the police. If you quit, it is like betrayal…I was 
deserted, particularly related to the security forces. 
He described fear among the security police after the announcement of the TRC: 
People said "why here, why not in Namibia?" It was a new start with a new government. And there was fear what would come 
out. Everybody was afraid that it would be a one way communication, and that it was only the police and the ones that was in the 
war was to feel it. It should have looked to the tops, to the leaders (former security police). 
The leader of the security branch came over here to me…he advised me to stop being an informer (retired security police).  
This shows that both the general white community in Oudtshoorn, and the security forces 
were hostile to  TRC's work from the beginning, and that the security forces feared what 
might come out. As there were no amnesty applications in connection with violations in 
Oudtshoorn, or people from the security forces that testified at public hearings, it seems like 
this group closed ranks and rejected  TRC's work. Still it seems like the TRC has had an 
impact on discrediting the Apartheid regime, at least among some whites: 
After the TRC both English and Afrikaners said "No, no, no, I did not support Apartheid". If you ask now, nobody supported it. 
It is not true. Most people supported Apartheid. The Afrikaners are lying about this now to cover up. They make a new image 
where they themselves were innocent. I think it is better to be honest. There were some liberals, particularly British and Jews 
that never supported Apartheid. But the majority did. I think it is better not to lie. To say that "yes, at that point in time, I did 
support Apartheid, but I have changed and I no longer believe in it. All this hypocrisy makes me sick (former security police). 
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Feelings of victimisation in the white community were not taken into account: The 
Afrikaners have a self-perception as a victimised group that the TRC did not acknowledge: 
If you ask me it all started in 1899 with the Anglo-Boer war. The Transvaal and so on was taken over from the Boers because of 
the diamonds. For three years the British used coloureds and blacks against the Boers, and that is how the racism started. 30-40 
000 Boers, women and children died in concentration camps. My own grandfather was in that war. This led to a "never again" 
attitude among the Boers. Not because the Boers were racist, but because they felt threatened (Afrikaner security police).  
Most white families here have been victimised. Everybody has a sister that has been raped, boys that have been sent to war, been 
violently mugged or had burglaries in their house (Afrikaner priest). 
Most whites have seen things, like in the war in Angola. This is very important when it comes to reconciliation: Everybody has 
been involved: It was seen as a war (Afrikaner). 
These violations fell outside the TRC's mandate because of the limitation to politically 
motivated violations, and only violations taking place after 1960. The victimisation of white 
people in general and Afrikaners specifically were excluded from the TRC agenda. The 
Afrikaners thus had little to gain and much to loose from the TRC process. This can be a part 
of the explanation of why the Afrikaners were alienated from the process and thereby limited 
the potential effect on intergroup reconciliation. 
The overall reactions to  TRC's work in Oudtshoorn thus seems to be that white people were 
alienated from the process because there was little in it for them, as their own perceptions of 
victimisation was not taken into account. It seems that the TRC would have had to go further 
in acknowledging some of the views of reality and feelings of victimisation in the white 
community to involve them in the reconciliatory work. The security police and the Army 
seem to have closed ranks and thereby not contributed to the work of discovering the truth 
about the violations or acknowledging the abuses.  
 TRC's work in Oudtshoorn could have been the start of a public dialog around the past It did 
fill this role at the national level, but seems to have done so less at the local level in 
Oudtshoorn. The local media reported bitterness against the TRC for holding the hearing in 
George, when Oudtshoorn had been the regional centre for oppression. The TRC had made 
the decision to place the hearing based on logistics (Oudtshoorn Courant 21.06.1996). Some 
argued that this made the possible impact of the work smaller:  
My personal opinion, and I say this as a private person, not as a member of the ANC; I had little faith in the TRC and the 
hearings. First it was wrong for the hearings to be held in George: It would have had a lot better effect here (victim that followed 
the hearing). 
Even though the hearing was covered in the local media, these failed to report controversial 
information like names of perpetrators that were named in the hearing (media archives, local 
museum). This might have lessened the impact of the hearing locally, even though national 
media revealed this information. As the major local newspaper, the Oudtshoorn Courant, 
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have chosen a so called "non-political" profile, this has not been a forum for debate after the 
revelations of the TRC or the community programme (media archive, Transcripts from 
PHCP) The role of the local media will be discussed further below. The Post Hearing 
Community Programme also had a limited effect as an arena of discussing different sides of 
the past, as the white community was to a large extent missing. We wanted to know why the 
white people did not attend the post hearing community programme, and thereby excluded 
themselves from this reconciliatory initiative made by the TRC: 
We (the Dutch reformed church) did not go to the TRC meeting, because we did not have the support for it in the congregation. 
You must understand that the TRC programme was an invitation to come and discuss the past. People are not going to come 
when they invited us to come and feel bad. That does not promote reconciliation (Afrikaner priest, Dutch reformed church) 
I think this (contact) has greater effect than TRC programmes. They are all "lets talk about racism". That makes people 
uncomfortable. We do not want to dwell with the past; we want to work for the future (former police, white) 
We have thus seen that both coloureds and whites, together constituting a large majority in 
Oudtshoorn felt excluded in connection with the victim hearing. The forensic truth presented 
by the commission was very painful in the white community, and many looked for flaws in  
TRC's work to disregard it. The security forces reacted with fear and closing ranks. Still 
some Afrikaners saw the TRC as an eye-opener, and it has had an effect on discrediting the 
apartheid regime. But the TRC had trouble involving the white community in discussing the 
past, and thereby in trying to find common ground across the race-border about the past and 
how to build the future and promote reconciliation in Oudtshoorn. To what extent the truth 
telling lead to healing will be addressed under reconciliation (6.5). 
Reactions to amnesty and lack of criminal justice in Oudtshoorn 
As South Africa gave up criminal justice after gross human rights abuses in the name of 
reconciliation, this form of justice was not achieved in Oudtshoorn. As local perpetrators 
didn't apply for amnesty, none of the perpetrators took the opportunity to tell their version or 
apologise to the victims. That could have served as a form of restorative justice by restoring 
the norm, acknowledging that it had been violated and accepting responsibility and 
accountability for the crimes. Many were also upset over amnesty.  
I am very uncomfortable with amnesty. Even though I see that it was a necessary compromise at the time, it makes me sick 
(UDF/ANC leader, victim). 
People here were very upset over amnesty (liberation movement). 
(amnesty) was very sad. I was a statement taker for the TRC in this area. And when I heard the stories people were telling me. 
They were crying. And I felt the same way (Black Sash). 
I think the (TRC) exercise was good, but without the necessary conclusion. It was like we had to impress the world about how 
South Africa was dealing with the past. But at the same time there was a need for conclusion. There is an absolute need for 
prosecutions. They were guilty of killing us (ANC victim). 
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One respondent argued that the South African amnesty has been accepted by the world 
community because there is an international difference in the evaluation of the value of 
black and white people:  
I do not see any difference between Hitler's Nazi Germany, Milosevic and what happened in South Africa. Only the setting is 
different: Here the victims were not white…I do not think I am short sighted if I say I am very unhappy about the situation in 
Zimbabwe. But Great Britain is opening the doors for the white farmers, but what happened during the Angola war? And in 
Mozambique? And the genocide in Sierra Leone? When Africa is in a crisis why is it so difficult then? Why are only white 
people getting help? Now I understand why Americans refuse reparations for the slave trade. White people were not victims. 
When human lives are at stake, there is a distinction between blacks and whites in the world (UDF/ANC leader, coloured). 
Prosecutions of named violators that did not apply for amnesty can in theory still happen. 
Victims can bring the cases where nobody applied for amnesty before the court, but no 
large-scale persecutions have taken place. It seems that the only form of justice that the 
Oudtshoorn perpetrators (and only a handful of them) had to face was potential ostracism by 
their community. While several people pointed out that most perpetrators had left the area, 
suggesting that is was impossible for them to live in Oudtshoorn after the TRC revelations, 
others described the following reactions towards perpetrators still in the community: 
The perpetrators here were closed out socially. It was hard to be a priest for them. Some ostracised them. But some stood up for 
them, the conservatives (Afrikaner priest). 
The reactions (towards named perpetrators) were negative (within the defence forces). But the defence forces were not that 
involved. It was mainly the police, particularly the security police. One guy in the security police still lives here. But generally 
speaking, people are not here anymore (Retired army officer, coloured). 
(the TRC) has changed some things. Last week we had a new member (of the ANC). A white person that used to be with the 
Democratic Party, then the National party, and now the ANC, because that person did not want to be associated with what 
happened. But many people are turning a blind eye. It is not being talked openly about (ANC leader). 
Some of them are still here or near by. Some live a little closer to the sea. They have this attitude that we should just forget about 
what happened (ANC leader). 
Even if names were mentioned in the TRC hearings, there was little focus on people that were perpetrators. It was hushed down 
by the TRC. I do not think that these people have been confronted by the TRC. Maybe it is because of the TRC's short life span. 
(ANC leader). 
It seems that dealing with the perpetrators have been difficult, particularly in the white 
community. While coloured and black people tend to be outraged about perpetrators still 
present in the community, the whites seem to be split over how to handle it. Many 
perpetrators seem to have left town which might indicate that they have felt socially 
excluded, which can be a sign that people have distanced themselves from the perpetrators 
or their actions, and thereby acknowledged that the violations were unacceptable. But as 
some stood up for them, it seems as if the white population is sending out mixed messages in 
this field. 
Restorative justice? 
The TRC recommended that the victims got compensations from the state as an attempt to 
create restorative justice. When I visited Oudtshoorn, some of the victims had got interim 
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reparations of a symbolic amount, and were still waiting to get to know whether there would 
be more coming. Several people I interviewed saw this waiting without any message about 
how long to wait for a decision about reparations or reparations actually being given, was 
worse then getting to know right away if there would be no reparations at all. Commissioner 
in the RRC, Wendy Orr, writes that in the early hearings, like in Oudtshoorn, the 
commissioners asked the victims what they wanted the TRC to do for them. They later 
stopped doing that to prevent expectations to get too high, as the TRC did not have the 
recourses to give reparations, but only the power to recommend it to the President (2000:80). 
The lack of following up of individual victims by giving reparations is widely being 
criticised for victimising this group again. As the TRC got political signals that it should 
search for symbolic reparations as an addition for expensive individual reparations for 
victims, it asked the community for suggestions. Oudtshoorn asked for some sort of 
memorial, which could have given acknowledgement to victims for their suffering, without 
costing much on a highly restrained nation budget. This was not implemented, and was 
another lost opportunity for acknowledgement and restorative justice. The acknowledgement 
from the TRC was thereby not completely sanctioned by the ANC led government that did 
not follow up the commission's recommendations. With the TRC model, the perpetrators 
already got off lighter than in successful trials while without reparations the victims got little 
out of the process but a place to speak up. 
Prospective justice? 
We have seen that government programmes to promote reform (prospective justice) has had 
an impact in Oudtshoorn in the form of a small direct support to the poorest of the poor, 
affirmative action programmes, and a building out of houses, public services, infrastructure 
in former disadvantaged communities. Still the general picture of poverty and inequality 
stays intact: Even though a new coloured middle class is emerging, the majority has seen 
few improvements, the poorest cannot afford to access public services when provided, and 
unemployment is widespread. How this affects reconciliation is discussed in section 6.6. 
We can thereby conclude that the TRC was successful at revealing a rough picture of gross 
violations of human rights that had taken place in Oudtshoorn. Still a lot of facts are 
unknown, suspicions are widespread, and important groups felt excluded in the process. The 
commission seems to have alienated the white community and thereby failed to involve this 
crucial group in a debate around the past. The TRC was not very successful at promoting 
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any form of justice in Oudtshoorn. Lack of implementation of individual reparations to 
victims or symbolic reparations, as memorials have not helped sweeten the sour taste of 
amnesty in Oudtshoorn. With continued problems in reducing poverty and inequality the 
attempts of creating reconciliation through reform/ prospective justice does not seem to help 
in the work for reconciliation in Oudtshoorn.  
6.5 Community Reconciliation? 
When I did fieldwork my major impression was that nothing had happened since the TRC 
left, as it had not put up an implementing body. Opinions vary in the community on how far 
reconciliation has come, the role the TRC played and what is needed to promote 
reconciliation. This can partly be due to different understandings of the concept, and which 
level of analyses the respondents were focusing on. We will therefor go through the main 
input from the community on the degree of reconciliation at different levels. First we discuss 
the degree of political reconciliation as that is the form of reconciliation usually considered 
nessesary for consolidation of democracy (Gloppen 2002). Then we turn to intergroup 
reconciliation (between the races), intragroup reconciliation (within racial groups), 
interpersonal reconciliation (between individuals involved in violence on opposing sides) 
and last, intra personal reconciliation (how people have reconciled with their personal 
history). I also go through the depth of the reconciliation in Oudtshoorn. 
Political reconciliation 
We have defined political reconciliation as a climate in which conflicting parties can resolve 
their differences through non-violent means, a political climate where former enemies may 
continue to disagree but nevertheless interact and communicate on the basis of a shared 
normative framework and mutual recognition. Oudtshoorn has seen a de-escalation of 
political violence even though violent crime is high enough for safety to be an issue at all 
times. At the municipality the different political parties work together, and the DA is now in 
charge because of support from former ANC councillors. This indicates that Oudtshoorn has 
moved in the direction of political reconciliation. 
Cross racial reconciliation 
How far has Oudtshoorn come at reconciliation across the race line? In the streets or in 
restaurants, you do not see people from different race groups socialising. Residential areas 
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are mainly kept separate between the races by class differences, even though some members 
of the new coloured/ black middle class is moving into residential areas formerly reserved 
for whites only. While some highlight a change in attitudes and the start reconciliation and 
even racially mixed friendships, others argue that only members of the new middle class get 
access to the same arenas as the whites. Some also claim that there is an uneven balance of 
power in these relationships:  
When you look around, you do not see social contact between the races in the streets or in restaurants. But you do not see the 
change, you should have seen how it used to be…Now we can walk freely in town…I have many friends from both sides of the 
conflict…We play golf together…Things are different now, we are more equal. Many white people came to me after the TRC 
and said they had no idea what it had been like…the TRC was an eye-opener for them. (retired military officer, coloured) 
Some people are moving into the white areas, and they are welcomed there, because the ones that can afford it is not an 
embarrassment to the white community (coloured, involved in the liberation movement). 
We are working on integrating the NG Kerk with the brown and black sister churches. In the start, reconciliation and making us 
understand what we had done to them was always on top of the agenda in our meetings. It is still on the agenda, but it is no 
longer always on the top (Afrikaner priest).  
Other people interviewed objected to views of progress in reconciliation between the races:  
 At the service clubs, there are now both black and white members, but they do not make best friends with each other every day. 
It is not just a black and white thing. The Afrikaners stay together by themselves, as does the Jews and the English (Afrikaner). 
One claimed that the power-balance in cross racial relationships was an important element 
other respondents had overlooked: 
To me reconciliation is not about blacks and whites going off to the golf club together and being friends…it is about sharing 
with each other and being part of one another's lives. We have to share in all spheres of life… We must be able to do things 
without restrictions. It most be possible. But reconciliation is an inner thing. White people must themselves see that they have to 
change. We have already gone far enough to meet them (ANC/UDF leader). 
These signs of reconciliation is not real reconciliation. We are only accepted by the whites if we do things their way. We are 
only welcomed into their communities if we accept their culture, values and ways of doing things, and slide into the white 
middle class. The same goes for the golf club. If the owner of the place came in now, he would give us a free round. But that is 
not because he likes me or we are reconciled, but because power has changed, and he knows it (UDF/ANC leader, coloured). 
Others also commented a change in power relations, but then as a positive thing for 
reconciliation: 
…things have changed some. Particularly for the blacks. They were always on the bottom, but now they are on the top. Then it is 
easier to open up…before, the whites knew they were on top, and then it was easy for them to be rude. They were lacking 
respect. For instance, they would use our first names instead of our family names. Now white people have to open up. Nobody is 
untouchable now. White people are down on the ground. They are as politically bankrupt now as I used to be. So we are on an 
even foot now. Then it is easier to open up. Time leads towards reconciliation, because it opens up people. It is also due to the 
commission that people are more on an equal foot now (coloured) 
I want to tell you a story. It is about my boss in the defence force. He was a Colonel. In 1994 when the MK and the APLA and 
the other military wings of the resistance movement were integrated in the army, we had a long talk. He did not want them in. 
They got ranks. He said it was unacceptable. When I first started in the defence force, he said: You cannot trust these people to 
do anything but driving a lorry, and only if there is a white man to watch. We were constantly pushed around and transferred in 
the start. Nobody wanted us. So I told my boss that before he did not accept me. Now you have to accept these new people 
(coloured army officer). 
Many pointed out lack of trust between the races and indicate limited overall reconciliation: 
Coloureds and black people don't trust white people. The only way for us to address this is by giving something, to rebuild. For 
example by giving to the poor. We don't stand up with our opinions, because everything we say is being perceived as racist. 
They do not take criticism well. This leads to us not speaking up, even when we see things are going wrong (Afrikaner). 
I have black and coloured friends, we work together, but too much have happened here for our generation to change (former 
security police). 
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If you listen to elderly Afrikaners they will say that there is no way in hell that coloureds, English or Blacks are to be allowed to 
take over (Afrikaner). 
A lot of (white) people are pretending like nothing (ANC/UDF). 
People do not understand that all are equal…There is acute racism now (ANC/UDF). 
I am worried (about reconciliation). There is a move, a rising mood of resentment, of anger. It can be avoided by addressing the 
race issue as it should have been done. Now it is so touchy. People are afraid of confrontation (ANC/UDF leader) 
Some highlighted the importance of Mandela's role in promoting cross-racial reconciliation: 
Mandela was of great importance when it came to the issue of race relations. Even his enemies see him as a great leader. If he 
had said "to hell with whites" when he came out of prison, South Africa could have been worse than Rwanda. But he just put the 
focus straight on reconciliation. And people are grateful for that. There are many black leaders that the Afrikaners do not accept 
as good leaders. For Mbeki it is difficult to try and fill those large shoes. The leader in South Africa must have the trust of all 
groups, like Mandela managed to get. My daughter wrote an essay for school about Mandela when he was here. We went to see 
him at the airport. There were 4-5000 people there. He went into the crowd to greet the people, and made the security police 
quite upset. He passed my wife and kids and greeted them. My daughter put the picture in with the essay. I helped her with the 
essay that praised him. I told her that if she had asked me about Mr. Mandela 10 years earlier, every word would have been the 
exact opposite. Then I would have told her that he was like the devil himself. And she put that in at the end of the essay (Former 
security police, Afrikaner). 
These differences of opinion indicate both different views of what reconciliation is, and how 
far it has come. It seems apparent that there has been a shift in power relations at the local 
level, at least between the whites and the blacks/ coloured people in the new emerging 
middle class, which are over represented in my material.  
Intragroup reconciliation  
Intragroup reconciliation can be studied both as how a group reconcile with its own history 
and degree of reconciliation with perpetrators and their own communities  TRC's work 
seems to have been particularly painful within the white community, as this was the sub 
community that had perpetrators revealed in Oudtshoorn.  
The perpetrators here were closed out socially(…) It was hard to be a priest for them; can you imagine being a priest for 
somebody you know is a murderer? (Afrikaner priest). 
When you quit the police, you get isolated from your old friends. When I quit…I was deserted, particularly related to the 
security forces(…)I would not mind taking up contact with the friends I used to have in the police…(Former security police). 
Some of the named perpetrators moved. Some have quit their jobs. Many of these people were just following orders. They were 
fighting terrorists and communists. Others were brutal murderers (Afrikaner). 
Nobody knew how to handle murderers in our own congregations. Many people have just shot themselves in, old members of 
the security police and the defence force and so on (Afrikaner). 
We have discussed above that there was a split between the people standing up for the 
perpetrators, and the people distancing themselves from them. The implications of the 
hearing for reconciliation within the coloured and black communities seems to have been 
smaller, as the focus of the local hearing was mainly on violations committed by other 
groups.  
We have seen that during the struggle, policemen living in the townships were driven out in 
Oudtshoorn. And it was in this setting the Trojan horse ambush, (the Bongulethu 3 case), 
took place at the house of a black policeman. He was mentioned in the hearing as present 
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during torture against members of the liberation movement. He is now back living in the 
township. This can either be seen as a sign of reconciliation, or that the process has had very 
little impact.  
Many coloureds pointed out that the coloured identity was very difficult because coloured 
people were always in the middle between black and white people (interviews). The 
Apartheid regime had given coloured people more priveleges than black people, and some 
saw coloureds that were fighting against the system as troublemakers (victim hearing 
transscript). Some also pointed out that coloureds in Oudtshoorn had identity problems 
conected to their mother-tongue being Afrikans, as they had felt shame for what the 
Afrikaners had stood for. One pointed out the need to take back the language as their own. 
Interpersonal reconciliation between ex-combatants 
In such a small community, people involved as victims or perpetrators regularly will 
experience some contact with each other. While one respondent argued that he had 
reconciled with many people that were directly involved on the opposite side, others 
expressed feelings of anger and hostility in spite of acting "civilised" towards people 
involved on opposing sides. 
…he is in the ANC. He was in the struggle on the opposite side of me, but now we have got to know each other better, and we 
talk to each other when we meet. We are not angry with each other anymore. I think that people that were involved in the 
struggle on either side understand each other better. I think white people that were not involved understand less. There is more 
trust between people that were directly involved, even if on opposing sides (former security police). 
…people that were directly involved can never put it behind. People like David Piet, Mandela and Sipo Khroma (Mayor in 
Oudtshoorn). I arrested Khroma. He confronted me with it here, but I did not remember it. It was in connection with a house 
being burnt down. But he was released. He is a strong councillor and an excellent man. We are not angry anymore. We 
reconciled and stretched out our hands. We will never forget, but we will forgive (Former security police).  
Another leader in the liberation movement rejects this security policeman's views on 
reconciliation between former combatants. Some also indicate that there is no 
acknowledgement among people working for the security forces that they had done anything 
wrong, and that this is negative for reconciliation: 
You saw my meeting with (…), and he claims we are reconciled… One day he came to my house with another man form the 
security police. I had a visitor that I was just taking to the door, which I was not allowed to (he was banned and restricted), I ran 
in just in time. That man came with a machinegun to my house. They would even come into my bedroom where I was with my 
wife. You saw him now. He is all "I want to help you". He is still patronising. And I don't think that is the solution…there is no 
grudge, because revenge does not solve anything (UDF/ANC leader). 
Around 1995 Mandela was visiting Oudtshoorn. A policeman who had personally called me death threats over the phone, saying 
he would "wipe me of the earth", (I knew it was him, because I recognised his voice). He was now a security guard for Mr. 
Mandela when he visited Oudtshoorn. I confronted him about the irony of this, and he just said the times had changed (ANC). 
I think I know who tried to kill me. The man walks the streets in Oudtshoorn now…(he) came to my office asking for help 
once…he never asked for apologies, and pretended like nothing, but he knows that I know…There was also an attempt of 
driving over me with a car by a man in the security police. He is still working here. (ANC/UDF leader, target of two attempted 
murders).  
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This illustrates that even though Oudtshoorn has moved away form a pattern of political 
violence, and ex-combatants from opposing sides are handling unavoidable contact, the 
wounds of the old conflict is hard to remove. As no perpetrators grasped the opportunity for 
apologies, acknowledgement or truth telling offered by the TRC, it is unlikely that the TRC 
has had any effect on improving the relationship between ex-combatants, victims and 
perpetrators. Still the democratic transition and the revelations about abuses have changed 
the power-balance between ex-combatants, in favour of the people supporting the liberation 
movement. 
Intrapersonal reconciliation 
Many people in Oudtshoorn were struggling to deal with their own personal histories.  
Before I always got uncomfortable if I met a group of white people. I got scared and needed to get out of there. Now, if I go into 
a cafe in town, and there are many white people, I do not get scared anymore. I can sit down and have a drink (victim, black). 
I still haven't had enough time to deal with the trauma I went through…there was always the humiliation…there was the 
humiliation as a young boy when we were thrown out of the area I was born to a dusty area with no recreational facilities at 
all…There was the humiliation as a teacher that I was forced to teach with a curriculum that was against any forms of good 
education system…I was taken to prison. I had to take off my clothes. Once it happened together with a minister of religion. -To 
see him as a fool. It was humiliating. It was painful. I cannot take it when control is taken away from me, and that was the 
intention of the state. That was fundamental to their policy(...)I had to make many strategic decisions, because we were dealing 
with the lives of young people. We had to be responsible. It was expected of us, but none of us were trained for decisions like 
that (UDF/ANC leader)  
A friend of mine (…) was assaulted in Jo'burgh together with Sipho Kroma (…) (he) did not go to the TRC. He was studying to 
be a teacher, but he had to stop. But he is still affected by it. He just walks the streets, as a street boy (ANC). 
My material is not large enough to say to what extent the TRC has had an effect on people's 
ability to reconcile with their own past. It is, however, clear that the trauma many people 
have suffered in Oudtshoorn is so deep that short term interventions as the TRC is far to 
little to heal the personal wounds. But  TRC's work did put the existence of these wounds on 
the agenda, even though it did not have the capacity to follow up individual victims.  
The depth of reconciliation 
We have argued that Oudtshoorn has reached the level of political reconciliation, but people 
disagree over how far reconciliation has come in other fields. We argued in chapter 2 that 
reconciliation is a matter of degree. Van der Merwe (1999) measures degree of changes in 
attitudes, behaviour, values and identity to determine the depth of reconciliation. We will not 
look into changes in all these spheres in Oudtshoorn, but scratch the surface by looking into 
whether reconciliation has come far enough for there to be friendship across the race 
boarder.  
I have got some white friends, but we don't discuss political issues. There are some cross racial relationships, but they never 
last…my nephew married a white girl, but we never see them anymore (liberation movement, coloured). 
I have a white friend from the arts festival, but we also have privacy from each other. We talk about race relations with friends 
across the race border. They usually get embarrassed (coloured). 
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My child goes to the former white only high school. The teachers are all white and always harder on the coloured children, and 
many will not take it and drop out. Our children are invited to parties with the white children, but they don't go, because the 
white children would never come to our home. So they stick to themselves (ibid) 
The coloured children have lower academic standards and keep dropping out. We invite them, but they choose themselves not to 
come (Afrikaner father) 
At the service clubs, there are now both black and white members, but they do not make best friends with each other every day. 
This is not just a black and white thing. The Afrikaners stay together as does the Jews and the English (white) 
(White people) are nice to other people that are well off. But there is no change in attitude towards the poor (coloured). 
Still we have seen that some felt that there had been improvements in cross-racial 
relationship, resulting in friendships: 
When you look around, you do not see social contact between the races in the streets or in restaurants. But you do not see the 
change, you should have seen how it used to be…Now we can walk freely in town…I have many friends from both sides of the 
conflict…We play golf together…Things are different now, we are more equal (retired military officer, coloured). 
If I look back, something has started in Oudtshoorn where people work together. For instance at the tourist bureau and so on. 
When people work together, people get to know each other and become friends naturally. Another example is the golf club. 
About a third of the members are coloured. And those who play together become friends. I think this has a greater effect than 
TRC programmes. They are all "lets talk about racism". That makes white people uncomfortable. 
We have seen that there is generally little contact across the race-border, but some 
friendships are being established across the race-line particularly in the middle class. Still 
these friendships are controversial and complicated by political issues. It seems like little has 
changed in this field for the poor majority. 
6.6 Hinders for reconciliation 
The post hearing community programme a.o. looked into community views on hinders for 
reconciliation. Special emphasis was put on the role of the family, women and youth, the 
religious communities and the press. Main views are presented below together with findings 
in my follow up interviews on the same themes. The main input lacking from the community 
programme was input from white people. When interviewing whites in Oudtshoorn, I found 
that the emphasis on how to promote reconciliation was on improving the relationships 
through contact between the races in a "natural", or non- forced way, as in opposition to the 
institutionalised attempts by the TRC. How cross-racial contact affects reconciliation in 
Oudtshoorn is addressed in section 6.7. 
The role of women, family, youth and education  
The women's group focus was mainly on development and intragroup reconciliation. It 
discussed the role of women by reaching out to victims and their families, and look into their 
needs. They wanted a monument risen for the people that died in the struggle. They pointed 
to a need for funding for NGO's that can keep the young people occupied and a need for 
education and funding for poorer peoples education.  
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Many of our children have the desire to go and work, but they cannot come out there, because they are afraid that because of their 
Xhosa accent and Xhosa names they are immediately turned away (submission by women's group, PHCP) 
The women also feel that they can go to the banks and apply for loans to launch small businesses, but as soon as we go to the 
banks we are turned down. Money is not made available to us because we cannot explain to the banks or assure them to how we 
are to repay them. So the women of Bongulethu would like to mean something to their people but they cannot, because the money 
is out of their reach (ibid). 
There are no adult education initiatives taken in Oudtshoorn, but there are several training 
programmes via the district municipality (interview municipality). The establishment of 
Oudtshoorn Economic Initiative (OEI) is an attempt to create a low threshold offer of help 
and advice on how to start up their own small-scale businesses. It receives about R400.000 
annually from the provincial government, and has resulted in some new companies. But of 
the about 400 people (mostly women) seeking advice a year, many do not come back. And 
many people seeking help are still unable to get loans to start up despite practical help and 
recommendations from the OEI (interview OEI). The human rights organisation Black Sash 
confirmed this picture. The focus of the organisation in the region had shifted from gross 
human rights abuses to social issues including lack of access to capital: 
We are facing a huge problem with loan sharks. Poor people cannot get loans in the bank, and it is impossible to live of regular 
pensions. So a lot of people have to take up loans with loan sharks that charge a 30% interest per month. So we are working on a 
project about that now (Black Sash).  
In an interview it was also pointed out that local black and coloured people had problems 
benefiting from the RDP projects in terms of getting jobs, because of lack of knowledge and 
capital (ANC leader). 
The family group emphasised the need for the perpetrators to come forward and explain the 
reasons for the violations, apologise and ask forgiveness. The need for reparations was 
raised. They suggested a mediation rehabilitation forum to teach people their rights and a 
local memorial, for instance a sports stadium with names of victims. They pointed to the 
need of training the police to work with the community, and to address perpetrators in the 
community: 
There are people who were killers, the people that were perpetrators. They are still around, they are still working even today, 
some of the perpetrators. Some of them like threatening people even right now…we want those people to be retrenched (family 
group, PHCP).   
The need to bring the perpetrators back into the community was also emphasised by the 
youth group.  
…also for the sake of the perpetrators we must find ways of bringing them back into the community…there was the idea of 
creating special occasions, even special days or special ceremonies where people who confessed for what they have done can be 
embraced, can be reintegrated into community (youth and education group, PHCP). 
While I was sitting there listening to especially the last contribution, I was just struck by in sadness, how it is possible for a white 
community in Oudtshoorn and I do not think that it is so unique, people can sit out there and they are so far removed from the 
TRC, so far removed from the other communities. And here we sit in a class room talking about ways to embrace perpetrators, 
looking into ways of reintegrate people and all they can worry about is, this is a sort of ANC witch hunt and I do not know what 
else (ibid). 
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People that do not have to reach out, who should actually be bitter and angry are prepared to reach out, but people are still not 
listening (ibid).  
This group was also focusing on education possibilities, funding of education for people that 
would like to go back to school and a need for tertiary education in Oudtshoorn.  
…a number of people felt that we should not just look into the individual people who suffered specific gross human rights 
violations, because the youth as a whole in a sense suffered under apartheid and large numbers of people suffered (youth group 
input PHCP). 
There was also focus on possibilities of two-way street learning by connecting white and 
black kids, and sharing different experiences. The need to get white people involved in 
reconciliatory attempts was emphasised. 
We talked a lot about using the children, perhaps the parents will not be able to convince, but the children at school level, expose 
them to the history of Oudtshoorn which are not being thought as schools, especially the white kids (ibid) 
As the local museum has closed down the exhibition put up by the TRC documenting the 
struggle and human rights abuses in Oudtshoorn, it is no longer contributing to spreading 
this history. The museum is now showing its permanent exhibition about the local ostrich 
industry, documenting mainly the history of the white population, despite intentions of 
making the other exhibition permanent. An opportunity to spread knowledge about the past 
abuses to up-growing generations and sections in Oudtshoorn that has turned a blind eye to 
such violations has thereby been lost. The reconciliation focus of this group was thereby 
creating opportunities for former disadvantaged communities and reaching out to both the 
white community and perpetrators. 
I interviewed several teachers that were worried about the impact of how the school system 
was run during Apartheid and now, and the consequences for attempts of creating 
responsible and critical citizens today. 
 It was humiliating as a teacher (teaching under Apartheid). We were forced to teach a curriculum against all good forms of 
educating. We were only to impose on people, and not teach them to be critical (teacher, ANC/UDF). 
Now we have democracy, but the school system have not changed. The schools were committed to giving the students 
discipline. I wanted to go away from the authoritarianism of the schools. I wanted a participatory democracy…it is the same 
hierarchy, and no interrelation between the students and the teacher. And that is one of the problems today: The kids are being 
trained to be a part of the system. They are only on the receiving end and they are not participating (teacher, ANC). 
At the high school, the management is all white. They are not visionaries, they do not look ahead. They just teach the children to 
reproduce knowledge, not to understand, analyse and be creative (teacher, ANC) 
Some teachers also highlighted economic issues as hinders for education possibilities: 
There is a need for change. The schools are too expensive for coloureds and Blacks. We are not accepted. We are accepted only 
if we act as inferior and follow their standards. I have no accept for them and they have no accept for me before they take some 
responsibility. They cannot complain about affirmative action when they created a need for it! (teacher, ANC/UDF). 
School is mandatory, still many do not come. For example, there was a boy who did not do very well, and he never did his 
homework. When people from the school came to check on him, they found that there wasn't even a table in the house to do 
homework on. There is poverty here (coloured teacher). 
Parents saw the high school as an arena for contact between the races, but were ambiguous 
about to what extent it promoted reconciliation: 
 115
I have a child in primary school. And they have a large collective memory. It is the same for the coloured children and the black 
children. They will not forget in a 100 years (Afrikaner). 
For my generation and us that was involved in the struggle, it will never go away. But the children go to school together, to them 
we must explain apartheid, because they do not know what it is. They can reconcile naturally through natural contact. I do not 
believe in forced ways of reconciliation like the TRC. It must come naturally, like at the workplace, where we can get to know 
each other. (Former Security Police, Afrikaner). 
…they go together to school now. the high school used to be white traditionally, now 22% are from Bridgeton and Bongulethu. 
It has high academic standards…When they hand out awards, there are always black and coloureds that receive them. So there 
was a need for a new system. I have to explain to my children what apartheid was. Now the children are doing things together. 
That generation can change South Africa (Afrikaner).  
Today the schools are open for everybody. Whites do not always want their kids in mixed schools (coloured). 
Some were also worried that the resistance movement had taught the children how to build 
down the system, to disregard laws and rules of behaviour, which makes it difficult to 
become law abiding citizens that are responsible of rebuilding a new system: 
So now when the boarders are being changed, and broken down, we see a behavioural crisis. They have not learned to behave 
responsibly. We se a huge problem with crime coming up (ANC/UDF). 
People working with mental health discussed the need to put up a local trauma service with 
existing recourses, and to have an open door to people suffering long and short term traumas 
as a result of the past. They located a need for further training in dealing with politically 
motivated trauma. They decided to set up a group of volunteers to develop skills like these, 
and counselling, and conflict resolution skills. This group thus had a mainly intrapersonal 
focus on reconciliation. 
Even though a lot of constructive suggestions had come out of the PHCP, little was 
implemented as there were no implementing body.78 
The role of the religious communities 
The church group at the post hearing community programme, excluding the Afrikaner Dutch 
reformed church that did not participate, focused on the need for the churches to come 
together again and lead the reconciliatory work. They discussed their possible role in 
identifying and bringing together victims and perpetrators in reconciliatory attempts, and 
locating their needs. These churches had been united working against apartheid, but as the 
"common enemy" vanished, the various churches had become more fragmented. They 
needed to bring back the co-operation, and together contact the white churches to convince 
them that reconciliation was also their concern. They pointed out that churches could play a 
                                              
78 This impression was confirmed in interviews with people that had been involved in putting up the programme. According 
to Paul Houpt (interview), that was involved from TRC's side, some health care workers may have had a project in 
Oudtshoorn. This was not common knowledge among the people I interviewed, many of whom were suffering from 
traumas related to human rights abuses, and were in key positions in Oudtshorn, and thereby should have been familiar 
with such a project.  
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role in convincing the white Christians that they were profiting from the past and have got 
the recourses to help the needy today. 
But Dutch reformed church representatives in the community were not familiar with any 
attempts from the other churches to contact them after the programme to work together with 
them on reconciliation projects. Some priests in this church were openly hostile towards the 
TRC and refused to discuss it or reconciliation at all. Still a few younger priests took the 
efforts of the TRC seriously and wanted to work for reconciliation: 
There is a split within the Dutch reformed church here. Between the majority of priests and a few younger, progressive priests 
like (…). He challenges the congregation all the time. But that is the exception, not the rule (liberation movement, coloured) 
At the national level, it was seen as a success when the Dutch reformed church, famous for 
legitimising apartheid religiously, formally apologised for apartheid after  TRC's work 
(Botman:1999). This was very controversial at the local level in Oudtshoorn: 
Before 1990-94, there was a division within the Afrikaner community, and within the British community in South Africa. There 
were harsh battles within the NG Kerk (Dutch reformed church). When the NG church apologised for Apartheid, a new church 
was established opposing this…there was a split within the church on the issue of apologising for Apartheid. At the national 
level, when this was decided, there were both ministers and members of the congregation, about 50-50. The split is between 
what is the right thing to do as a Christian, and the majority in the congregations (priest, Dutch reformed church)  
The local churches have made some reconciliatory steps too but they remain controversial: 
We had a meeting with all the Dutch reformed churches in Oudtshoorn. There are 10 of them. Then we prayed for the first time 
for forgiveness for apartheid. This was very controversial and finally, after a long debate, it went through. Our sister churches, 
for the coloured communities had a similar gathering nearby…11 people from our church went there and asked forgiveness. 
This has lead us closer together…We are now working to come together as one church, instead of three (ibid). 
A few weeks ago I was myself in a TRC meeting, and got very negative reactions…(but) the church is to play a prophetic role, it 
shall lead the people: It is not a democracy. But that makes it difficult in the congregation. There are many that do not want to 
participate in the unification process…(Afrikaner priest). 
The NG Kerk , with its history of legitimising apartheid will not be taken seriously if we talk too loud about reconciliation. We 
must show goodwill through action, and my congregation has put up a local small scale land project, giving training on how to 
use the land, and it is run like a kibbutz. We also hand out soup, and many people that would otherwise not have anything to eat, 
gets at least one meal a day because of this (leader NG Kerk). 
As mentioned the Dutch reformed church were working on integrating its own church for the 
different races when I visited Oudtshoorn, and some progress had been made:  
In the start, reconciliation and making us understand what we had done to them was always on top of the agenda in our 
meetings. It is still on the agenda, but it is no longer always on the top (Afrikaner priest).  
No steps have been taken by local Dutch reformed churches towards perpetrators: 
…nothing has been done officially from the church towards the perpetrators. If it should have been done? Maybe. Not to punish 
them, but to help them burn the sins of the past. Many are struggling with the past (Priest Dutch reformed church). 
This shows that the different church communities have had problems in coming together and 
lead the reconciliatory work across old lines of division as suggested at the PHCP. Still the 
Dutch reformed church is working with integration across the race border, even though there 
seems to be a wide split between a few young liberal priests and the majority of priest and 
the Afrikaner congregations on these issues. 
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The role of the press 
At the Post hearing community programme, problems with the local media and its ability to 
be a forum for debate and promote reconciliation was voiced. The media in Oudtshoorn have 
traditionally been owned and controlled by white people. All the newspapers in Oudtshoorn 
are in Afrikaans, as this is the dominant language in town, but is excluding for the Xhosa 
speaking population, the poorest section of the population. The local radio station has 
recently started to send some in Xhosa. The main paper, the Oudtshoorn Courant, has been 
in operation for over 100 years, but has a "non-political" profile, selling to all communities 
by steering away from any politically touchy themes (PHCP, interviews). But the liberation 
movement used to run an alternative community paper, Saamstaan, based in Oudtshoorn, but 
targeting the whole of Southern Cape. It was focusing on social and local political issues, 
targeting the black and coloured communities to raise political awareness.  
The Oudtshoorn Courant would not cover the same issues that we did. We could not even get it printed here. So we had to go all 
the way to Cape Town (a days travel) to print it (Saamstaan co-worker) 
Editors and journalists working for the Saamstaan experienced police harassment, 
detentions, restrictions and some were shot by the police (former Saamstaan co-worker). It 
received South African Society of Journalists award for outstanding journalism in 1986. It 
was funded by donors that pulled out with the democratisation. Ironically, the paper that had 
been a voice for the voiceless, were closed down due to lack of funding because of the 
democratic transition. The editor of Oudtshoorn Courant is coloured, but many pointed out 
the lack of capacity and editorial freedom because of white owners, and the need to sell adds 
to the mainly white owned businesses in town. This makes it impossible to raise issues 
controversial in the white community (ANC/UDF leader, Saamstaan co-workers). The need 
for community based newspaper, like the Saamstaan, addressing social issues from a 
different perspective was raised by the media group and in interviews.  
Without the Saamstaan, people would not have been so politically conscious. It (Oudtshoorn Courant) did not cover the same 
issues as we did at the time, and it still does not. It does not cover the hardship…nobody is trying to fill the gap after the 
Saamstaan (Saamstaan co-worker). 
The local newspaper does not explain why things happen, just that they happen. I think there is a huge gap between the role the 
Oudtshoorn Courant plays and the role the Saamstaan used to play (Saamstaan co-worker) 
The media group wanted a balance between negative and positive news in the media.  
These are the kind of things which people would like to see reflected in the media -things of reconstruction, things of 
development, of healing, of reconciliation, of bringing people together and of integration (media group, PHCP) 
Little had happened in form of editorial freedom or capacity to cover these issues after the 
community programme. Still the Oudtshoorn Courant has changed its profile somewhat 
since the apartheid years. During apartheid it was commonly not seen as important enough 
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to put inn the names of the people that died in political violence: They are only referred to by 
the colour of their skin. After the hearings in George the Oudtshoorn Courant dedicated most 
of its next edition (21.06.1996) to the hearings, and reported on several of the cases that 
were heard. The names of victims were now reported, but the paper left out controversial 
information like details on who was named as perpetrators from Oudtshoorn. Any form of 
analysis and putting the violations in a political context were also left out. 
A newly established local paper, Die Herring, is owned and run by white people only, and it 
is therefor unlikely that it has the potential of filling the gap after Saamstaan.  
There were different views on the reconciliatory role of the media in the existing media 
environment and people formerly working with the Saamstaan. By steering away from 
political issues the Oudtshoorn Courant is able to sell across the race border. The editor sees 
the paper in a role of bridging the black/ coloured and the white communities. Still it has 
trouble getting adds because it is being perceived as a “coloured” newspaper as the editor is 
coloured (interview). Former Saamstaan workers emphasised that the media should serve as 
a debate forum on how to address social/political issues within the coloured and black 
communities, a role the Oudtshoorn Courant does not fill (interviews). One particularly 
mentioned that Saamstaan would have written about AIDS and been a forum for debate 
about how the community should deal with the problem, while the existing newspapers are 
ignoring the issue. The differences in opinion on how the media should work to promote 
reconciliation can partly be seen as an example of different focus for reconciliation: People 
that has been connected with the Saamstaan had a focus on intergroup reconciliation with 
focus on social and economic rebuilding. For cross racial reconciliation, it was seen as 
essential that the white community was enlightened by news from the black and coloured 
communities, and given a greater understanding of the hardship created by apartheid. The 
supporters of the a-political profile chosen by the Oudtshoorn Courant focused on possible 
effects on intragroup reconciliation by selling to all communities, and not highlighting 
conflicts.  
The way things stands in Oudtshoorn now, a Saamstaan like paper has little chance of being 
funded at all, or being read by the white population. An a-political paper, not addressing 
local conflicts, has little potential for being a debate forum and increasing understanding 
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between different population groups. This leaves the existing media in Oudtshoorn impotent 
in promoting cross racial reconciliation. 
Some pointed out that poor people particularly are excluded from access to the media. First 
the language barrier is excluding for the poorest Xhosa population. Second, there is a 
problem with illiteracy: 
Now the problem is who can read and write…So because of this, the media is not accessible to everybody. So there is a need for 
adult training and education. The radio might fill some of this gap, at leas they are trying. It is still mainly in Afrikaans and 
English, but they have something in Xhosa. Most of the subjects are "white", but we have to be reasonable about this, at least 
they are trying (coloured). 
Last, the Oudtshoorn Courant is mainly dependent on people coming to the paper with 
stories, because it has very limited recourses to spend on investigative journalism. It is 
therefor likely that the threshold is higher for the poorer sections to access the media than 
the educated elite.  
I am worried about the press… I see little independent journalism. I see nobody who covers the underdogs. There is a need to 
build on what the constitution stated. But it is not happening (ANC/UDF leader, co-founder of the Saamstaan) 
The media thus seems to have problems playing a reconciliatory role in Oudtshoorn. It is 
still controlled directly or indirectly by the white community, and fails to be a forum for 
debate, raise political awareness and create greater cross racial understanding. Issues 
particularly affecting the poorest sections in Oudtshoorn do not reach the local media. Even 
though most of these problems were uncovered by the TRC, nothing has been done to 
change it after the TRC pulled out. 
Poverty and land rights 
How to address poverty and the conflicts over access to land was worrying people in 
Oudtshoorn across the race border. Some highlighted the social and economic changes after 
apartheid, while most were worried because it is too slow, and government projects seem 
inadequate to fill the enormous needs. Many feared developments as in Zimbabwe. People 
were generally worried because the issues at stake are high, and there does not appear to be 
any easy solutions either at the national level or within the community. 
Before, we could not buy businesses in town. That was not good for our self -esteem. But now we can. As long as you got the 
money. Then it is easier to look people in the eye (coloured). 
The conditions in the townships are the results of neglect, neglect, and neglect. Even if there are real attempts to change the social 
consequences of apartheid, the needs are enormous (coloured). 
And that (electricity) is a large problem here. Things have got better, but because of unemployment it is difficult. We do not have 
any economic growth here. The farmers are in trouble, so the workers loose their jobs and travel to the towns (ANC leader). 
The gap is smaller between people of the same class, but there are only a few blacks and coloureds that have the money 
(Afrikaner). 
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According to poor people, very little has changed. I think the overall health care system is better now. Education is also somewhat 
changed…I am amazed over poor peoples ability to forgive and their faith for a better future. There I do not think the government 
is addressing economic and social issues properly (Afrikaner priest). 
The South African land reform is going far to slow. Something has to be done. Now. People are getting impatient. After the first 
election the black were happy because of the new democracy, and were supporting the ANC. At the second election there was 
disillusion…But at the at the third or fourth election I think people will see through and demand action (Afrikaner). 
Many saw the social and economic situation as a threat to reconciliation 
Reconciliation is not possible without resolving the social issues. I put my life on the line for the ANC, but now I criticise them 
(ANC/UDF)  
I think it is harder for poor people to reconcile than for others (ANC/UDF). 
I think it is easier to reconcile when the economy is good, so I think it is easier for privileged people. For the majority there is 
minimal contact with whites. And when there is, it is the relationship between the boss and the maid. For them nothing has 
changed, and then reconciliation is hard. But we are trying our best to manage reconciliation. But if the economy stays the same, 
reconciliation becomes impossible (coloured). 
Rich people do not see poor people: They are physically separate. Poor people are seen as a threat (Afrikaner). 
I am very disturbed (about reconciliation). There is power now in a new black elite. But I do not see the effect down to regular 
people. So there has been created a new empowered black elite, but to the disadvantage for ordinary blacks. White people still 
control the economy. The growth of infrastructure is important, but with no jobs, there is no money to buy for instance is a lot of 
goodwill among poor people, but it is disillusioning that so little is happening (Afrikaner priest). 
All I interviewed wanted the land conflict resolved through lawful means. Still people 
seemed to recognise that far too little land was made accessible to the land reform 
programme as it is based on voluntary sales of land from private people. Many pointed out 
that the people accessing land through the national land reform needs training on how to 
farm it. 
Let's take Zimbabwe as an example. People here say "we earned everything ourselves". The Afrikaner is typically hard working. 
We have the bond back to Calvinism. We are not like the blacks, with their "African time" and their "ubuntu". But it is hard to 
claim that because of the Apartheid system. Blacks and coloureds were paid less, even for the same work (Afrikaner priest). 
I do not support the occupation of land that is going on in Zimbabwe right now. We need a peaceful solution of the distribution 
of land. And people need to learn how to use the land. The land itself in not enough (Black Sash) 
I believe that land reform is good in theory, but it is not going well in practice. Because we do not want to chase people off their 
farms. Peoples lives are connected to the farms. And the new farmers need help and subsidies. They need basic training. If you 
pay the owners when taking over the land, its like recognising that they have built their empire themselves. As if! I have been 
part of the monitoring process here. Suddenly white farmers do not want to sell. They do not want blacks of coloureds in their 
neighbourhood (ANC/UDF leader). 
One was worried that landreform, by dividing the land into smaller production units might 
reduce overall production: 
Over all in the world, the trend is towards larger production units, because dividing the land in smaller pieces leads to less 
productivity. Large scale farming also gives indirect benefits to the rest of the population. These are the tensions, and I don't 
have the answers (Afrikaner). 
This view does not take into account that larger overall production does not alone secure 
distribution. Successful landreform can give access to land to poor people, and reduce their 
food and income insecurity. 
As mentioned, one of the Dutch reformed churches led by a young priest had privately 
bought land to give to black and coloured people, as part of a reconciliatory project. One of 
the ideas was that people from the congregation should help in the start to build competence 
in farming among the poor. Not all took this as a sign of genuine goodwill:  
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I find the NG Kerk's programme patronising, patronising, patronising! In this way, the white people stays in control and the 
structural power stays with them, and the coloured and black communities are to stay dependent on them. We must take what is 
rightfully ours, but this must happen through lawful, political means. We must not get into the same situation as Zimbabwe 
(ANC leadership). 
The social and economic improvements after the democratic transition thus seem to be 
inadequate for reconciliation. As blacks and coloureds tend to focus on rebuilding and 
increased understanding in the white community as the fundament for reconciliation, lack of 
delivery in this field hampers reconciliation, particularly between the majority of poor 
people, and the wealthy white elite. 
6.7 Cross racial contact and reconciliation  
We have seen that some in Oudtshoorn claimed that contact between the races for instance at 
the workplace would be more suited to promote reconciliation than  TRC's work. This 
argument goes along the lines of the contact hypothesis discussed in chapter 3, suggesting an 
alternative or additional road to reconciliation in South Africa. We have seen that theorists 
argue that the cross racial contact have to include equal status, common goals, co-operation 
and authoritative norms from society encouraging acceptance. The question that pops up is 
whether this is the typical form of contact in Oudtshoorn. If it is, we might expect that the 
limited level of reconciliation achieved by  TRC's work will be deepened by cross racial 
contact. This would render costly institutional attempts of reconciliation unnecessary, as 
contact over time will solve the problems. However, if daily contact does not work in favour 
of reconciliation, we risk that it can undermine the reconciliatory work initiated by the 
government, including  TRC's work. 
We have seen that the races still generally live physically apart as a result of the apartheid 
policy, so there is little contact between the races as neighbours. The overlap between race 
and class limits movement between residential areas, and is thereby hindering contact. We 
have seen that there were disagreement locally about to what extent the new emerging 
coloured/ black middle class were accepted by whites in their traditional domains, such as 
neighbourhoods and social clubs. While one claimed that middle class coloured people were 
welcomed into the white settlement areas, another claimed that only people accepting the 
white middle class’ values and way of life would be accepted. This view suggests a non-
equal relationship that according to the contact hypothesis is needed to for contact to lead to 
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tolerance79. We have also seen that most black and coloured people do not have access to 
these meeting places due to class differences. Class thus appears to be a hinder for cross 
racial contact in the first place, but also equality in that contact when it takes place.  
We have seen that one of the few social meeting places where both whites and coloureds 
were now gathering is the golf club. This is obviously only accessible for the wealthier part 
of the population and exclude most of the black and coloured people that are not generally 
members of the middle and upper classes. A member of the emerging coloured middle class 
pointed out this to be a place to mingle and where he had white friends too. He pointed to 
this being important for getting to know, respect and understand one another. In his eyes, the 
TRC had played an important role as an eye-opener for the white community, and their 
relationship was more even now than then. Others objected to that understanding claiming 
that the golf club were only for “White Wannabes”: Coloured people were only accepted if 
they accepted the values and way of life of the whites. He also claimed that white people’s 
changed attitudes towards the coloured population were due to the power change and not 
because of an increased understanding of one another because of the TRC. 
Some argued that reconciliation was impossible for people that had been involved in the 
struggle, but there was hope for the young South Africans. Contact for instance at school 
was seen as promising for long term reconciliation. The schools are no longer formally race 
divided in Oudtshoorn, but practically speaking the overlap between race, class and 
residential areas hinders children across the race border from going to the same schools. As 
the former white schools are generally a lot more expensive than the other schools, most 
black and coloured parents cannot afford to send their kids to formerly white schools, in 
spite of general opinions of higher academic levels and more recourses in these schools. The 
former white high school in Oudtshoorn is known for a high academic level, and repeatedly 
in my interviews the issue of integration here came up. Parents estimated about 20% of the 
students there to be coloured or black. An Afrikaner (interview) saw this as a sign of racial 
integration and that times were changing by it self. One of the coloured parents (interview) 
were not so optimistic. She worried about the high drop out percentage among these 
students, and claimed that the coloured children were socially isolated in school. She 
                                              
79 This reflects a larger issue in discussion in South Africa today: whether the new black and coloured middle class should 
stay in their communities and help rebuild them, or simply move into the former white areas and enjoy their newly won 
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understood this as a result of the teachers (all white) harassing the coloured children, and 
that the coloured kids did not visit white children's houses (even when invited), because the 
white children would never come visit back. One of the Afrikaner parents understood the 
high drop out percentage as a result of lower academic standards in the schools the non-
white children had been attending. He was puzzled that the coloured children seemed to 
prefer to stay to themselves (interview). 
These findings are disturbing because it shows that there is little contact to start with 
between the races, and this seems to spread on to the up-growing generation. It shows that 
the coloured children does not feel that they are treated equally, and that class differences 
are serious hinders for equal social contact, which hampers reconciliation through daily 
contact.  
Gibson's work indicate that the workplace is the most common meeting place between the 
races (2001A:45-46). It is a natural meeting place with potential for developing friendships 
and mutual respect and understanding (given that the contact is not hierarchical, not 
competitive but co-operative with a common goal). This is often not the case in the South 
African workplaces. Apartheid provided superior education to whites, and also restricted 
certain jobs for them. As Oudtshoorn, was a “coloured labour preference area”, blacks were 
excluded from work if there were coloureds that could fill the job. Apartheid therefore 
effectively secured whites the top positions, the coloureds the middle position and the blacks 
the bottom position. The relationship at workplaces is therefore often of a hierarchical nature 
as a legacy of apartheid. 
The policy of Affirmative Action is implemented to start undoing this: This means that 
former disadvantaged groups will have priority when they apply for jobs where their group 
are underrepresented. Whites in South Africa tends to see this as opposite racial 
discrimination, without acknowledging that without the apartheid system favouring the 
whites, there would be no need for affirmative action (ANC/UDF leader). An unintended 
side effect of this is that whites feels threatened by co-workers from the other races: When 
applying for jobs, or issues of promotion comes up, whites know they might loose out not 
because of lack of qualifications but because of race. Job insecurity, virtually unknown for 
                                                                                                                                           
wealth.   
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white South Africans during Apartheid, is now something they have to deal with, like the 
rest of the population. A new higher position at the municipality of Oudtshoorn was a hot 
potato at the time of my stay because of the white candidate’s superior qualifications and the 
more popular coloured candidate’s potential playing out of the race-card referring to 
affirmative action (interview municipality). 
The non-equal status to start with, and affirmative action to try to change it thereby 
introduces a stronger element of conflict in the work relationship, and as pointed out earlier 
is not a positive thing if social contact is to lead to greater understanding and tolerance 
between the races. Still, it is hard to se how South Africa could do without affirmative action 
given the incredibly unfair system of apartheid, creating a need for it. 
This discussion of the contact hypothesis on the case of Oudtshoorn suggests that the little 
contact there is between the races is not of the kind that is most favourable to reconciliation 
and racial harmony. I pointed to the general overlap between both race and class and the 
physical separation of residential areas as a hinder for contact in the first place. We have 
discussed before that the press have limited ability to bridge the gap between the races and 
their world views, when personal contact is highly limited. I showed that social meeting 
places were usually the workplace, where unequal status and conflicts of interests due to 
affirmative action (and the need for it in the first place) were not the most favourable to 
promote racial harmony (reconciliation). I argued that this lack of contact or non-positive 
contact is spreading to the younger generation through a school system where the same 
components of class divide (largely overlapping with race) and physical separation of 
residential areas leads to schools being largely divided by race still. I argued that some 
members of the new coloured middleclass meet with whites in the golf club, and moved into 
the white residential areas, and their children attend to the former whites only high school. I 
showed that this contact was not uncontroversial or uncomplicated. Different people in the 
community viewed the power relationship in these relationships differently, which is of 
importance for its ability to promote reconciliation.  
6.8 Summary 
We have seen that Oudtshoorn was heavily affected by gross human rights violations as well 
as repression of economic and social rights resulting in a general overlap between race, 
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class, and a coloured majority because of the coloured labour preference policy. The 
democratic transition resulted in several national strategies to promote reconciliation that 
manifested itself in Oudtshoorn including social reform programmes to reduce poverty and 
inequality, and TRC's work focusing on gross human rights violations, seeking to promote 
reconciliation through truth and restorative justice. We have seen that the poverty alleviation 
programmes have had some results in providing public services, but as unemployment stays 
high, it has had limited success at uplifting the majority of the poor, but created a new black/ 
coloured middle class. 
Although the TRC was successful at uncovering a general pattern of abuse, it only scratched 
the surface of these abuses and suspicions and anger are still widespread. Amnesty and 
thereby lack of criminal justice is deeply unpopular even though many see it as unavoidable 
in the transition process. Limited implementation of reparation policy by the government has 
partly undermined the public acknowledgement of victimisation given by the TRC and 
hindered restorative justice. The forensic truth presented by the TRC was very painful in the 
Afrikaner community that responded by withdrawing from the process and looking for flaws 
and excuses to disregard them. Many Afrikaners felt that the TRC did not take into account 
or acknowledge their self perception as a victimised group (as violations against them fell 
outside the TRC mandate). Little but pain was to be found in the TRC process for this group, 
that responded by pulling away from the TRC and the discussions about the past and how to 
build a new future. Although Oudtshoorn is facing enough political reconciliation for the 
political parties to co-operate at times at the local level, cross racial reconciliation is very 
limited. It appears to be easier for the emerging black/ coloured middle class to reconcile 
with whites, than for the poorer sections. For them reconstruction, social and economic 
change seems to be a precondition for cross racial reconciliation. The revelation of 
perpetrators have been very painful in the Afrikaner community. Many pointed out the TRC 
as an eye-opener also for the Afrikaners, that people seemed to think knew less about abuses 
than the coloured/ black communities did before TRC's work. Still there was a split between 
Afrikaners that distanced themselves from the perpetrators and their actions (and thereby 
acknowledging the human rights norm), and the conservative Afrikaners that stood up for 
the perpetrators. Many perpetrators left the community. While some ex-combatants claims to 
have contact and are reconciled with people involved on opposite sides, others claim that the 
conflicts are still deep, that this contact is painful, despite a civilised surface. Many still 
struggles with coming to terms with their own past, and even though the need to address 
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personal traumas have been uncovered by the TRC, little has come out of this practically in 
Oudtshoorn. 
The PHCP was a valuable initiative to start the debate on the past and how to promote 
reconstruction and reconciliation after apartheid abuses. But the absence of the white 
community excluded dialog across the race-border and lack of implementation of local 
suggestions limited its effect in the local environment. We have seen that the local press 
have trouble filling the role as a debate forum, hindering increased knowledge and 
understanding across the race-line. 
The continued general overlap between race and class is a hinder for reconciliation because 
(particularly poor) black and coloured people see improved living conditions as a 
precondition for reconciliation. It also hinders equal contact between the races and thereby 
limits the potential of this suggested non-institutional path to reconciliation. 
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7. CONCLUSIONS 
The starting point of this essay was the problems of democratic consolidation in the new 
African democracies. We argued that lack of reconciliation can be a hinder for democratic 
consolidation in cases that has experienced gross human rights abuses under previous 
regimes. Some authors also claim that the majority of poor Africans want democracy to be 
an instrument to improve their living conditions. Lack of delivery of economic and social 
human rights can thus undermine belief in democracy and be a hinder for consolidation. 
We questioned how we can address former gross violations of human rights after democratic 
transitions in ways to promote reconciliation and whether institutional means, such as the 
TRC, is sufficient to promote reconciliation in cases that have also experienced massive 
repression of economic and social rights.  
We discussed six suggested roads to reconciliation after human rights abuses. Criminal 
justice, oblivion, truth, and restorative justice are roads focusing dealing with gross human 
rights violations. Prospective justice has a stronger focus on rebuilding and creating a fair 
future by reform after political repression. Cross-racial contact was suggested as a possible 
road to reconciliation in cases where race has been the main political cleavage. We used 
experiences with different approaches to illustrate that no strategy is superior under all 
circumstances. While criminal justice is the road demanded by international law after gross 
human rights violations, it is not always possible to achieve. Restraints on the new 
democratic regime, such as guarantees of amnesty after pacted transitions, fear that trials 
might lead to coups by powerful antidemocratic forces have often led to lack of national 
prosecutions. In other cases the new government does not have the economic or institutional 
recourses, or even commitment to human rights to go through with trials. We saw that 
international ad-hoc tribunals or trials in foreign countries sometimes have been put up in 
such cases: But these trials often have a limited effect on reconciliation in the countries 
where violations took place. Such trials are also highly costly, and are dependent on the 
getting the attention of the world community to be put up. Resent developments in 
international law have led to the establishment of a permanent international tribunal that can 
prosecute people accused for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes, in cases 
where national governments fail to do so. Although this might prevent future abuses, it is 
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questionable whether this court will overcome the problems faced by former ad hoc 
international courts regarding reconciliation. 
We saw that the justice system serves several functions adding to promoting reconciliation, 
including prevention, rehabilitation, restitution, restatement of values, socialisation, 
regulation and deterrence. We argued that oblivion doesn't fill any of these, but restorative 
justice, uncovering the truth about former abuses and prospective justice are ways to fill 
some of these functions in cases where criminal justice are ruled out. Truth commissions and 
restorative justice shift the focus from the perpetrator to the victim and are often combined. 
Uncovering and acknowledging abuses have been seen as positive for reconciliation.  
We then turned to the South African case, as it is often regarded a success case in democratic 
transition despite a history of widespread gross human rights violations, extreme inequality 
and widespread poverty after massive repression of human rights. Many argue that South 
Africa is moving towards democratic consolidation in spite of a transition form, pact, that 
put restraints on the choice of reconciliation strategy (how to deal with former abuses). We 
saw that South Africa gave up criminal justice by granting amnesty for gross human rights 
abuses as part of the negotiated, pacted, transition. We questioned if the TRC, as an 
institutional path to reconciliation was sufficient to promote reconciliation after the massive 
abuses of economic and social rights. South Africa is still struggling with the legacy of 
abuses including poverty and inequality, and a general overlap between race and class that 
strengthens the divide between the former conflicting groups. We saw that South Africa, by 
the establishment of the TRC, adapted several reconciliation strategies including truth and 
restorative justice to address former gross human rights violations. But the government 
seems to have moved away from these strategies and adapted a reconciliation strategy based 
on social and economic reform (prospective justice). 
We questioned to what extent South Africa is reconciling after the democratic transition, and 
what are hinders for democratic consolidation. As there is no consensus on how to define or 
measure reconciliation, we distinguished between a narrow definition of political 
reconciliation, and a broader, multi-dimensional definition including changes in identity, 
values, attitudes and behaviour at different social levels. We distinguished between different 
social levels reconciliation can take place (national elite/mass level, community, inter and 
intrapersonal), and saw that the TRC wanted to promote reconciliation at all these levels. 
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At the national political level the reconciliatory compromises with amnesty and truth 
commission made the transition to democracy possible in the first place. All the major 
political parties now accept the new political rules, political violence has dropped 
dramatically and militant groups have become politically isolated. This suggests movement 
towards political reconciliation, the form of reconciliation considered most crucial for 
democratic consolidation. But the TRC's actual work seems to have had limited effect at 
promoting reconciliation at the political elite level as all major parties or their leadership 
challenged its findings. The political parties in government hampered the implementation of 
the TRC's recommendations on reparations and thus undermined it's work.  
At the mass level, we saw that amnesty remains deeply unpopular, but reparations and 
sincere apologies from perpetrators had a potential of making amnesty more acceptable for 
the general public. The limited implementation of recommendations thus underscores this 
potential. Even though the TRC was fairly successful at uncovering a rough picture of 
former abuses by making amnesty contingent on revelations of the abuses, overall 
commitment to human rights remains low. There are also indications that the TRC's work 
has worsened cross-racial relations. Particularly white people are unconvinced they played a 
role in former abuses and that the abuses were morally wrong. This made us question why 
the group benefiting from the abuses rejected the TRC findings, and what could have been 
done to involve this group in reconciliatory attempts. As most research on the TRC focus on 
the national level, we did a community study to see if local communities could offer new 
insight on why the TRC had limited success at promoting cross racial reconciliation.     
In Oudtshoorn, an Afrikaner dominated town that had experienced harsh oppression of all 
human rights and gross violations in particular, we found that the TRC process had been 
particularly painful within the white Afrikaner community. Although the TRC only 
scratched the surface of local abuses it established that they had taken place, which was not 
publicly acknowledged by the white population in town. The white population was split over 
how to deal with revealed perpetrators within their own community, and thereby sent mixed 
signals to the other communities about whether the Afrikaners distanced themselves from or 
supported the abuses. National accusations of bias in favour of the liberation movement 
seems to have been a convenient excuse to look away from painful revelations of gross 
human rights violation. This can have made it easier to avoid notions of guilt or 
responsibility (individually or collectively).  Involved groups, as the security police and the 
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army, closed ranks and did not appear before the commission. They thereby gave up an 
opportunity both to acknowledge that violations had taken place and accept responsibility, 
but also give input on their version of the truth about the past conflict.  
We saw that the TRC, by establishing a Post Hearing Community Programme, tried to get 
input in the work for reparations as well as starting a local debate on how to promote 
reconciliation in Oudtshoorn. But the white community felt alienated by the TRC as it didn't 
think that the Afrikaner self-perception as a victimised group was taken into account. This 
group thereby withdrew from TRC initiatives, limiting its potential of starting a cross-racial 
dialogue. Lack of a local implementation body has also severely limited the local impact of 
the programme in terms of reconciliation and development. The governments hesitation to 
implement reparations limited the potential effect on reconciliation in Oudtshoorn. 
We also looked into how the other national reconciliation strategies affected Oudtshoorn, 
and whether contact as a suggested non-institutional path to reconciliation, has had the 
intended effect. We saw that there were improvements in terms of infrastructure and housing 
after RDP programmes, but unemployment and poverty remain widespread. Although a 
minority of blacks and coloureds have climbed into the middle class, little has changed for 
most of the black and coloureds. We saw that the general overlap between race and class still 
hinders cross-racial contact. Residential areas, schools and social meeting places remain 
separate as most black and coloureds can not afford access to traditional white arenas as 
residential areas, schools and certain social meeting places. Inequality in social status are 
also hinders for this contact to be positive for cross-racial reconciliation. Although some 
members of the new black/coloured middle class are forming friendships across the race-
border, this contact remains controversial. Many pointed out that it as easier to reconcile for 
the people that had experienced improvements in living conditions, but for most people little 
have changed. This hampers the suggested non-institutional road to reconciliation, and 
shows that there is a continued need for initiatives working for reconciliation at the 
community level. 
We have seen that South Africans have an instrumental view of democracy. But even though 
the South African Constitution is one of the most progressive in the world when it comes to 
recognising economic and social (and cultural) human rights, the government is struggling 
with delivery: Reconciliatory compromises made in the transitional pact, the international 
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political climate and fear of uproar in the white community has ruled out radical 
redistribution of land: Land that have accumulated in the hands of the white population as a 
direct result of apartheid human rights abuses reserving most land for this population group. 
Landreform could have had the potential of giving the poor majority access to means of 
production and have an impact on addressing poverty. But the apartheid government would 
not have given up power if radical redistribution was an option. South Africans fear that 
attempt now would lead to white uproar, renewal of violent conflict and democratic 
breakdown. At the local level in Oudtshoorn this has led to tensions as the current 
landreform programme, based on voluntary sales of land to the state for redistribution is far 
too limited to fill the need and have any impact on redistribution of wealth or poverty 
reduction. Against this background, with the main social and economic conflicts unresolved 
after almost 10 years of democratic rule, it seems that the TRC's work was too limited to 
deliver strong, long term reconciliation.  
I have argued that South Africa is institutionalising democracy if we understand democracy 
in the minimalist way with a focus on formal civil and political rights and elections. But 
several writers point to the need for a minimum delivery of economic and social rights for 
every part of the population to be able to exercise the democratic rights. South Africa is still 
struggling with violent crime and widespread poverty, making reconciliation hard. Even 
though white South Africans had to give up exclusive political power, they still benefit from 
better access to the economic recourses as a result of the human rights abuses from the past. 
The problems in delivery of economic and social rights is threatening to undermine the 
consolidation of the South African democracy because people have an instrumental view of 
democracy: They want democracy because they hope it will lead to delivery of economic 
and social rights, not because it is seen as a good thing in itself, independent of performance. 
This shows that reconciliation after human rights abuses, despite it being put on top of the 
political agenda during the democratic transition, is still difficult because the legacy of the 
abuses lives on. We have seen that economic and social human rights also count in 
consolidation of democracy: Not only can we distinguish conceptually between 
consolidation of minimalist and maximalist democracies: In South Africa problems of 
delivering economic and social rights, are hampering reconciliation, which in the long run 
can undermine democratic consolidation. 
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To what extent are these findings generalisable? 
When picking South Africa as a case for this study, it was done because it is viewed as a 
success case in democratic transition, despite a violent history where gross human rights 
abuses were frequent, and the negotiated pact made prosecutions of human rights abuses 
impossible. Like many other countries, South Africa is also struggling with delivering 
economic and social human rights, despite South Africa's relatively privileged position as a 
middle income country. But South Africa stand out from other cases because the poverty and 
inequality is a result of human rights abuses, not only lack of delivery. The overlap between 
class and race also makes the injustice in this particularly visible. Whether a similar 
connection between economic/ social human rights, reconciliation and democratic 
consolidation is found elsewhere, is therefore an open ended empirical question.  
Further research 
The Oudtshoorn study shows that poverty and inequality, the result of economic and social 
human rights abuses are hinders for reconciliation across the overlapping race and class 
division. As these findings are based on an explorative qualitative study, there is a need to 
follow up this with quantitative material to see how generalisable these findings are in South 
Africa. It would also be interesting to see whether there is a connection between economic 
and social human rights and reconciliation in other countries, or if this is unique in the South 
African case, as it has experienced extreme repression in this field. 
We still need to know more about the relationship between reconciliation at different social 
levels and how lower social levels affect national reconciliation, which are seen as the most 
relevant for democratic consolidation. Gloppen (2002:8) points out that the growing 
literature on reconciliation assumes a close relationship between reconciliation and 
democratisation, without making it explicit. The Oudtshoorn study indicate that lack of local 
level reconciliation undermines national reconciliatory attempts. But we need to investigate 
closer which levels and degrees of reconciliation are sufficient for democratic consolidation 
to take place. This work shows that economic and social human rights abuses and lack of 
delivery in this field in the form of poverty, can make reconciliation difficult. This creates a 
need to further explore the relationship between economic and social human rights, 
reconciliation and democratic consolidation.  
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APPENDIX 1 
Profile on basic needs in South Africa at the end of apartheid, 1993  
Nutrition 
25% of children under the age of 5 suffered from stunting as a result of chronic malnutrition, 
i.e. 3.37 million children. Malnutrition affects physical and mental development, thus 
placing children at a disadvantage for the rest of their lives. 
Water 
Nearly 25% of South African households did not have access to piped water while only 40% 
actually have water laid on to their homes. Only 17,5% of all African households had access 
to piped water in their homes. Over 99% of white and Indian households had water laid in. 
Energy 
45% of all households did not have access to grid electricity. 75% of African households in 
rural areas are not connected to the national grid. Many households in rural areas are 
experiencing serious energy shortages due to the depletion of fuel wood stocks and because 
alternative energy sources are unaffordable. 
Housing 
Just under 1 million households lived in shacks in South Africa. Around 1/2 million 
households lived in hostels. 
Sanitation 
Nearly 50% of all households had flush toilets. Nearly all white and Indian households had 
toilets. 88% of coloured households had toilets. 34% of African had flush toilets, 41% pit 
latrines and 6.5 % had bucket toilets. 16% of African households had no form of toilet. 
Health, life expectancy 
73 years for whites, 60 years for Africans. 
(Complied from the South African Living Standard and Development Survey 
October 1993, quoted in Deegan1999:129). 
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APPENDIX 2 
South Africa's history and the shaping of group identity before apartheid 
South Africa is a multi racial, multi ethnic society where the black people are a majority, but no ethnic groups 
are large enough to be a majority. It was first inhabited by nomadic hunters and gatherers (the San and 
Khoikhoi) and around the third century black Bantu speaking pastoral/farmers migrated in to the area. 
Europeans entered South Africa in 1478 when Bartholomeu Dias rounded the Cape of good hope, and in 1488 
Vasco da Gama rounded the cape and found the sea route to India in 1498. By the end of the 16th century the 
English and Dutch were beginning to challenge the Portuguese traders, and the Cape became a regular 
stopover to stock up food and water, and was ruled by the Dutch East India company. The first settlers were 
Dutch and German farmers, and later French Huguenots fleeing prosecutions under Luis XIV. This was the 
start of the Boers (farmers), the Afrikaans speaking white population. Some started to migrate into the country, 
missing out on the new intellectual development in Europe: The French revolution and the associated ideas of 
liberalism and democracy.  
The white population imported slaves from Asia, Madagascar and Mozambique and together with Khoisan 
people they became the basis for the coloured population in South Africa. 
Around 1770 the first of 9 frontier wars between the treek Boers and the Xhosa (living west of the great Fish 
River) started in 1779. 
In 1795 the Dutch power was fading, and the British invaded the Cape. The British power was based on race, 
and the colonial powers started using the recourses of raw materials and labour. It introduced missionaries and 
British settlers that were farmers and traders. This was the start of the English speaking white population that 
was highly urbanised, and dominated politics, trade, finance mining and manufacturing. 
Early in the 1800 the difqane (forced migration) started around today's KwaZulu-Natal where a centralised 
militarised state was taking form and reaching its height under the Zulu king Shaka, forcing thousand of people 
to flee with his brutality. This was the start of the Zulu, the largest ethnic group in South Africa today. 
Dissatisfaction with the British rule lead to the great treek in the 1830s: Boers migrating in larger groups 
inland, crossing the Orange river in search for the promised land, that was disintegrated after the difakane. 
The Boers started establishing their own republics and it ended in a series of fights between the Boers and the 
Zulu, heightened at the battle of blood river in 1838 where 3000 Zulu were killed, and only 3 Boers were 
injured. The most significant Boer republics were the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. But when 
diamonds were discovered near Kimberly, conflicts of interests increased and Transvaal was annexed by the 
British. This lead to the first Anglo-Boer war, won by the Boers who established the Zuid Afrikaasche 
Republiek. The finding of gold lead to the growth of Johannesburg with large amounts of black workers and 
white business people. In fear of being colonised by the British, the ZAR formed an alliance with the Orange 
Free State. 
This lead to another Anglo-Boer war, where the British killed 26000 people in concentration camps alone, 
many children. In 1902 the Boer republics became British colonies, with limited self-government from 1906, 
but where the Boers were marginalised as poor farmers when the mining ventures and foreign capital made 
them of little relevance. 
After the war, the Cape Province was the only state where political rights were shared between the races, but 
only 15 % of the registered voters were "non-white". In 1906/7 the republics were given representative 
government, and only white people were eligible. In 1910 the republic of South Africa was established with 
Cape Town as its capital. The three British High Commission territories of what are now Lesotho, Botswana, 
Swaziland and Zimbabwe were excluded from the Union (Murray, Everist & Williams 1996:12-26). 
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APPENDIX 3  
Truth Commissions  
Uganda (1974-75): Commission of Official Inquiry into the Disappearances of people in Uganda since 25 
January 1971. Prompted by international pressure on government to investigate disappearances. Listed 308 
cases. Security forces found guilty. Commissioners were victimised and report ignored, but stands as official 
history. 
Bolivia (1982-84): National Commission of Inquiry into Disappearances. Established by the president after 
change from military to democratic rule. Mandate excluded torture. 8 commissioners. Limited financial support 
from government. Investigated 155 cases (1967-82). Disbanded after 2 years without delivering report. Trials 
against former officials were investigated in mid 1980s. 
Argentina (1983-84): National Commission on the Disappearances of Persons. Established by President. 13 
commissioners, staff of 60. 9 months duration. Narrow focus, mandated to investigate disappearances (8960 
cases) by the former military regime (1976-82) victims of torture or prolonged detention interviewed and 
included in report, but not defined as victims, significant violations excluded. Report Nuna Más published in 
1985 and widely distributed. Names of perpetrators not made public, but leaked. Material later used for 
compensation and in trials against the military regime. Prosecutions were subsequently halted and pardons 
given. 
Zimbabwe (1985): Commission of Inquiry. Investigated repression in Matabeleland where at least 1500 
civilians were killed in 1983. Kept confidential. Defence Minister apologises for killings and torture. 
Continued demands for publication of report.  
Uruguay (1985): Investigative Commission on the Situation of "Disappeared" People and Its Causes. 
Established by parliament. Around 9 commissioners worked for 7 months. Mandate limited to disappearances 
during military rule (1973-82), excluding more prevalent abuses (torture, lengthy detentions etc). Reported on 
164 disappearances and evidence of security force involvement. Forwarded this to the Supreme Court, but this 
has not resulted in prosecution. Public, but not widely distributed report with minimal effect. 
Philippines (1986-87): Presidential committee on human rights. Put up after transition to democracy to 
investigate state crimes during martial law. Amid continued unrest, commission resigned over killing of 
civilian protesters in 1987. Work unfinished, no report or prosecutions.  
Uganda (1986-95): Commission of Inquiry into Violations of Human Rights, established by the President after 
the overthrow of Obote. Broad mandate, investigating human rights abuses by public officials (1962-86). 608 
deponents. 6 commissioners and 5-10 staff, operated for 9 years with progressively deteriorating funding. 
Presented findings, including widespread arbitrary arrests, detention and imprisonment, recommended repeal 
of laws following detention without trial, conclusions and recommendations in 1994. Government accepted 
recommendations, and established human rights commission. 
Nepal (1990-91): Commission of Inquiry to Locate the Persons Disappeared during the Pnchayet period, 
established by Prime Minister. During its year of operation 4 commissioners investigated 100 cases occurring 
between 1961 and 1990. The 1991 report was made public in 1994. Perpetrators were not named. 
Chile (1990-91): National Commission on Truth and Reconciliation, established by the President after change 
from military to democratic regime. 8 commissioners, balanced between the parties, were tasked with 
investigating disappearances (3428), killings, torture resulting in death and kidnappings by both sides of the 
conflict during the junta (1973-1990). Commission operated for 9 months and had a staff of 60. Investigated 
2920 cases in depth. The 1991 report (the Retting report) was made public, but perpetrators not named. 
Recommendations implemented; Reconciliation and Compensation Corporations set up. Material from the 
report was used to identify victims for compensation. Amnesty law barred prosecution, but the report later 
become basis for the Spanish extradition request for General Pinochet.  
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Chile (1990-96): Reconciliation and Compensation Corporation. Further investigation into abuses under the 
Pinochet regime (1972-90). Report published in 1996. Found further 899 cases of people who had died or 
disappeared. total of victims of political repression: 3197 of whom 2095 are known to have died and 1102 are 
officially classified as disappeared. 
Chad (1991-92): Commission of Inquiry on the Crimes and Misappropriations Commanded by the Ex-
president Hambré… Established by the new President to investigate killings (3900 cases), torture and arbitrary 
detentions committed by the former regime (1982-90). 12-16 commissioners operated for 10 months before 
finalising the 1992 report. Report on 40 000 killings and involvement of US, France, Iraq and Egypt in training 
of the military. First commission to name perpetrators (only so far to publish photos of the perpetrators) -many 
whom were in high offices. No purges or trials. Mainly PR exercise for the new government. Human rights 
abuses continue. 
South Africa (1992): Commission of Inquiry into Complaints by former ANC Prisoners and Detainees, "The 
Skweyiya Commission". ANC investigation into allegations by former members of human rights abuses in 
camps outside South Africa (1979-91). ANC accepted findings, notably "staggering brutality" in camps. 
Against the naming or prosecution of individuals. Accused of bias and lack of due process. 
Germany (1992-94): Commission of Inquiry for the assessment of History and Consequences of the SED 
Dictatorship in Germany was established by parliament to investigate human rights abuses in DDR between 
1949 and 1989. Composed of political representatives and experts. Focus on political-historical analysis rather 
than investigation of individual human rights violations. Academic papers commissioned and presented at 
public hearings. 27 commissioners and a staff of around 20 took 3 years to complete the 15 000 page report. 
This academic exercise was combined with individual's right to review own Stasi files. 
El Salvador (1992-93): Commission on the Truth for El Salvador was established by the UN as part of the UN 
moderated peace accord. Staffed and funded entirely by non-nationals. Broad mandate. 3 commissioners and 
15-45 staff members. 22 000 cases of human rights abuses (disappeared, killed, tortured or kidnapped), 
committed by both sides between 1980-91). 32 cases were investigated in depth during the 8 months the 
commission operated. The 1993 report named over 40 perpetrators and made mandatory recommendations. 
Criticised for inadequate investigations of death squads. Shortly after publication of the report, amnesty laws 
was passed, but some of the named perpetrators were removed from positions. Key recommendations were 
implemented after international pressure. 
Rwanda (1993): International Commission of Investigation on Human Rights Violations in Rwanda. 
Established after agreement between government and rebels in connection with cease fire to investigate abuses 
during civil war (1990-93). Mass graves unearthed. Official welcome by Hutu government but killings start 
again immediately; commission leaves the country. Brought pressure on Belgium and to lesser extent France to 
stop support for government. 
South Africa (1993): Commission of Inquiry into certain allegations of cruelty and human rights abuses against 
ANC prisoners and detainees by ANC members, "The Motsuenyane Commission" investigating abuses from 
1979-91 after criticism of lack of independence and due process in the Skweyiya Commission. Ran like a trial. 
Report finds severe abuses in camps. Perpetators were named. ANC accept report but deny systematic policy: 
Call for a wider truth commission in South Africa. 
Sri Lanka (1994-97): Commissions of Inquiry into the Involuntary Removal or Disappearance of persons. 3 
geographically distinct commissions, each with 3 commissioners and a staff of 5-20, established by President. 
Mandated to investigate human rights violations from 1998-94. 20 000 cases presented for the commissions 
during 3 years of operation. Each commission presented separate final reports. Released after international 
pressure. Some perpetrators were named, and several have later been prosecuted. limited reparations 
programme. 
Haiti (1995-96): National Commission for Truth and Justice. Established by President following the restoration 
of Aristide by a US lead multinational force. Investigated violations committed by former regime (1991-94). 
8600 cases were presented to the commission. 7 commissioners and staff of 50-100 operated for 10 months. 
Report was presented in 1996, and made public in 1997. List of perpetrators were included, but not released. 
Recommended an international tribunal to try perpetrators. 
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Burundi (1995-96): International Commission of Inquiry. Established by UN Security Council on request by 
Burundian government to report on human rights abuses occurring between 1993-95. 5 commissioners 
operated for 10 months before presenting their report to the UN in June 1996. (Due to a coup the release was 
delayed until October). International prosecution and new commission to investigate pre 1993 abuses. 
Renewed violence prevented further action. 
South Africa (1995-2001): Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Established by Parliament. 17 
Commissioners mandated to investigate gross human rights abuses of all sides of the conflict (1960-94). Staff 
of 300, annual budget of US$18 mill. Strong powers of investigation. Amnesty for political crimes upon full 
disclosure. Public, broadcasted hearings. Report naming perpetrators and more than 21 000 victims published 
in 1998, after 2, 5 years in operation. Recommendations on reparation policy (partly implemented) and 
prosecution (not implemented). Amnesty committee continued hearings. Final report halted in the legal system. 
Criticised by all sides but has much support also. 
Ecuador (1996-97): Truth and Justice Commission established by ministry of Government and police to 
investigate human rights violations between 1979-96. 7 commissioners disbanded after 5 months without 
finishing report, due to lack of support and recourses. 
Guatemala (1997-99): Commission for Historical Clarification, established by UN as part of UN moderated 
peace accord to investigate killings, disappearances, torture and rape committed by both sides of the conflict 
(1962-96). Broad mandate. Cases of 42 275 victims presented to the commission (which estimated a total of 
200 000 killed or disappeared in the 34 years of armed conflict). The commission operated for 18 months, had 
3 commissioners (one international and 2 national) and a staff up to 200. Restricted reporting powers, no 
naming of perpetrators, but documented involvement by "the highest authorities of the State". 
Truth Commissions are currently underway or in the process of being established in Nigeria (1999-), Sierra 
Leone (2000-), East Timor, Indonesia, Bosnia a.o. (Source: Gloppen 2002:20-21 and Christie 2000:54-58) 
Other Acts and Commissions dealing with Human Rights violations in South Africa 
1989 The McNally Commission: Examined claims of a hit squad after allegations by former police captain 
Dirk Coetzee. Commission found allegations to be unfounded. Later court cases showed the allegations to be 
largely true.  
The Commission of Inquiry Regarding the prevention of Public Violence and Intimidation (Goldstone 
Commission) looked into human rights abuses committed by the security forces. 
The Steyn Commission followed up the work of the Goldstone commission and examined the responsibility of 
high-level military personnel, resulting in 23 high-ranking officers having to resign.  
1990 Indemnity Act: Gave amnesty to ANC personnel in order to facilitate their return to South Africa (After 
initial negotiations between ANC and NP). This temporary indemnity was specifically aimed at ANC members 
who needed a guarantee that they would not be imprisoned when returning to South Africa during the 
negotiation process. 
1992 The further Indemnity Act: Gave the State President sole discretion to grant amnesty to individuals who 
committed an act with political intent and whose release might promote negotiations and peaceful solutions. 
Was blocked in parliament, but was pushed through. 
1995 The Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act: Established to fulfil the constitutional 
obligation of granting amnesty. The basis for the TRC. (Van der Merwe 1999:ch.5.2a) 
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